McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 May 1982
• Parties: , 435 N.E.2d 1072 Kevin McCARTHY, Appellant, v. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 457

450 N.Y.S.2d 457

55 N.Y.2d 543, 435 N.E.2d 1072

Kevin McCARTHY, Appellant, v. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 11, 1982.

James J. Hasson, Staten Island, for appellant.

Herbert Rubin, Michael Hoenig, Edward L. Birnbaum and David B. Hamm, New York City, for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GABRIELLI, Judge.

The issue posed upon this appeal is whether an injured plaintiff may successfully assert the toll of the Statute of Limitations for the disability of insanity, created by CPLR 208, upon the claim that he had suffered from a post traumatic neurosis.

Plaintiff was seriously injured on July 26, 1974 when the 1965 Volkswagen he was operating struck a utility pole and burst into flames. As a result of the accident plaintiff suffered massive injuries, including severe fractures and extensive burns. Plaintiff later commenced this personal injury action against Volkswagen of America on September 28, 1978 and against Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft on January 5, 1979. Defendants then moved to dismiss the action as barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 214 (subd. 5).

In opposition to this motion to dismiss, plaintiff asserted that the running of the Statute of Limitations was tolled by virtue of his claimed disability of insanity. ¹ CPLR 208 provides, in pertinent part, that where a person is under a disability of "insanity" at the time his cause of action accrues, the limitations period in a personal injury action will be extended to three years after the disability ceases. ²

At a hearing to determine plaintiff's mental condition during the period of time surrounding the accident, plaintiff's psychiatric expert testified that plaintiff was suffering from a condition known as "post traumatic neurosis". Although it was established that plaintiff could function normally in many respects shortly after the accident, the expert opined that as a result of this neurosis plaintiff had attempted to repress and forget as much of the accident as possible and therefore would have had difficulty in cooperating with counsel or understanding his rights regarding the accident. Defendant's expert concluded, in contrast, that plaintiff was not previously unable to protect his rights. The record discloses that in February, 1975, plaintiff successfully entered college, and shortly thereafter he resumed participation in athletics and returned to his job as a stock clerk in a supermarket. In fact, during the period of plaintiff's claimed insanity, he was named as a defendant in an action by a passenger in the accident vehicle, and on September 17, 1975, less than 14 months after the accident, a third-party complaint against the City of New York was filed on his behalf seeking indemnification for damages which might be recovered by that passenger. Special Term accepted the theory that plaintiff was suffering from post traumatic neurosis and concluded that he had therefore been insane within the meaning of CPLR 208. The Appellate Division, 78 A.D.2d 849, 432 N.Y.S.2d 722, reversed, on the law and the facts, holding that Special Term erred in making this finding. The court observed that the record contains sufficient evidence to conclude that, at least since February, 1975, plaintiff was able to manage his business affairs and estate and to comprehend his own legal rights and liabilities. The court went on to conclude that it cannot be said that during this period plaintiff was suffering from a temporary mental incapacity which prevented him from understanding or protecting his legal rights.

Plaintiff now maintains that his claim of post traumatic neurosis, manifesting itself in an inability to confront the memory of his accident, falls within the scope of the toll for insanity contained in CPLR 208. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that this is insufficient, implying that the insanity toll of CPLR 208 contemplates proof of an individual's over-all inability to deal with his general affairs, rather than simply a specific inability to deal with his affairs in relation to the accident.

In general, Statutes of Limitation are creatures of the legislative rather than the judicial process (see 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac., par. 201.01). Similarly, the various tolling provisions to the Statutes of Limitation are largely, if not exclusively, the product of legislative design. Because the toll of the Statutes of Limitation for the disability of insanity is a product of statutory law, our examination of the scope of this toll requires a determination of the legislative intent underlying the statute.

We begin by noting that the statute itself provides no definition of the term "insanity". Additionally, there is scant case law in this area. We have previously held that insanity need not have been adjudicated at the time the cause of action accrued (Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 165 N.E.2d 756), and it has also been held that a temporary mental...