McCahon v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Com'n

• Decision Date: 04 June 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-0553.
• Citation: 491 F.Supp.2d 522
• Parties: Joseph J. McCAHON, et al., Plaintiffs v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

491 F.Supp.2d 522

Joseph J. McCAHON, et al., Plaintiffs v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-0553.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

June 4, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William James Young, National Right to Work Legal Defense, Springfield, VA, for Plaintiffs.

Doreen A. McCALL, Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, Harrisburg, PA, Martin J. Sobol, Martin J. Sobol & Associates, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Kenneth S. Hall, Norristown, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

CONNER, District Judge.

Presently before the court is plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the motion.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are employees of defendant Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission ("FTC"). They are employed in a bargaining unit represented by Turnpike and Public Employees, Teamsters Union Local No. 77, International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("the Union"). (Doc. 3 ¶ 8.) A collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") in effect from October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2007 governs the relationship between PTC and the Union. (See Doc. 3, Ex. A.) Article 4 of the CBA has a "maintenance of membership" provision stating:

Any employee who, on the effective date of this agreement, has joined the Union or who joins the Union in the future must, as a condition of employment, remain a member for the duration of this agreement with the proviso that any such employee may resign from the Union during a period of fifteen (15) days prior to the expiration of this agreement.

(Id. art. 4 at 8-9.)¹ The CBA also provides:

The Employer further agrees to deduct a Fair Share Fee monthly from all employees in the bargaining unit who are not members of the Union.

* * * * * *

The [PTC] shall deduct regular initiation fees and monthly dues from the pay of employees covered by this agreement and upon receipt from the Union of individual written authorization cards executed by an employee for that purpose and bearing his signature.

(Id. at 9.)

Plaintiffs submitted to the Union letters of resignation from membership. The Union received these letters and rejected the resignations because the "maintenance of membership" provision of the CBA provided a specific time for resignations.² The Union continues to collect full union dues from plaintiffs for unrestricted use by the Union. The next collection of union dues will occur on June 7, 2007.³ (See Tr. at 28-31; see also Doc. 3, Exs. B, C.)⁴

Plaintiffs commenced the instant action on March 22, 2007 by filing a verified complaint (Doc. 1), and subsequently amended the complaint to add a plaintiff (Doc. 3). Plaintiffs allege that the "maintenance of membership" provision of the CBA and §§ 1101.301(18) and 1101.705 of the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act violate their First Amendment rights. They also allege that the Union is in violation of the notice requirements set forth in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986). (Doc. 3)

On April 4, 2007, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 4) seeking to enjoin defendants from seizing union dues or fair share fees and from enforcing Article 4 of the CBA, including the "maintenance of membership" provision. Following a telephone conference with the parties, the court established a briefing and hearing schedule. (See Does. 12, 15.) The court conducted a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on May 24, 2007 and the motion is now ripe for disposition.

II. Discussion

The requirements for preliminary injunctive relief are well settled. The moving party must establish that (1) there is a reasonable probability of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury will result without injunctive relief, (3) granting the injunction will avoid a comparably greater injury than denying it, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. See BP Chems., Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d. 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2000); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Chamberlain, 145 F.Supp.2d 621, 625 (M.D.Pa.2001). While each factor need not be established beyond doubt, they must combine to show the immediate necessity of injunctive relief. See Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir.2002); see also Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 275-79 (7th Cir.1992) (Posner, J.); 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.3 (3d ed.1998).

A. Reasonable Probability of Success on the Merits

To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action. See Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582-83 (3d Cir.1980). Whether success is likely requires examination of the legal principles controlling the claim and potential defenses available to the opposing party. See BP Chems., 229 F.3d at 264. However, the mere possibility that the claim might be defeated does not preclude a finding of probable success if the evidence clearly satisfies the essential prerequisites of the cause of action. Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir.2001) (citing 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 2948.3).

Although there is a dearth of case law on the issue of whether "maintenance of membership" provisions violate the First Amendment, the court finds that plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. In the context of deciding whether certain union expenses may be charged to non-members as part of their fair share fee, the Third Circuit stated that "[t]he First Amendment affords public-sector employees the freedom not to associate with a labor organization." Otto v. Pa. State Educ. Ass'n-NEA 330 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Hudson, 475 U.S. at 301, 106 S.Ct. 1066); cf. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106, 105 S.Ct. 3064, 87 L.Ed.2d 68 (1985) (involving a union shop agreement and the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3): "Full union membership thus no longer can be a requirement of employment.... By allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his union.").

In the matter sub judice, the "maintenance of membership" provision locks plaintiffs into union membership for the duration of the CBA — the only way plaintiffs can resign from the union is to leave their employment. See, e.g., Debont v. City of Poway, No. 98CV0502, 1998 WL 415844 (S.D.Cal. Apr.14, 1998) (finding that the plaintiff "has shown he is likely to succeed on his First Amendment claim" where a "maintenance of membership" provision prevented him from resigning from the union and granting a temporary restraining order). Despite plaintiffs' apparent disagreement with the Union's ideology or politics, the "maintenance of membership" provision forces their continued membership. And the Union continues to collect full union dues from plaintiffs. These dues are in excess of the fair share fee paid by non-members and can be used by the Union for any purpose. See Otto, 330 F.3d at 128 ("But a union may not, consistent with the First Amendment, collect fair-share dues [from non-members] to support ideological causes or other expenses insufficiently related to collective bargaining."). As union members, plaintiffs are also subject to discipline under the CBA. For example, plaintiffs were fined for crossing the picket line during a seven-day strike. (See Tr. at 18-19; Doc. 22 at 3.)⁵ Thus, the "maintenance of membership" provision may have a direct and deleterious impact on plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment. Although Otto and other similar cases involve non-members' First Amendment right not to associate, the court finds that plaintiffs are reasonably likely to succeed in extending this right to union members who are unable to resign unilaterally because of a "maintenance of membership" provision.

B. Irreparable Injury

[6-9] Irreparable injury is harm of such an irreversible character that prospective judgment following trial would be inadequate to make the moving party whole. See Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 163 (3d Cir.1997); Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir.1989). The mere risk of injury is not sufficient to meet this standard. Rather, the moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable. Id.; 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 2948.1. Harm that may be contained effectively only through immediate injunctive relief is properly deemed "irreparable." Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 801. In the context of First Amendment claims, plaintiffs satisfying the "likelihood of success on the merits" prong are not "entitled to preliminary injunctive relief unless they [can] show a `real or immediate' danger to their rights `in the near future.'" Conchatta, Inc. v. Evanko, 83 Fed.Appx. 437, 442 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 164 (3d Cir.1997)).

In the matter sub judice, defendants rely on Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69 (3d Cir.1989), for the proposition that the harm in the instant matter is not irreparable. Id. at 73 ("In this case the alleged impingement of the Union's fair share collection procedures on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights simply fails to rise to that level of constitutional deprivation sufficient to show the irreparable harm necessary for the issuance of a preliminary injunction...."). Their reliance is misplaced. The harm in Hohe involved only the fair share fee for non-members. See id. In the instant action, the harm involves full union dues and plaintiffs' continued association with the union, including susceptibility to union discipline. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a "real or immediate danger" to their First Amendment right not to associate because the Union informed them that they cannot resign their membership...