McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp.
| Decision Date | 22 February 1962 |
| Citation | 16 A.D.2d 35,224 N.Y.S.2d 909 |
| Parties | Annie Lee McCARTHY, Respondent, v. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION, Appellant |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Bond, Schoeneck & King, Syracuse (John C. Kinney, Leslie H. Deming, Syracuse, of counsel), for appellant.
Costello, Cooney & Fearon, Syracuse (Vincent A. O'Neil, Syracuse, of counsel), for respondent.
Before WILLIAMS, P. J., and GOLDMAN, HALPERN, McCLUSKY and HENRY, JJ.
The question here presented is this: May the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation be held liable, under its uninsured motorist endorsement, for injuries caused by an assault and battery committed by an insured motorist, where the insurance company covering the automobile was absolved from liability upon the ground that the assault and battery was not an accident within the meaning of the liability insurance policy? It is undisputed that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by an assault and battery committed by her brother-in-law, David Branch. On October 18, 1959, the plaintiff was driving her automobile in the City of Syracuse, New York, with her sister as a passenger in the automobile. The plaintiff's sister had had a violent argument with her husband and the plaintiff was assisting her in escaping from him. Branch suddenly appeared in his own automobile and deliberately drove into the plaintiff's automobile for the purpose of stopping it. As a result of the intentional collision, the plaintiff suffered bodily injury. Branch was subsequently convicted of the crime of assault because of his action.
Branch's automobile was covered by a standard automobile liability policy issued by the United Services Automobile Association. The insurance carrier denied liability to the plaintiff upon the ground that the injuries were not 'caused by accident' within the terms of the policy. The plaintiff recovered a default judgment against Branch in the Onondaga County Court in the amount of $3,000.00 and costs and thereafter commenced an action against Branch's insurance company under section 167 of the Insurance Law. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant dismissing the complaint upon the ground that the insurance company was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries because they were not caused by accident. The correctness of the result reached in that action is not now questioned.
The plaintiff's automobile was also covered by a standard policy to which there was attached a MVAIC endorsement, which all liability insurance companies are required to add to their policies under section 167 (2-a) of the Insurance Law. Under this endorsement, the MVAIC agreed to pay the plaintiff for all injuries for which she was legally entitled to recover, 'caused by accident', arising from the operation of an uninsured automobile.
After losing her action against Branch's insurance company, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the MVAIC, seeking a declaratory judgment that the MVAIC was liable for the plaintiff's injury under the MVAIC endorsement attached to the plaintiff's policy.
The court below granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, leaving only the question of the amount of the damages to be assessed. From that order, this appeal was taken.
The order of the court below cannot be permitted to stand. The MVAIC was set up in 1958 (Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation Law, Article 17-a of the Insurance Law; L.1958, ch. 759) to fill the gaps in the compulsory automobile insurance plan which had been adopted by the State in 1956 (Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act, L.1956, ch. 655; Vehicle and Traffic Law, art. 6-A), arising from the fact that, notwithstanding the statute, some accidents might be caused by automobiles which had no insurance applicable to the accident or by 'hit-and-run' motorists who could not be identified. The MVAIC Law was designed to afford a person injured in such an accident the same protection as he would have had if he had if he had been injured in an accident caused by an identifiable automobile covered by a standard automobile liability insurance policy in effect at the time of, and applicable to, the accident. In the declaration of purpose in section 600 of the statute, it is explicitly stated, that 'The legislature determines * * * that the public interest can best be served by closing such gaps in the motor vehicle financial security act [by creating the MVAIC]'. The MVAIC Law was not designed to supplement the insurance coverage of insured automobiles or to protect injured persons against risks which were not covered by the standard automobile liability policies.
This is plain upon a reading of the statute itself; the conclusion is strengthened by a reference to the explanatory statements issued by the interested State departments and the members of the Legislature in advocating the passage of the act and by the Governor in recommending and approving it. (N. Y. Legis. Annual, 1958, pp. 244, 299, 436, 473; see also Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 215, 230, 239). There is not a shred of legislative history to support the view that the statute was designed to extend protection beyond that afforded by the standard liability insurance policies issued in the form approved by the Superintendent of Insurance.
As will be seen below, an assault and battery committed by the named insured by means of the use of an insured automobile is not within the ambit of the risks covered by the standard liability insurance policy. There was no intention on the part of the Legislature to supplement the coverage of liability insurance policies by having the MVAIC cover the excluded risk.
The MVAIC is a corporation of which all the insurance companies authorized to write automobile liability insurance policies in New York State are required to be members (§ 602). Its funds are raised by assessment against the members (§ 607).
The statute adopted two devices to carry out its purpose. (1) Automobile owners who suffered personal injuries as the result of accidents caused by uninsured motorists were to be covered by an endorsement in the name of the MVAIC to be attached to their own insurance policies (Insurance Law, § 167, subd. 2-a); the endorsement was also to cover members of their families and others coming within the term 'insured' as defined in the endorsement. (2) All others who were so injured and who came within the class of 'qualified persons' defined in the statute were authorized to proceed against the MVAIC in the manner specified in the statute. (MVAIC Law, §§ 601 and 608 of the Insurance Law). We now turn to the language of the MVAIC endorsement upon which the plaintiff brought this action. The endorsement provides that the 'MVAIC will pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury * * * sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile' (emphasis added). The endorsement was in the form approved by the Superintendent of Insurance pursuant to subdivision 2-a of section 167 of the Insurance Law.
In order to recover under this endorsement, the plaintiff had the burden of establishing (1) that the automobile which caused her injury was an uninsured one, and (2) that her injury was 'caused by accident'. The plaintiff's case was deficient in both respects.
(1) Branch's automobile was not an uninsured automobile. The term 'uninsured automobile' is defined in the MVAIC endorsement, so far as here pertinent, as follows: 'an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is, in the amounts specified in the New York Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act [no] bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy, applicable to the accident'. In this case, there was in effect, at the time of the occurrence in question, a bodily injury liability insurance policy in the amount specified in the Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act applicable to any accident in which Branch's automobile might be involved. The plaintiff's claim against Branch's insurance carrier was defeated, not because the insurance policy was not in full force and effect, but because the court found that the plaintiff's injuries had not been caused by an accident within the meaning of the policy. This finding did not convert Branch into an uninsured motorist or convert his automobile into an uninsured automobile within the meaning of the endorsement. All that an automobile owner is required to carry under the Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act is a policy of liability insurance in specified amounts insuring against liability for bodily injury 'caused by accident', in the form specified by the 'Minimum Provisions for Automobile Liability Insurance Policies' promulgated by the Superintendent of Insurance (Regulation 35-A, 13th Suppl. to Off. Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York, pp. 868-870). The MVAIC endorsement does not come into play until it is established that the automobile involved in the occurrence was not covered by a valid and enforceable policy of the kind required by the statute and regulations. Branch's automobile was covered by such a policy.
There was no disclaimer by the insurance company of liability under the terms of the policy for any accident for which Branch might be responsible. Returning to the words of the MVAIC endorsement, there was an outstanding policy 'applicable to the accident', if the plaintiff could establish that there was an accident.
A disclaimer or denial of liability by an insurance company may place the automobile in the position of an uninsured automobile, within the meaning of the MVAIC endorsement, if, but only if,...
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...697 (1952). I. Bowen v. Lloyds Underwriters , 162 NE2d 65 (Mass. 1959). J. McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnity Corporation , 224 N.Y.S. 2d 909 (1962). K. Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corporation , 601 A.2d 978 (1991). 2. Is The Tortfeasor or Vehicle Uninsured or Underinsured? This questi......
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Initial client contact
...697 (1952). I. Bowen v. Lloyds Underwriters , 162 NE2d 65 (Mass. 1959). J. McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnity Corporation , 224 N.Y.S. 2d 909 (1962). K. Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corporation , 601 A.2d 978 (1991). 2. Is The Tortfeasor or Vehicle Uninsured or Underinsured? This questi......
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Initial Client Contact
...697 (1952). I. Bowen v. Lloyds Underwriters , 162 NE2d 65 (Mass. 1959). J. McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnity Corporation , 224 N.Y.S. 2d 909 (1962). K. Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corporation , 601 A.2d 978 (1991). 2. Is The Tortfeasor or Vehicle Uninsured or Underinsured? This questi......