McBride v. Jacobs, 13927.

• Decision Date: 06 August 1957
• Docket Number: No. 13927.,13927.
• Citation: 247 F.2d 595,101 US App. DC 189
• Parties: Daniel McBRIDE, Appellant, v. Louis JACOBS, Superintendent, National Training School for Boys, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

101 US App. DC 189, 247 F.2d 595 (1957)

Daniel McBRIDE, Appellant, v. Louis JACOBS, Superintendent, National Training School for Boys, Appellee.

No. 13927.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued July 5, 1957.

Decided August 6, 1957.

Mr. James J. Laughlin, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Messrs. Hubert B. Pair and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the Dist. of Columbia, with whom Messrs. Chester H. Gray, Corp. Counsel, Milton D. Korman, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Andrew G. Conlyn, Asst. Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before EDGERTON, Chief Judge, and PRETTYMAN and BURGER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a District Court order discharging a writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the petition therefor. The petition urged that appellant, a minor, had been unlawfully committed to a training school by the Juvenile Court in that he was not advised by the court of his right to counsel and was without counsel when he admitted committing an unlawful act. The record discloses that prior to the hearing appellant's mother was notified in writing of her son's right to counsel and that the mother subsequently signed a statement acknowledging she had been advised of appellant's right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court in his behalf.

This court has previously indicated that Congress intended to allow a juvenile offender to be represented by counsel, which of course includes the right to be advised of such right. From and after May 17, 1956, our holding in Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 375, 236 F.2d 666, 670, requires¹ first, "the juvenile must be advised that he has a right to engage counsel or to have counsel named on his behalf," and second "where that right exists, the court must be assured that any waiver of it is intelligent and competent." (Emphasis added.) The latter implies that where a waiver is relied on, the Juvenile Court must affirmatively find as a fact that by reason of "age, education, and information, and all other pertinent facts" the minor is able to and did make an intelligent waiver. See Williams v. Huff, 1944, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 32, 142 F.2d 91, 92.

The record before us does not show that the judge of the Juvenile Court passed on both these requirements or indicated they had been complied with, i. e., the juvenile does not appear to have been advised of his right to counsel, as one of 17 years must be advised, even if we assume, arguendo, that the mother was so advised and made an intelligent and competent waiver.

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