McCall v. State
| Decision Date | 12 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 51093,51093 |
| Parties | Annette McCALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
R. Cory Schnepper, of Ser, De Cardenas & Levine, Miami, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Ira N. Loewy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee.
Under jurisdiction granted by Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, we must determine whether Section 231.07, Florida Statutes (1975), which makes one criminally liable "who upbraids, abuses, or insults any member of the instructional staff on school property or in the presence of the pupils at a school activity" is constitutional. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, we find that it is not.
This case arose from an unfortunate incident occurring between appellant and her daughter's teacher. On the day of the incident, Mrs. McCall's daughter came home from school and informed her mother that she had been struck by her teacher. Mrs. McCall immediately went to the school and confronted the teacher. This confrontation became a profane verbal attack upon the instructor and took place in the presence of at least 50 students.
A complaint was filed upon the sworn affidavit of the teacher, charging appellant with a violation of Section 231.07, Florida Statutes (1975), which reads:
Any person who upbraids, abuses or insults any member of the instructional staff on school property or in the presence of the pupils at a school activity, or any person not otherwise subject to the rules and regulations of the school who creates a disturbance on the property or grounds of any school, who commits any act that interrupts the orderly conduct of a school or any activity thereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided by law. This section shall not apply to any pupil in or subject to the discipline of a school.
Appellant moved to dismiss on grounds that the statute is unconstitutional in that it "violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, because on its face this is a standardless, vague, overbroad statute, which includes within its prohibition constitutionally protected words." The statute was also attacked on the grounds that it violates Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution of Florida.
Motion was denied and appellant convicted.
Section 231.07 is designed to insure that the schools of this state will operate smoothly, without undue interruption or disturbance from persons outside the school community. The interests sought to be protected are worthy. However, we must determine whether our historical and judicial notions of free speech, guaranteed under the Florida and federal Constitutions are compatible with a statute which attempts to regulate speech in the manner prescribed by the statute under review.
It is clear that if we were concerned solely with the language used by appellant, her conviction would be overturned under our recent opinion in Spears v. State, 337 So.2d 977 (Fla.1976). But there is more here; the activity described as unlawful by Section 231.07 relates to language used in a particular place dedicated to a special purpose for the benefit of special people.
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable." Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966), making a speech in the reading room almost certainly would. That same speech should be perfectly appropriate in a park. The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time. Grayned v. City of Rockford, (1972) 408 U.S. 104 at 116, 92 S.Ct. 2294 at 2303, 33 L.Ed.2d 222. (Footnotes omitted)
While it is true that rights protected by the First Amendment are not magically lost when one steps upon school property, "neither teachers, students, nor anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building for unlimited expressive purposes." Connecticut State Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education Members, 538 F.2d 471 at 480 (2nd Cir. 1976). "Time, place and manner" regulations may be necessary to further significant governmental interests, and are permitted. But, in assessing the reasonableness of such regulations "we must weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved; the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest." Grayned, supra, 408 at 116, 92 S.Ct. at 2303. The test, as announced in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) is whether a regulation is designed to restrict only that expression which "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." At 513, 89 S.Ct. at 740. In Tinker, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a school regulation which forbade students from wearing black armbands (on school property) as a symbolic way of objecting to the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court stated that the expressive activity involved in that case, i. e., the wearing of armbands, "was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct" and was therefore protected.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, the Supreme Court again considered the subject of First Amendment rights in the framework of the school environment. In that case, Grayned, a demonstrator picketing in front of an Illinois high school was convicted of violating an anti picketing ordinance which outlawed demonstrations near schools in session, and an anti noise ordinance 1 which prohibited the willful making of noise or diversion on grounds adjacent to a school while school was in session. The Court found the anti picketing ordinance unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, 2 but upheld the anti noise ordinance against challenges of vagueness and overbreadth, as follows:
Designed, according to its preamble, "for the protection of Schools," the ordinance forbids deliberately noisy or diversionary activity that disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school activities. It forbids this willful activity at fixed times when school is in session and at a sufficiently fixed place "adjacent" to the school. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. at 2300.
Although the prohibited quantum of disturbance is not specified in the ordinance, it is apparent from the statute's announced purpose that the measure is whether normal school activity has been or is about to be disrupted. We do...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Elder
...the legitimate state interest involved, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); McCall v. State, 354 So.2d 869 (Fla.1978); so that the first amendment freedoms are given the breathing room needed to survive. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 32......
-
State v. Keaton
...a reading of parts (a) through (d) of subsection (1) as distinct provisions does not render the statute meaningless. In McCall v. State, 354 So.2d 869 (Fla.1978), we declined a similar invitation to read an element of one part of a statute into another portion of the enactment when the two ......
-
West v. State, S16A1369
..."materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." [Id.] at 513 .McCall v. State, 354 So.2d 869, 871 (Fla. 1978). It is "evident beyond the need for elaboration" that government has a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psych......
-
Ketchens v. Reiner
...and encompassed speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, that statute was held unconstitutional. (McCall v. State (Fla.1978) 354 So.2d 869, 870-872.) The analysis of the Florida court is equally applicable to our statutes. We, too, recognize that such regulation has th......