McCabe v. ADP Total Source FL XVIII, Inc., ED 110169
| Docket Number | ED 110169 |
| Decision Date | 27 September 2022 |
| Citation | 653 S.W.3d 420 |
| Parties | Martin MCCABE, Appellant, v. ADP TOTAL SOURCE FL XVIII, INC. and Division of Employment Security, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Martin McCabe Acting Pro Se, 3515 Giles, Apt. 1, Saint Louis, MO 63116, for Appellant.
Sarah L. Lipp, PO Box 59, 421 E. Dunklin Street, Jefferson City, MO 65104, ADP TOTAL SOURCE FL XVIII, INC Pro Se, PO Box 67748, St. Louis, MO 63166, for Respondents.
Appellant Martin McCabe ("McCabe"), acting pro se , appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission disqualifying him from unemployment benefits. McCabe argues the Commission erred in that he had good cause to leave his job with ADP Total Source FL XVIII, Inc. ("ADP Total Source"), and he left for a more remunerative job. We affirm the decision of the Commission.
McCabe filed for unemployment benefits on April 21, 2020. A deputy for the Division of Employment Security determined that McCabe was disqualified from receiving benefits because he voluntarily resigned from ADP Total Source without good cause attributable to his work or his employer under Section 288.050.1
McCabe appealed the deputy's determination to the Appeals Tribunal. On February 18, 2021, the Appeals Tribunal heard McCabe's appeal by telephone conference, at which McCabe testified.
McCabe testified that he began working for ADP Total Source on January 7, 2019. He worked in the Hopewell division as a community service specialist offering mental health services. As of January 3, 2020, McCabe voluntarily resigned from his position with ADP Total Source. McCabe testified that, before he voluntarily resigned, he had been working part-time with Uber and Lyft. He testified that his primary reason for resigning was that he "just chose personally to start working full time for Uber and Lyft as a private contractor." McCabe referred to his position with Uber and Lyft as "private contractor work."
McCabe testified that a secondary reason for his resignation was an ongoing conflict with his direct supervisor regarding the time at which McCabe was required to arrive at work each morning. Company policy required each employee to work five billable hours every day but allowed for a flex schedule in which employees could determine the hours they would work between 8 A.M. and 5 P.M. According to McCabe, his supervisor started requiring him to arrive by 9 A.M. or earlier, contrary to company policy. McCabe was unable to meet this requirement due to his need to deliver his son to school at 9 A.M.
Finally, McCabe also cited his inability to complete requirements for his master's degree program due to work as another factor in his decision to voluntarily resign.
The Appeals Tribunal made findings of fact and conclusions of law and affirmed the deputy's decision that McCabe was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The Appeals Tribunal found that McCabe voluntarily left work at ADP Total Source. It concluded that McCabe's desire to deal with his childcare responsibilities and educational pursuits during work hours did not provide him with good cause to voluntarily leave.
Consistent with McCabe's testimony, the Appeals Tribunal also found:
Before claimant left his employment with the employer[,] he was working for Uber and Lyft on a part-time basis. Claimant voluntarily resigned so he could work fulltime with the other companies. The claimant performed services for Uber and Lyft as an independent contractor.
Based on those findings of fact, the Appeals Tribunal concluded that McCabe quit, first and foremost, because he wanted to work as an independent contractor for Uber and Lyft full-time. McCabe did not quit his job to take a more remunerative job, and his Uber and Lyft endeavors were continuations of self-employment and not jobs.
On September 2, 2021, McCabe sought review by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. A two-member majority of the Commission found the decision of the Appeals Tribunal was supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Commission adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Appeals Tribunal and affirmed its decision.
McCabe now appeals to this Court.
Appellate review of the Commission's decision in an unemployment case is governed by Section 288.210, which reads in pertinent part:
This means that, in the absence of fraud, the Commission's factual findings are conclusive and binding if supported by competent and substantial evidence. Burns v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Comm'n, 845 S.W.2d 553, 554–555 (Mo. banc 1993) ; Lashea v. Fin-Clair Corp. , 30 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). "We will affirm the Commission's decision if we find, upon a review of the whole record, that there is sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision." Smith v. Greyhound Bus Co. , 477 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).
The Court is not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law or its application of law to the facts. Kimble v. Div. of Emp. Sec. , 388 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). We review questions of law de novo. Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp. , 271 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Mo. banc 2008).
McCabe presents two points on appeal. In his first point, McCabe argues the Commission erred in finding that he left work without good cause attributable to the work or his employer. McCabe cites his legal obligations to deliver his son to school on time, in conjunction with what he characterizes as unreasonable demands by his supervisor, as good cause to quit under Section 288.050.1. In his second point, McCabe contends the Commission erred by failing to recognize his planned full-time work with Uber and Lyft as a more remunerative job than his position with ADP Total Source under Section 288.050.1(1)(a). We address McCabe's points seriatim.
The primary purpose of the Missouri Employment Security Law is to provide benefits to persons "unemployed through no fault of their own." RSMo § 288.020.1 ; Difatta-Wheaton , 271 S.W.3d at 596. Section 288.050.1 disqualifies a claimant from receiving certain unemployment benefits if the claimant left work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to such work or his employer. Smith , 477 S.W.3d at 60. "An employee is deemed to have left work voluntarily when he leaves of his own accord, as opposed to being discharged, dismissed, or subjected to layoff." Darr v. Roberts Mktg. Grp., LLC , 428 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014).
If a claimant is deemed to have left voluntarily, then the question becomes whether the claimant had good cause attributable to his work or employer. Id. The burden is on the claimant to show good cause for leaving his employment. Id. Whether a claimant's reason for resigning constitutes good cause is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Smith , 477 S.W.3d at 60.
Here, McCabe repeatedly testified that he voluntarily resigned, and that fact is undisputed on appeal. The Commission's finding of fact that McCabe voluntarily resigned is supported by competent and substantial evidence and is conclusive on appeal. See Turner v. Proffer Transp., Inc. , 310 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). Accordingly, our analysis shifts to the legal issue of whether McCabe had good cause attributable to his work or employer to voluntarily leave under Section 288.050.1.
Missouri courts have long interpreted "good cause" as circumstances that would cause an average, able-bodied, qualified, and reasonable person in a similar situation to leave the employment rather than continue working. Darr , 428 S.W.3d at 724; Hessler v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Comm'n, 851 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo. banc 1993) ; Belle State Bank v. Indus. Comm'n Div. of Emp. Sec., 547 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Mo. App. 1977). This is an objective standard asking what a reasonable, average person would do in the same or similar circumstances. Partee v. Winco Mfg., Inc. , 141 S.W.3d 34, 38 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004).
"Conditions that motivate the employee to voluntarily leave must be real, not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical, and good faith is an essential element." Cooper v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000). Good cause is limited to circumstances in which external pressures attributable to the work or the employer are so compelling that a reasonable person would be justified in terminating employment. Smith , 477 S.W.3d at 60.
Missouri precedent consistently holds that parental obligations during working hours do not constitute good cause attributable to the work or the employer under Section 288.050.1. Lashea, 30 S.W.3d at 241 ; Price v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Comm'n of Missouri , 811 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) ; Rothschild v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Comm'n, 728 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987) ; Lyell v. Lab, & Indus. Rels. Comm'n Div. of Emp. Sec., 553 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Mo. App. 1977). "A worker who leaves his employment under compulsion of marital or parental obligation has left his work voluntarily without good cause because his reasons for termination lack the causal connection with his employment which is required by the statute." Lashea, 30 S.W.3d at 241 (quoting Lyell, 553 S.W.2d at 901 ).
In Lyell , the...
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