McCaskey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.

Decision Date09 March 2001
Docket NumberCIV. A. No. G-00-572.
Citation133 F.Supp.2d 514
PartiesMary McCASKEY, Individually and as Widow, Heir and the Personal Representative of the Estate of Ralph McCaskey, Plaintiff, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Ronald L. White, White Mackillop & Baham, PC, Houston, TX, mediator.

Steven E. Holden, Attorney at Law, Michael S. Ashworth, Attorney at Law, Bruce A. McKenna, Attorney at Law, Tulsa, OK, for Mary McCaskey, Individually and as Widow, Heir and the Personal Representative of the Estate of Ralph McCaskey, Ralph McCaskey, The Estate of, plaintiffs.

Nicholas E. Zito, Markle Ramos et al., Houston, TX, James Richard Watkins, Royston Rayzor et al., Galveston, TX, Mary C. Harlan Brooksby, Goodwin Raup PC, Phoenix, AZ, Stephen Robert Lewis, Jr., Lewis & Williams, Galveston, TX, William Lee Maynard, Beirne Maynard & Parsons, Houston, TX, for Continental Airlines Incorporated, John Doe Pilot, John Doe Physician, Gordon Bethune, an Individual, Douglas Dang, Douglas Dang, Dr., MedAire, defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT MEDAIRE, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY VENUE TRANSFER

KENT, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this wrongful death lawsuit based upon the October 10, 1998 passing of her husband. Now before the Court is Defendant MedAire, Inc.'s ("MedAire") Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for Improper Venue, and Motion for Discretionary Venue Transfer, each filed December 26, 2000. For the reasons stated below, MedAire's Motions are DENIED.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY

On September 24, 1998, Plaintiff and her husband were scheduled to travel on Continental Airlines, Inc. ("Continental") from their home in Tulsa, Oklahoma to Frankfurt, Germany. In order to reach Frankfurt, they flew from Tulsa to Houston, Texas. In Houston, they boarded Continental Flight 1720 bound for Newark, New Jersey, from which point they were scheduled to catch their international flight to Frankfurt.

Tragically, shortly after departing Houston on Flight 1720, Plaintiff's husband, Ralph McCaskey, is alleged to have suffered a stroke. Despite Mr. McCaskey's condition, however, Flight 1720 continued on to its planned destination of Newark, New Jersey. Upon arriving in Newark, Plaintiff and her husband sought medical attention and did not board their international flight. Several weeks later, on October 10, 1998, while aboard a train returning to Tulsa from New Jersey, Mr. McCaskey died, allegedly from complications attributable to the September 24 stroke.

As is common in the airline industry, Continental had a contract with a company, here Defendant MedAire, to provide medical advice in the event of in-flight medical emergencies. MedAire employs physicians who, based upon the information provided to them, assess the medical situation from afar. MedAire then makes recommendations to the flight crew regarding care of the ill traveler and possible flight diversions. On September 24, 1998, Continental contacted MedAire and allegedly sought and received advice regarding how to proceed in light of Mr. McCaskey's medical situation.

On September 22, 2000, Plaintiff filed suit against Continental and others. Soon thereafter, on October 5, 2000, Plaintiff amended her Complaint, adding MedAire as a Defendant in this action. Plaintiff now alleges, in essence, that MedAire was negligent in its provision of medical services, and that this negligence led to Mr. McCaskey's death a few weeks later.

MedAire is not a Texas citizen. It is, rather, an Arizona corporation with its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona. MedAire now argues, alternatively, that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, that venue is improper, or that the Court should exercise its discretion to transfer the action to Arizona.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

MedAire seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), contending that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. In federal court, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper when: (1) the defendant is amenable to service of process under the forum state's long-arm statute, and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is consistent with due process. See Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir.2000); Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir.1992). The Texas longarm statute authorizes service of process on a nonresident defendant if the defendant is determined to be "doing business" in Texas. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 17.042. Because the phrase "doing business" has been interpreted to reach as far as the United States Constitution permits, the jurisdictional analysis under the Texas long-arm statute collapses into a single due process inquiry. See Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir.1993); Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356-57 (Tex. 1990).

Whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution likewise requires a two-pronged inquiry. First, the Court must conclude that the defendant has "minimum contacts" with Texas. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Second, the Court must ensure that requiring the defendant to litigate in Texas does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id.; see also Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.1994); Ruston, 9 F.3d at 418.

The "minimum contacts" aspect of due process can be satisfied by either finding general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. See Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. For general jurisdiction, the defendant's contacts with the forum state must be both "continuous and systematic" and "substantial." See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); Villar v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 990 F.2d 1489, 1496 (5th Cir.1993). By contrast, the minimum contacts analysis in a specific jurisdiction case is more "narrow, focusing on the relationship between the defendant, the cause of action and the forum state." Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 937 F.Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.Tex.1996). Thus, specific jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant if the defendant has "`purposefully directed' his activities at the residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that `arise from or relate to' those activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); Villar, 990 F.2d at 1496. Accordingly, even a single contact with the forum state can be sufficient to support specific jurisdiction. See Ruston, 9 F.3d at 419; see also Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1990) ("It is well settled that specific jurisdiction may arise without the nonresident defendant's ever stepping foot upon the forum state's soil."). The critical inquiry for specific jurisdiction, therefore, concerns whether the defendant, by directing activities to the forum state, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474-75, 105 S.Ct. at 2182; Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 5 F.3d 877, 884 (5th Cir.1993).

Generally, with regard to a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, once a nonresident defendant raises the issue of personal jurisdiction by motion, the plaintiff must bear the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction over the nonresident. See Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir.1994). However, a plaintiff may bear her burden by presenting a prima facie case in situations, like this, in which the Court does not hold an evidentiary hearing. See id.; Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 785 (5th Cir.1990). Moreover, in evaluating whether a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of jurisdiction "uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor." D.J. Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir.1985); accord Stripling, 234 F.3d at 869.

1. Minimum Contacts

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") alleges that her husband's stroke occurred "shortly after" departing Houston.1 Pl.'s 1st Am. Compl. at para. 17. Apparently based upon these allegations, Plaintiff contends, in her Response to MedAire's Motion to Dismiss, that MedAire's medical advice was dispensed in (over) Texas, and that MedAire's "consultation caused Ralph McCaskey harm while McCaskey was physically present within the State of Texas." Pl.'s Resp. at pg. 12. If Plaintiff could carry her prima facie burden on this assertion, this would be a contact from which specific jurisdiction would likely attach. See Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.1999) ("[A] single act ... directed toward Texas that gives rise to a cause of action ... can support a finding of minimum contacts."). However, the allegations made in Plaintiff's Complaint do not fairly support this argument. Plaintiff's Complaint simply makes no mention of the aircraft's location when MedAire became involved with Mr. McCaskey's situation.2 In contrast to Plaintiff's unsubstantiated argument, MedAire does attempt to specifically...

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