McCarter v. State
Decision Date | 24 June 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 847-91,847-91 |
Citation | 837 S.W.2d 117 |
Parties | Steven Todd McCARTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Randy Schaffer, on Petition for Discretionary Review only, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., and Alan Curry, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
A jury found appellant guilty of delivery of a controlled substance pursuant to Tex.Health & Safety Code ann. § 481.112. The trial judge assessed punishment at 15 years confinement. Tex.Health & Safety Code ann. § 481.106. The Court of Appeals affirmed. McCarter v. State, No. 11-90-029-CR (Tex.App.--Eastland, delivered June 20, 1991) (not published). Appellant presents two grounds for review. We will reverse.
In his first ground for review appellant contends the Court of Appeals erred by holding the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting his voir dire to 30 minutes. Appellant's attorney conducted his voir dire of the prospective jurors subject to a thirty minute time limit. During the appellant's voir dire, the trial judge informed appellant's attorney when five minutes, and two minutes, remained in the 30 minutes allotted for appellant's voir dire. When the trial court informed the appellant's trial attorney that the time had expired, the following exchange occurred:
For the record, I want the record to reflect that the way in which you conducted this voir dire you knew in advance you were going to have a 30-minute limit on this voir dire and there are certain people who have raised their hands who said they could not be fair and impartial jurors and you continued to speak to those people knowing full well that we are going to come up here and talk about their inability and on one occasion, 18, you have gone back to him number 18 and number 18 disqualified whenever I was voir diring and you continued to go back and ask him questions which is a waste of this Court's time on voir dire. So your request is denied.
On direct appeal, appellant contended the trial judge erroneously imposed an unreasonable time limit of his voir dire. 1 The Court of Appeals addressed the point of error according to the abuse of discretion standard in Ratliff, 690 S.W.2d 597, 599-600. McCarter, slip op. at 3. Under Ratliff, the appellate court must conduct a three prong test to consider whether the trial judge abused his discretion by imposing a time limitation on voir dire. The reviewing court must determine:
3. whether the party was not permitted to examine prospective jurors who actually served on the jury.
Ratliff, 690 S.W.2d at 599-600.
The Court found appellant's attorney prolonged the voir dire "by questioning prospective jurors whom he had questioned earlier and that he made no attempt to ask any of the questions that he ultimately claimed he would have asked when informed of his remaining time." The Court of Appeals also found the record did not reflect appellant's attorney was not permitted to examine any veniremember who actually served on the jury. Slip op. at 3-4. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating appellant's voir dire.
This case deals with two competing rights. The first right is the constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel which encompasses the right to question prospective jurors in order to intelligently and effectively exercise peremptory challenges and challenges for cause during the jury selection process. Naugle v. State, 40 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.Cr.App.1931). The second right is that of the trial judge to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of voir dire examination. McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Boyd v. State, 811 S.W.2d 105, 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) ( ); Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) () As we said in Ratliff v. State, 690 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), these two rights "coexist and must be harmonized."
In Ex parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), we stated:
The constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel encompasses the right to question prospective jurors in order to intelligently and effectually exercise peremptory challenges and challenges for cause during the jury selection process. [citations omitted.] To that end, trial judges should allow defendants much leeway in questioning a jury panel during voir dire. At the same time, however, we have afforded trial courts the ability to control the voir dire process if sound discretion would compel a trial judge nevertheless to restrict the questioning in the interest of conducting an orderly and expeditious trial. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) and McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) ( ); Clark v. State, 608 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) ( ); Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) ( ). Accordingly, a trial court's decision to limit questioning during voir dire may be reviewed only to determine whether such a restraint amounts to an abuse of discretion. Smith, 703 S.W.2d at 643.
In Woolridge v. State, 827 S.W.2d 900, 905-06 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), we recognized any proper question has the potential to lengthen the voir dire portion of a trial.
However, it is improper for a trial judge to impose restrictions based on the mere possibility that the otherwise proper question might lengthen the process. The trial judge must first allow the question, and may later curtail similar questions if the voir dire process proves to be unduly lengthy. See Battie [v. State ], 551 S.W.2d at 403 [ (Tex.Cr.App.1977) ]. Also, trial judges may prohibit an otherwise proper question which substantially repeats others posed by the same party, Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 167 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), or when the prospective juror has stated his position clearly, unequivocally, and without reservation. Phillips v. State, 701 S.W.2d 875, 889 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). 2
In Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), we held:
... although time constraints on voir dire are a legitimate concern of a trial judge, the paramount concern in a case such as this must be the appellant's freedom to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. We cannot improve upon our Presiding Judge's observation:
It is always commendable for a trial court to dispatch business with promptness and expedition, but this salutary result must never be attained at the risk of denying to a party on trial a substantial right.
In Ratliff, we added another consideration to the two prong test announced in De la Rosa v. State, 414 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). We distinguish the application of these cases as follows. De la Rosa concerned the termination of a voir dire during appellant's collective questioning of the venire. Id. at 670. In Ratliff, however, the trial judge terminated the voir dire as the defendant attempted to question veniremembers individually. Ratliff, 690 S.W.2d at 600. In the instant case, the trial judge terminated the voir dire while appellant's attorney was asking general questions of the venire. Therefore, we will analyze the case under the two prongs of De la Rosa.
The first prong is whether appellant attempted to prolong the voir dire. Before the trial court terminated the voir dire, appellant's attorney asked the venire general questions concerning appellant's expected testimony, law enforcement officers, anti-drug organizations, experiences with African-Americans, the presumption of innocence, the "concept of mere presence," criminal records, victims of crime, and drug addiction. The appellant's attorney received numerous responses from the venire. At the conclusion of the thirty minute limit, appellant's attorney requested additional time to...
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