McCarron v. District Court In and For Jefferson County, First Judicial Dist., 83SA241
Decision Date | 07 November 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 83SA241,83SA241 |
Parties | Brian McCARRON, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT In and For the COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and the Honorable Joseph P. Lewis, Respondent. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
G. Nicholas Pijoan Conifer, for petitioner.
Joseph P. Lewis, pro se.
This is an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 in which the petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the District Court for Jefferson County to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.), sections 14-13-101 to -126, C.R.S. 1973. The district court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction because the Oklahoma courts retained full jurisdiction. We issued a rule to show cause why the district court should not exercise jurisdiction. We now make the rule absolute.
The petitioner, Brian McCarron (father), and Gail J. Brisco (mother) were married in 1974 in New Jersey. On July 1, 1976, a divorce decree was granted upon the mother's petition by the Oklahoma district court and she was awarded custody of their child, Jesse James McCarron. The father was served by publication in the divorce proceeding. The father and mother later informally agreed that the father would have summer visitation with the child.
On June 1, 1981, the father moved to Colorado which has been his state of residence and domicile since that time. On February 18, 1982, the child broke his leg in a skiing accident while he was in Colorado visiting his father. The mother and father agreed that the child should be enrolled in the West Jefferson Elementary School located in Conifer, Colorado. On March 19, 1982, the child was sent to Oklahoma for a one-week visit with his mother who refused to return him to Colorado as the parties had agreed.
In August of 1982, the child came to Colorado to visit with his father. The mother and father again agreed that the child should remain in Colorado and attend the elementary school at Conifer. In December of 1982, the parties signed a written stipulation in which they agreed that the child would remain in the temporary custody of his father for the 1982-1983 school year and would attend the West Jefferson Elementary School. The stipulation provided that the mother was to have visitation rights with the child during the Christmas vacation. The stipulation also stated: "The parties desire that this stipulation be made an order of this court." The stipulation was filed in the Oklahoma district court but not acted upon by the judge.
On May 9, 1983, the mother, who had moved to Texas in February or March of 1983, removed the child from the school in Conifer without the knowledge or consent of the father. The mother apparently took the child to Texas.
Shortly thereafter, the father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a verified petition for custody pursuant to sections 14-13-101 to -126, C.R.S.1973. The petitions were filed in the Jefferson County district court which ordered that the writ of habeas corpus issue on May 18, 1983, and set the matter for hearing on June 13, 1983. The writ was personally served on the mother in Fort Worth, Texas on May 24, 1983.
On May 27, 1983, a judge of the district court in Oklahoma telephoned the respondent judge to discuss the writ and the question of jurisdiction over the child custody issue. The Oklahoma judge stated that he would retain jurisdiction on the issues of custody, support, and visitation. The respondent judge agreed that the "Oklahoma court should retain full jurisdiction over the divorce and all matters, including custody of the minor child." Thereupon, the respondent judge dismissed the writ of habeas corpus on June 1, 1983.
There are two separate and distinct inquiries which should be made in determining whether a Colorado district court should hear a child custody case filed under the U.C.C.J.A. The first is whether jurisdiction exists in this state, and the second is whether this state should exercise its jurisdiction. Johnson v. District Court, 654 P.2d 827 (Colo.1982).
The district court clearly has jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A. to hear this case pursuant to sections 14-13-104(1)(a) and (b), C.R.S. 1973, which provide:
A child's home state is defined by section 14-13-103(5), C.R.S. 1973, to be:
We note that the definition of "home state" refers to the child's physical residence, not his/her legal residence or domicile. In the present case, the child lived with his father in Colorado from August 1982 to May 9, 1983. The only period of absence was the few days the child visited with his mother in Oklahoma during the Christmas holidays. The father has lived in Colorado since 1981. The child was not in Colorado on the date proceedings were commenced in the district court because he was removed from this state by his mother ("a person claiming his custody," see section 14-13-104(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973). Thus, the respondent court has jurisdiction under section 14-13-104(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973.
The Colorado district court also has jurisdiction under section 14-13-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973. The father has a significant connection with Colorado because he has lived in this state since 1981. The child also has a significant connection with Colorado because he has lived in this state continuously for nine months and attended the elementary school in Conifer. He also was in Colorado during visitation periods. There is substantial evidence in this state from the father's neighbors, the child's teachers, and other persons concerning the child's care, training, and personal relationships. 1
Having determined that Colorado has jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A., the next inquiry is whether the respondent judge abused his discretion when he refused to exercise jurisdiction in the case.
Several sections of the U.C.C.J.A. address the question of when a court should exercise its jurisdiction. Section 14-13-107, C.R.S. 1973, provides that a Colorado court shall not exercise its jurisdiction if a proceeding concerning the custody of the child is pending in a court of another state. Where there is such a pending proceeding, exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the court in which the matter is first raised. In Re the Petition of Edilson, 637 P.2d 362 (Colo.1981). There is no such pending proceeding in this case for two reasons. First, the stipulation of the parties was not made an order of the Oklahoma court. Second, the stipulation has expired by its own terms.
Section 14-13-114, C.R.S. 1973, provides that Colorado courts shall recognize and enforce decrees of other states which assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with the U.C.C.J.A., or which were made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the U.C.C.J.A. Section 14-13-115(1), C.R.S. 1973,...
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