McCann v. Atl. Mills

• Decision Date: 10 June 1898
• Citation: 40 A. 500,20 R.I. 566
• Parties: McCANN v. ATLANTIC MILLS.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

40 A. 500

20 R.I. 566

McCANN

v. ATLANTIC MILLS.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 10, 1898.

Action by John McCann against the Atlantic Mills for personal injuries received. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant petitions for a new trial. Granted, and case dismissed.

F. P. Owen, for plaintiff.

Comstock & Gardner and Raymond G. Mowry, for defendant.

TILLINGHAST, J. This is a petition for a new trial on the ground that the verdict, which was for the plaintiff, is against the law and the evidence. The facts in the case are briefly as follows: In November, 1892 We do not think the evidence shows that the defendant corporation was guilty of any negligence in the premises. The reservoir was not on or near the passageway, but was in the open part of the mill yard, and was as thoroughly protected as could reasonably be expected, considering the uses to which it was constantly put. It is a matter of common knowledge that mill yards, outside of the necessary passageways over them, are more or less occupied with obstructions to travel, such as wagons, merchandise, piles of lumber, hydrants, reservoirs, or cisterns, and the like. The question which arises, then, is whether every such obstruction must be so guarded and protected as to prevent an employe from being injured thereby while walking on a dark night in any part of the mill yard. We think that to hold the owner to the performance of such a duty would be wholly unreasonable, as well as unwarrant ed by any rule of law. It is true the master is under obligation to furnish a reasonably safe and convenient place for his servants to work in, and reasonably safe appliances for them to use in the performance of their work; but he is not an insurer against accidents, nor is he called upon so to construct every part of his premises as to prevent the possibility of accident thereon. Suppose, for instance, that the plaintiff in the case at bar, instead of having fallen into the reservoir, had come in contact with the pump house immediately adjacent thereto, and had been injured thereby; could it be reasonably claimed that the defendant would be liable? Clearly not. Suppose, again, that, instead of falling into the reservoir, the plaintiff had stumbled over the low chain fence which surrounds the reservoir, and had fallen upon the stone coping thereof and been injured; could it be claimed that the fence itself should not have been there without something to protect it? These questions, and many...