Stowe v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.. (“amtrak”)

• Decision Date: 23 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 08–CV–4767 (RER).,08–CV–4767 (RER).
• Citation: 793 F.Supp.2d 549
• Parties: Ellicia STOWE, Plaintiff,v.NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (“AMTRAK”), Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

793 F.Supp.2d 549

Ellicia STOWE, Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (“AMTRAK”), Defendant.

No. 08–CV–4767 (RER).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

June 23, 2011.

[793 F.Supp.2d 552]

Elizabeth Blair Starkey, Paul T. Hofmann, Hofmann & Schweitzer, New York, NY, Paul G. Moody, Willard J. Moody, Moody Law Firm, Portsmouth, VA, Rafael Vergara, Roseberg Musso & Weiner LLP, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff.Mark Seth Landman, Elizabeth Gannett Land, Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, NY, for Defendant.MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RAMON E. REYES, JR., United States Magistrate Judge.

Ellicia Stowe (“Stowe” or “plaintiff”) seeks damages from National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak” or “defendant”) under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) for personal injuries she sustained during the performance of her duties as an Amtrak employee. I presided over the five-day jury trial that began on October 25, 2010. At the end of trial, the jury returned a verdict for defendant finding that Amtrak's negligence, which was admitted, did not cause any of Stowe's alleged injuries. Plaintiff has since moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Amtrak employed Stowe beginning in February 1998. Since that time, she has worked for Amtrak in various positions.

[793 F.Supp.2d 553]

At the time of the incident in question, Stowe worked as lead cash clerk at Amtrak's Penn Station Ticket Office. As part of her duties, Stowe managed money for the ticket agents, which required her to utilize a large safe located in her office. During Stowe's shift on August 14, 2006, the safe door became unhinged, fell, and allegedly struck her. Stowe claims that the incident caused physical injuries to her back, chest/breast, shoulder, and neck, and mental/emotional injuries including post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and fear of cancer. Prior to trial, Amtrak conceded that it failed to properly maintain the safe door. Having admitted negligence, the only issues remaining for the jury were whether the incident caused Stowe's alleged injuries, and the amount of damages as a result.

At trial, the jury heard testimony about the day of the incident from Stowe, her mother Monica Medina, co-worker Robert Ermer, Amtrak Police Officer Paul Pisano, and Amtrak labor representative John Michael (Charles) Jackson. Stowe, Medina, and friend and co-worker Shelley Ann Martin also testified as to Stowe's present-day condition, and what effects the incident had on her daily living. Cathy Ryan, an Amtrak manager, testified as to Stowe's recent work history, internal Amtrak documents about the incident, and Stowe's medical leave. The jury also heard medical testimony from experts Dr. Leonard Bleicher, Dr. Arthur Wardell, and Dr. Edward Crane, treating physician Dr. Lauren Stimler–Levy and treating psychologist Nancy Julius, Ph.D.¹ The jury also watched the security video from the day of the incident and surveillance video taken of Stowe starting one week after the incident through December 2009. On October 29, 2010 after hearing all the evidence, the jury delivered a verdict for Amtrak, finding that Amtrak's negligence did not cause any of Stowe's alleged injuries.

Stowe argues that she is entitled to a new trial because: (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the verdict was against the weight of the law; (3) the Court erred in instructing the jury on causation; (4) the Court erred in granting Amtrak's motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to Stowe's fear of cancer claim; (5) the Court erred in admitting evidence of Stowe's sexual history; (6) the Court demonstrated antipathy toward Stowe's case; and (7) the verdict is defective as a matter of law due to juror misconduct.

DISCUSSION I. Standards for Granting a New Trial

A trial court may order a new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has [previously] been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1)(A). However, a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 ordinarily “should not be granted unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.” Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2002). As such, a new trial is warranted if the trial court finds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or law, DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir.1998), or finds that “errors [were] likely to have had a substantial effect on the jury's resolution of the factual disputes at

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trial,” Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir.2005).II. Jury Verdict was Not Against the Weight of Evidence or LawA. Amtrak's Opening Statements Did Not Constitute a Binding Admission

Plaintiff argues that as a matter of law, she was entitled to some damages since defense counsel admitted that she injured her left shoulder and chest as a result of the incident. (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Plaintiff Ellicia Stowe for Post–Trial Relief (“Pl. Mem.”), dated Nov. 26, 2010, at 4.) In his opening statement, defense counsel made the following statements that could arguably be construed as admissions against Amtrak:

• “Amtrak admits they were negligent. Amtrak admits that Ms. Stowe was injured. Amtrak admits she is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation. We are not contesting any of that.” (Tr. at 19.) ²

• “But what happened to Ms. Stowe? And I'll tell you exactly. She injured her left shoulder. It hit her and you will see it in the video exactly how it plays out[ ]. You can't really see if it hits or not but we are not contesting that it didn't hit her.” ( Id. at 19–20.) ³

It is true that an attorney's statements during opening and closing arguments may constitute admissions of his client; however, to bind the client by such statements, they must constitute “a clear and unambiguous admission of fact.” United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1984) (citing Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263, 26 L.Ed. 539 (1880)); see also Butynski v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 592 F.3d 272, 277 (1st Cir.2010) (explaining that to qualify as a binding admission, counsel's opening “statement, when viewed in context, must be clear and unambiguous”); Robinson v. McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 615 F.3d 861, 872 (7th Cir.2010) (quoting MacDonald v. General Motors Corp., 110 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir.1997) (“[I]n order to qualify as judicial admissions, an attorney's statements must be deliberate, clear and unambiguous.”)). All inferences must be made in favor of the party against whose interests the admission was allegedly made, particularly considering that “opening statement [s] of counsel [are] ordinarily intended to do no more than to inform the jury in a general way of the nature of the action and defense so that they may better be prepared to understand the evidence.”

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Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415, 54 S.Ct. 487, 78 L.Ed. 882 (1934).

Contrary to Stowe's contention, counsel's statement that she “is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation” did not unequivocally mean that she was entitled to some compensation. Rather, counsel acknowledged that a plaintiff who is injured as the result of negligence is generally entitled to compensation for such injuries. The statement intimated to the jury that Amtrak's theory of the case was not if any compensation was appropriate, but rather how much. However, the statement does not constitute a clear and unambiguous admission that would take the issue of whether she was entitled to anything out of the jury's consideration.

The most troubling statements, and the only ones upon which Amtrak's counsel could have bound its client to a finding for Stowe, were “Amtrak admits that Ms. Stowe was injured” and “[s]he injured her left shoulder.” (Tr. at 19.) Yet, Amtrak's counsel during summation directly addressed the statement, and recanted:

And the first question you're going to have to decide when you go back to talk is did she have any injury? Now, I told you you know right up front we don't contest that. Well, my eyes have been opened a little bit by this trial but that's your call whether or not she had got injured.

( Id. at 1022–23.) Moreover, throughout the trial, Amtrak consistently challenged not only the extent of Stowe's injuries, but whether she sustained any compensable injury at all. Viewing the identified statements about Stowe's injured left shoulder in isolation, Amtrak seemingly conceded that, at the very least, she had a compensable shoulder injury; however, in the context of the opening, wherein counsel qualified his statements as what he thought the evidence would show, and that he was pointing out “landmarks to look for,” ( id. at 19), his statements were not so clear and unambiguous as to qualify as a binding admission by Amtrak that Stowe injured her left shoulder.

In fact, during plaintiff's opening statement to the jury, her counsel said: “The railroad is saying that she never got hurt.” ( Id. at 12.) Equally telling, plaintiff never moved for judgment as a matter of law that she sustained shoulder injuries based on Amtrak's alleged admission. She did not object to Amtrak's statement during summation that the jury had to decide whether she was injured at all. Nor did she object to the inclusion of “shoulder injuries” as part of the causation question on the verdict sheet. And so, it seems that Stowe did not reasonably perceive Amtrak's opening statement as a binding admission during trial. Drawing all inferences in Amtrak's favor, counsel's opening statements did not constitute a binding admission that Stowe suffered a compensable shoulder injury, and therefore, the question of whether Stowe suffered any injury at all remained one for the jury...