McCarty v. Menards
| Decision Date | 08 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17 C 3261,17 C 3261 |
| Citation | 319 F.Supp.3d 974 |
| Parties | Robert MCCARTY, Plaintiff, v. MENARDS, a corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Charles Jeffrey Thut, Noonan Perillo and Thut, Robert Hauser, Sullivan, Smith, Hauser & Noonan, Ltd., Waukegan, IL, for Plaintiff.
W. Anthony Andrews, John Edward Motylinski, Laura A. Weizeorick, Ottosen Britz Kelly Cooper Gilbret & DiNolfo Ltd., Naperville, IL, for Defendant.
In February of 2017, Robert McCarty and his employee, Tristan Parks, went to the Menard's in Antioch, Illinois, to purchase materials for a building renovation project. One of the things they needed was 3/4″ thick, 4′ by 8′ oriented strand board ("OSB"), similar to particle board. They rented a Menard's pickup truck, drove it into the lumber shed, and began selecting and loading sheets of OSB. In the process, Mr. McCarty fell and injured himself, breaking his upper arm. He claims that he tripped over a product display sign that was in front of the pile of OSB to the right of the pile he and Mr. Parks were getting their sheets from. Mr. McCarty filed a lawsuit against Menard's, charging it with negligence for having the display sign in a public area, thereby causing a tripping hazard, and failing to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition. [Dkt. # 6, ¶ 5]. Menard's has moved for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must construe the evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Allin v. City of Springfield , 845 F.3d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 2017) ; Chaib v. Geo Grp., Inc. , 819 F.3d 337, 340 (7th Cir. 2016). But, the court makes "only reasonable inferences, not every conceivable one." Spitz v. Proven Winners N. Am., LLC , 759 F.3d 724, 730 (7th Cir. 2014). Importantly, "[the court's] favor toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture." Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. , 884 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted).
Not every purported factual dispute precludes summary judgment; the factual dispute must be material and genuine. Alston v. City of Madison , 853 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2017). A factual dispute is "genuine" only if a reasonable jury could find for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Alston , 853 F.3d at 910 (7th Cir. 2017). If the opponent – here, the plaintiff – " 'fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,' summary judgment must be granted." Blow v. Bijora, Inc. , 855 F.3d 793, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2017). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court "must resist the trap of assessing the credibility of witnesses, choosing between competing inferences or balancing the relative weight of conflicting evidence." Orton-Bell v. Indiana , 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2014). See also Khan v. Midwestern Univ. , 879 F.3d 838, 840 (7th Cir. 2018). Proper fulfillment of the court's task in summary judgment proceedings in the Northern District of Illinois requires adherence to Local Rule 56.1, which prescribes the format of summary judgment proceedings must take.
The Local Rule is critical in the presentation of and opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. , 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir.2012). It aids the parties' understanding of the arguments and immeasurably aids the court in correctly resolving the motion, which after all is the ultimate purpose of the whole enterprise. Townsend v. Alexian Bros. Medical Center , 589 Fed.Appx. 338, 339 (7th Cir.2015) ; United States v. Gutierrez Rodriguez , 288 F.3d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 2002) ; Kay v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago , 547 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir.2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.). See also WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Sopkin , 488 F.3d 1262, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.2007) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The Local Rule then goes far in helping to achieve what should be the lawyer's ultimate goal, namely to make it "easier for the court for the court to rule in his client's favor ...." Dal Pozzo v. Basic Mach. Co. , 463 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2006).
The Local Rule requires a party seeking summary judgment to include with its motion "a statement of material facts as to which the ... party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the ... party to a judgment as a matter of law." Local Rule 56.1(a)(3); Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc. , 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir.2008). Each paragraph must refer to the "affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials" that substantiate the asserted facts. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3); F.T.C. v. Bay Area Business Council, Inc. , 423 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir.2005). The party opposing summary judgment must then respond to the movant's statement of proposed material facts; that response must contain both "a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement," Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B), and a separate statement "consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment," Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C); Ciomber , 527 F.3d at 643. Again, each response, and each asserted fact, must be supported with a reference to the record. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B); Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc. , 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009) ; Bay Area Business Council, Inc. , 423 F.3d at 633.
While the Local Rules regarding summary judgment motions were not intended to provide a maze of technical traps to complicate and delay litigation without advancing the merits, Stevo v. Frasor , 662 F.3d 880, 887 (7th Cir. 2011), because of their importance promoting the clarity of summary judgment filings, the district court is entitled to demand strict compliance with its local rules. Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP , 796 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 807 F.3d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp. , 653 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir.2011). Whether it does so ultimately is left to the district court's discretion. Stevo v. Frasor , 662 F.3d 880, 886-887 (7th Cir. 2011) ; Little v. Cox's Supermarkets , 71 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1995).
When a responding party's statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party's statement in the manner the Local Rule demands, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion. Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 807 F.3d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Cracco , 559 F.3d at 632. Adherence to the Local Rule regarding summary judgment presentation aids the parties' understanding of the arguments and immeasurably aids the court in correctly resolving the motion. Townsend v. Alexian Bros. Medical Center , 589 Fed.Appx. 338, 339 (7th Cir.2015) ; United States v. Gutierrez Rodriguez , 288 F.3d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 2002) ; Kay v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago , 547 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir.2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.). See also WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Sopkin , 488 F.3d 1262, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.2007) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Ultimately then, the Local Rule helps to achieve what should be the lawyer's ultimate goal, namely to make it "easier for the court for the court to rule in his client's favor ...."
Dal Pozzo v. Basic Mach. Co. , 463 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2006).
Local Rule 56.1(b) requires a party's response to a statement of facts to be "concise." Mr. McCarty's response is not faithful to that requirement. Menard's factual assertions cover about eight pages and Mr. McCarty's responses cover nearly thirty pages. A few specific examples will provide a better idea of the difficulty of sifting through plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 submission.
At paragraph 8 of its Statement of Facts, Menards asserted, simply, that it operates the retail store where this incident occurred, located at 369 Illinois Rte. 173 in Antioch, Illinois. [Dkt. # 55, ¶ 8]. Despite the straight forward nature of the statement, the response is a four-page breakdown of the store and the managerial hierarchy. [Dkt. # 62, at pp. 2-6]. While Mr. McCarty does manage to admit that Menard's operates the store where he tripped, the response is not the "concise response" that Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) demands. This is not, unfortunately, an isolated example; rather, Mr. McCarty's responsive filing continues in that vein throughout. If Menard's states, uncontroversially, that Mr. McCarty and his employee were shopping for materials at the store on February 13, 2017 [Dkt. # 55, ¶ 11], Mr. McCarty needlessly responds by detailing the entire process from renting a truck driving through a certain gate, at a specific time of day and so forth. [Dkt. # 62, ¶¶ 11-12]. Simple sentences are met with paragraphs of response. One example (there are many others) should suffice to demonstrate the format. When Menard's asserts – correctly in light of the record – that its store general manager, Naushad Kazi, testified that he routinely patrols the outside yard himself [Dkt. # 55, ¶ 54], Mr. McCarty responded:
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