McBride, In re

• Decision Date: 11 January 1956
• Docket Number: No. 34456,34456
• Parties: , 58 O.O. 242 In re McBRIDE.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 419

164 Ohio St. 419

132 N.E.2d 113, 58 O.O. 242

In re McBRIDE.

No. 34456.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Jan. 11, 1956.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The power to admit attorneys to the practice of law and to disbar, suspend or otherwise discipline them after admission rests inherently in the judicial branch of the government.

2. The legislative branch may provide by statute standards and qualifications for admission to the bar and methods for the initiation and conduct of proceedings to disbar, suspend or otherwise discipline attorneys for specified causes, but such legislation is to be interpreted as an aid to and not as a limitation on the power of the judicial branch in these respects.

3. Statutes authorizing the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys on stated grounds do not operate as a restriction on the general powers of courts over attorneys, who are their officers, to disbar, suspend or otherwise discipline them on grounds other than those specified by statute.

4. The inherent powers of courts to disbar, suspend or otherwise discipline attorneys are not affected by recognizing and following the regulations and practice prescribed by statute on the subject.

5. The conduct of an attorney in the pursuit of his profession which may subject him to disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary measures is that which brings discredit upon himself, his profession and the courts and which violates his oath of office and the recognized and accepted code or rules governing his profession.

6. The solicitation of business by an attorney or his employment of others for a consideration to secure business for him is unethical and unprofessional conduct violative of the code or rules of his profession and makes him amenable to proceedings for disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action.

Acting under the provisions of Section 1707 et seq., General Code, Section 4705.02 et seq., Revised Code, the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, upon information imparted to them by the Grievance Committee of the Mahoning County Bar Association that Wilbert B. McBride, an attorney at law of the city of Youngstown and duly admitted to the bar of Ohio, was probably guilty of misconduct as such attorney, appointed three attorneys at law of Mahoning County as a committee to prepare and file written charges against McBride.

Such charges embracing four specifications were duly prepared and filed, and a certified copy thereof was served on the respondent. The first specification charges respondent with having solicited employment in June 1950 and thereafter from a designated person (in a case involving a claim for damages for personal injuries); the second charges that respondent during the summer of 1952 endeavored to employ another person for remuneration to solicit professional employment for him; the third charges respondent with having attempted to impede and obstruct the investigations being made of his conduct as an attorney by the Grievance Committee of the Mahoning County Bar Association, and that he vilified the members of such committee by calling them vile and obscene names; the fourth charges that by reason of the misconduct set forth in specifications 1 to 3, inclusive, the respondent violated his oath of office as an attorney.

The matter came on for hearing before a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of another county, sitting by designation, upon the charges and specifications presented, the answer of respondent and upon a considerable amount of evidence introduced by both the committee and the respondent.

Whereupon the court found that all proceedings were had in accordance with law, and that respondent in his capacity and office as an attorney at law was guilty of misconduct involving moral turpitude as set out in the specifications contained in the charges; and the court suspended respondent from the practice of the profession of the law for and during the period of one year from February 26, 1954, in all courts of the state of Ohio.

An appeal on questions of law to the Court of Appeals resulted in an affirmance of the judgment below, and the allowance of a motion to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record places the matter before this court for a decision on its merits.

Clarence M. Addison, Columbus, for appellant-respondent.

Paul E. Stevens, Raleigh P. Swanner and Henry C. Robinson, Youngstown, for appellee committee.

ZIMMERMAN, Judge.

Section 1707, General Code, Section 4705.02, Revised Code, reads as follows:

'The supreme court, court of appeals or court of common pleas may suspend or remove an attorney at law (from office) or may give private or public reprimand to him as the nature of the offense may warrant, for misconduct or unprofessional conduct in office involving moral turpitude, or for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Such suspension or removal shall operate as a suspension or removal in all the courts of the state of Ohio. * * * Judges of such state courts are required to cause proceedings to be instituted against an attorney at law, when it comes to the knowledge of any judge or when brought to his knowledge by the bar association of the county in which such attorney practices that he may be guilty of any of the causes for suspension, removal, or reprimand.' (Emphasis supplied.)

An important question in this case which should be squarely met and definitely decided is whether the statutory causes for the suspension, removal or reprimand of an attorney at law are exclusive and binding on the courts. There is language in the opinion in the case of In re Hawke, 107 Ohio St. 341, 349, 350, 140 N.E. 583, 585, which would indicate that the above question should be answered in the affirmative, but this court definitely held in the first two paragraphs of the syllabus in the case of In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N.E. 39, that the Supreme Court of Ohio has inherent jurisdiction to disbar an attorney as an incident of its organization as a court as well as from its power to admit to the bar, and, furthermore, that Section 563, Revised Statutes, Section 1707, General Code, Section 4705.02, Revised Code, is but a regulative provision which does not more than recognize the existing power of the courts.

In other later cases this court has said that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law and to suspend, disbar or otherwise discipline them rests inherently in the judicial branch of the government. State ex rel. Turner v. Albin, 118 Ohio St. 527, 161 N.E. 792; Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650; Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288. And see State ex rel. Thatcher, v. Brough, 15 Ohio Cir.Ct.R.,N.S., 97, 23 Ohio Cir.Dec. 257, affirmed without written opinion in 90 Ohio St. 382, 108 N.E. 1133.

Upon admission to the bar lawyers become officers of the courts in which they are authorized to practice and are responsible to the courts wherein they are such officers for professional misconduct.

The holding of this court in In re Thatcher, supra, finds abundant support in numerous cases from other jurisdictions. The matter is well stated in the case of In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 915, 63 S.W.2d 672, 675, as follows:

'It is not always easy to determine what objects are naturally within the range or orbit of a particular department of government, but it will scarcely be denied that a primary object essentially within the orbit of the judicial department is that courts properly function in the administration of justice for which purpose they were created, and in the light of judicial history they cannot long continue to do this without power to admit and disbar attorneys who from time immemorial have in a peculiar sense been regarded as their officers. Since the object sought is not naturally within the orbit of the legislative department, the power to accomplish it is in its exercise judicial ant not legislative, although in the harmonious co-ordination of powers necessary to effectuate the aim and end of government it may be regulated by statute to aid in the accomplishment of the object but not to frustrate or destroy it.'

Later on in the opinion it is remarked, 'The great weight of authority is that statutory grounds of disbarment are not exclusive.' Among the cases cited in substantiation of this statement is In re Thatcher, supra.

In State Bar Commission ex rel. Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okl. 745, 763, 131 P. 703, 711, L.R.A.1915D, 1218, the observation is made:

"While the statutes of many of the states authorize the suspension or removal of attorneys upon specified grounds, it has generally been held that such statutes do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds."

Likewise, in In re Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 196, 47 N.E.2d 12, 21, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:

'Statutes purporting to regulate admission to the bar * * * are to be interpreted as 'making provision in aid of the judicial department in reaching a proper selection of those qualified for admission as attorneys to practice in the courts.' * * * And statutes stating the grounds upon which an attorney may be disbarred also are to be so interpreted, and are not to be interpreted as limiting the grounds for disbarment.'

Of similar import are the cases of Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 87 N.E.2d 838; In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392; In re Hartford, 282 Mich. 124, 275 N.W. 791; In re Delano, 58 N.H. 5, 42 Am.Rep. 555; Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah, 548, 133 P.2d 325, 144 A.L.R. 839; and In re Lambuth, ...