Mcbride v. Csx Transp. Inc

• Decision Date: 16 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-3557.,08-3557.
• Citation: 598 F.3d 388
• Parties: Robert McBRIDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

598 F.3d 388

Robert McBRIDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-3557.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 29, 2009.

Decided March 16, 2010.

Michael A. Gross, St. Louis, MO, Lawrence M. Mann (argued), Alper & Mann Bethesda, MD, Robert P. Marcus, Kujawski & Associates, P.C., O'Fallon, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dan Himmelfarb (argued), Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Robert McBride instituted this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, seeking compensation for an injury that he sustained while performing switching operations for his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"). A jury returned a verdict in Mr. McBride's favor, and the district court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. CSX appealed, and, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we now affirm the judgment of the district court.

IBACKGROUND

A. Facts

CSX operates an interstate system of railroads. In addition to transporting freight over long distances, it makes "local" runs; that is, it picks up individual rail cars for long-distance transportation or delivers cars to their final destinations. The process of adding or removing cars during these local runs is called "switching." When performing switching operations, engineers are required to start and stop more frequently than when transporting freight over long distances.

Trains use multiple brake systems in slowing to a stop. The automatic brake slows the cars of the train; a separate "independent brake" slows the locomotives. CSX explains the operation of the braking systems in this way:

The automatic brake normally activates the independent brake as well, and careless use of the former can cause the locomotives to brake too quickly, leading the rear cars to run into those in front. To slow a long train, engineers apply the automatic brake while releasing the independent brake, a maneuver known as "actuating" or "bailing off the independent brake. Standard practice is to actuate the independent brake for four seconds per locomotive.

Appellant's Br. 7 (citations omitted). On some heavier, "wide-body" locomotives, the independent brake is actuated by pressing a button on the side of the brake handle located in front of the engineer's seat. On smaller locomotives, the independent brake is actuated by pushing the handle down with one hand.

Mr. McBride began working for CSX in 1996 as a conductor. In 1999, he became a locomotive engineer, and, from 1999 until 2004, his work consisted primarily of operating a train "from Evansville, Indiana, to Nashville, Tennessee, and back again." Tr. II at 87. However, Mr. McBride was interested in transferring to a different division "where they worked locals, " id. at 88, because engineers on local runs worked regular, predictable hours and did not often spend nights away from home. Mr McBride explained that the process of qualifying to operate on a new territoryinvolved being paired with a supervising engineer, who "explains to you as you're running the train where everything is, how the land lays, just the sightings. Explains the whole territory to you." Id. at 89.

On April 12, 2004, Mr. McBride went on a qualifying run with supervising engineer D.J. Baker. The run was going to entail switching in at least four locations. When Mr. McBride saw the train that he would be operating, he was concerned because the two front engines were wide bodies which were followed by three conventional cabs. Mr. McBride's concern stemmed from the fact that he never had switched with a wide body cab before. See id. at 91. Mr. McBride explained that "[tjhey're not used for switching. From Evansville to Nashville, they are used for coal trains and grain trains. So I was never trained to use one for switching. They are not used for that." Id. Mr. McBride expressed this concern to Baker. Baker then went to speak with the yardmaster, ¹ but the yardmaster instructed Mr. McBride and Baker to "take them as is." Id. at 92. Mr. McBride and Baker complied with this instruction.

Mr. McBride's run began at 10:00 a.m. Mr. McBride testified that, at the first stop, he switched cars for approximately two and one-half to three hours. During this time, Mr. McBride testified, he was using the independent brake and the actuation button "the whole time." Id. at 95. At the following two stops, Mr. McBride performed switching operations for two hours and one and one-half hours, respectively. Mr. McBride stated that "[jjust all day long I had been doing that, grabbing it, pushing the button, grabbing it, pushing the button. That's constant what I was doing." Id. at 98. Mr. McBride was performing switching operations at the final stop, at approximately 8:00 p.m., when the following events took place:

[T]he conductor told me to release the brakes.... [W]hen the independent brakes is [sic] applied, its forward. So I was reaching to release them. By then my hands and everything is [sic] numb because I've been doing it for approximately seven or eight hours constantly.

Now I ran my hand into the independent brake, and it felt like—like somebody threw gas on my hand and set it afire.

Id. at 99. Mr. McBride screamed and immediately put his hand in his cooler. Baker operated the train during their return to Evansville.

Mr. McBride underwent two surgeries on his hand and extensive physical therapy as a result of his injury. He returned to work in February 2005; however, he continued to experience pain, numbness and some limitations in the use of his hand.

B. District Court Proceedings

Mr. McBride eventually sued CSX under the FELA for damages resulting from his injury. His theory of negligence was that, because of the configuration of the trains to which he was assigned, the switching operation required constant use of the actuator button. This use caused his hand to fatigue, and, at some point, due to the fatigue, his hand fell and hit the independent brake.

At trial, Mr. McBride proffered the following instruction on causation, which followed in substance the Seventh Circuit Pattern Instruction.² The proffered instruction stated:

Defendant "caused or contributed to" Plaintiffs injury if Defendant's negligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing about the injury. The mere fact that an injury occurred does not necessarily mean that the injury was caused by negligence.

R.43 at 13. The pattern instruction cites as its authority Rogers v. Missouri, Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957), which, according to the drafters of the instruction, stands for the proposition that a "relaxed standard of causation" applies in FELA cases and that the "common law standard of proximate cause does not apply." Fed. Civ. Jury Instructions of the Seventh Cir. 9.02, cmt. a.

CSX countered with its own causation instruction:

In order to establish that an injury was caused by the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff must show that (i) the injury resulted "in whole or in part" from the defendant's negligence, and (ii) the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury.

R.44 at 17. CSX also proffered the following instruction defining "proximate cause":

When I use the expression "proximate cause, " I mean any cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury complained of. It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it concurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it causes the injury.

Id. at 14. In support of its proffered instructions, CSX maintained that, in Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 127 S.Ct. 799, 166 L.Ed.2d 638 (2007), the Supreme Court had clarified that Rogers had not abandoned commonlaw proximate cause, and, in fact, proximate cause was the proper standard for causation in cases under the FELA.

The court rejected CSX's proffered instruction. Instead, the court used Mr. McBride's causation instruction, and the jury returned a verdict in Mr. McBride's favor. After unsuccessfully challenging the jury's verdict before the district court, CSX appealed.

IIANALYSIS

The central issue in this case is the proper standard for causation under the FELA. Stated another way, the question we must resolve is whether Section 1 of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51, abrogates the common-law rule of proximate cause. We begin with the applicable statutory command. Section 51 of Title 45 provides in relevant part:

Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier insuch commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.

45 U.S.C. § 51 (emphasis added). The question of causation centers on the meaning of "resulting in whole or in part from the negligence... of such carrier." Id.

CSX submits that this language does not establish a causation standard. Instead according to CSX, common-law proximate causation is—and always has been—the proper causation standard under the FELA. ...