McCann v. Doe
| Decision Date | 07 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 26468.,26468. |
| Citation | 377 S.C. 373,660 S.E.2d 500 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Laura McCANN, Respondent, v. Jane DOE and John Doe, Appellants. In re Baby McCann. |
James Fletcher Thompson, of Spartanburg, for Appellants.
Kenneth L. Tootle, of Beaufort, Scott M. Merrifield, of Quindlen & Merrifield, of Beaufort, for Respondent.
Diane Piazza DeWitt, of Beaufort, for Guardian Ad Litem.
In this adoption case, the prospective adoptive parents, John and Jane Doe, appeal the family court's orders: (1) revoking Laura McCann's (the biological mother's) consent for adoption because it was involuntarily entered; and (2) finding the revocation of the consent would be in the best interest of the child and placing the child back with McCann. We note both the Does and McCann love and take excellent care of the child. However, our review of the evidence supports the family court's decision to revoke McCann's consent to adopt and to return the child to McCann.
On the afternoon of Wednesday, July 19, 2006, thirty-year-old McCann drove herself to Hilton Head Regional Medical Center while in labor. At the time, McCann had several emotional stressors in her life, including: (1) her boyfriend had died tragically in a car accident two years prior; (2) her father had died from pancreatic cancer the prior year; (3) the pregnancy was the result of a rape; (4) she hid her pregnancy from her mother, sister, friends, and coworkers because she was ashamed and afraid of their reaction; and (5) she had lost her job during her pregnancy when the restaurant she managed closed down. Although McCann initially informed the hospital staff that she had prenatal care in New York, she later admitted she had not had prenatal care. McCann indicated on the hospital intake forms that she: had a bachelor's degree; worked as a waitress; was of Catholic faith; did not have plans to place the child for adoption; and desired contact with the child. She did not have anyone with her during her delivery and did not want anyone called on her behalf.
McCann delivered a healthy baby girl around 5:00 p.m. that same day. However, McCann did not respond to the child, touch the child, or look at her when the child was placed on McCann's chest. McCann did not want to see the child later in the nursery. Nurse Wendy Yemec thought McCann's flat response to the baby was not normal, and the treating obstetrician ordered a social work consult. McCann was very tearful and remained so for the rest of her hospital stay.
On Thursday, July 20, 2006, McCann had several evaluations. Dr. Ann Gorman, the obstetrician in charge of post-partum care, noted McCann was tearful and learned of McCann's stressors. McCann briefly mentioned adoption to Dr. Gorman.1 Although she did not diagnose McCann with post-partum depression, Dr. Gorman was concerned that McCann did not have any apparent support system, believed McCann might be at risk for post-partum depression, and ordered a psychiatric consultation with Dr. Srivastava.
That same morning, Judy Hewes2 performed the social work evaluation on McCann to determine what kind of support system McCann had and what kind of prenatal care McCann had been given. The two discussed the stressors in McCann's life and Hewes provided McCann with names and telephone numbers of adoption agencies per McCann's request. Hewes informed McCann that she had positive experiences with adoption because two of her siblings were adopted.
Hewes' conversation with McCann was interrupted when Dr. Srivastava entered the room to perform a psychological evaluation. The examination was for the sole purpose of determining whether McCann required further hospitalization for psychological issues due to her incessant crying; he did not evaluate McCann for the purpose of determining whether she could knowingly and intelligently consent to the relinquishment of her child for adoption. After speaking with McCann for less than an hour, Dr. Srivastava determined that, although she had significant stressors in her life, she did not have significant depression requiring hospitalization. He recommended follow-up therapy without medication. Dr. Srivastava diagnosed McCann with "significant adjustment disorder," between anxiety and depression, with a functioning level, or GAF score of 50, which meant partial insight. Although he noted that a GAF score of below 50 would require hospitalization, he testified that "partial insight" meant fair insight within the normal range and not significantly impaired. He stated the diagnosis of adjustment disorder did not impair judgment. Although McCann did not discuss adoption in detail, she told Dr. Srivastava she was considering adoption, she would "feel ok about it," and she did not have enough resources to care for a baby. Dr. Srivastava testified he did not think social stressors would generally affect decision making, and he had no concerns about McCann's ability to make decisions. Dr. Srivastava did not diagnose McCann with post-partum depression because the illness does not generally manifest until some time after delivery, and he did not see signs of post-partum depression in McCann. According to Dr. Srivastava, McCann was initially tearful during their meeting, she smiled at times, and she was able to engage in the conversation and was not tearful by the end.
In the afternoon on July 20th, McCann referred to a business card given to her along with the list of adoption agency names she requested from Hewes, and she called Helen Duschinski, director of A Child's Future Adoptions, a private adoption agency based in Aiken, South Carolina. McCann testified that she was just exploring options, but Duschinski stated McCann informed her that she had a baby that she wanted to give up for adoption and wanted to know whether there was a family with which the child could be placed. Duschinski agreed to meet with McCann the next morning at the hospital in Hilton Head, and Duschinski contacted the Does about the baby. At some point, Nurse Yemec came in the room and overheard McCann on the phone with Duschinski. Yemec hugged McCann and told her how unselfish and brave she was being in making the adoption decision. McCann requested to see the baby for the first time the evening of July 20th, and the baby stayed in the room with her, for the most part, until discharge the next day. McCann appeared to bond with her baby.
On the morning of Friday, July 21, 2006, Duschinski got lost on her way to the hospital, McCann called her to find out why she was late, and McCann gave Duschinski directions to the hospital. Duschinski testified McCann was clearly resolved in her decision to give the baby up for adoption, and never verbalized any doubts, citing the fact that she was single and there were societal and financial pressures associated with raising a baby. However, McCann denied having made up her mind about adoption when she called Duschinski, but she did not know whether she had told Duschinski she wanted to put her child up for adoption. McCann believed Duschinski worked with the Department of Social Services and would explain the process. Duschinski filled out paperwork, including medical and family history. One of the documents Duschinski had McCann sign regarded counseling and stated, Duschinski testified McCann was crying and laughing during their meeting, trying to lighten the room with humor. She did not think McCann's emotional reaction was unusual.
At that point, Duschinski left the room and the Does' attorney, Rick Corley, and attorney Hector Esquivel, the separate attorney to present the consent form to McCann, entered the hospital room. Corley left as Esquivel went over the consent for adoption form with McCann and Hewes remained in the room as a witness. McCann believed he was her attorney, although his fees were being paid by the Does. Esquivel testified he went through the consent form line by line, trying to ensure that McCann understood the form and that her consent was voluntary. He stated she did not appear to be in any unusual emotional distress, that she was teary at times, but he believed she was comfortable and resolute. McCann was holding the baby during her meeting with Esquivel.
Esquivel testified he specifically went over the sections regarding the fact that there was no waiting period, that her decision was permanent, and that she had no right to rescission like with financing agreements. At one point he told her the only way to revoke the consent was to go to court and explain the decision was made under duress, but Hewes testified he responded to one of her questions by stating that McCann could go to court to prove she was the better parent in order to "undo it." Esquivel testified that he told her he would leave if she had any doubts, that she could get either legal or other counseling and then decide at a later time whether to proceed with the adoption, but McCann did not want counseling and seemed to understand the gravity of the situation.
One of the documents Esquivel had McCann sign was a medical power of attorney, which stated, "this limited medical power of attorney shall expire upon the surrender of my parental rights in a court proceeding in accordance with South Carolina law unless I earlier revoke it in writing." Although McCann testified that she did not listen to what Esquivel was saying because she was looking at the baby, she admitted that she was calm when she signed the documents. McCann initialed the consent form next to the section stating there is no revocation period.
After signing the documents, McCann refused additional time with the child and handed the child over to Corley. McCann was...
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