McCaskey v. Ft. Dodge, D. M. & S. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 March 1912 |
| Citation | 154 Iowa 652,135 N.W. 6 |
| Parties | MCCASKEY ET AL. v. FT. DODGE, D. M. & S. RY. CO. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Boone County; R. M. Wright, Judge.
In separate proceedings for the condemnation by defendant of a right of way through two farms, each consisting of a tract of 160 acres, it appeared that there was a life estate in each farm belonging to Elsie D. McCaskey as widow of H. A. McCaskey, deceased, who had at one time been the owner in fee of both farms, and that the remainder was in these plaintiffs as heirs of said H. A. McCaskey. The commissioners appointed by the sheriff to assess the damages made separate findings as to the damages to the life estate and to the remainder in the two farms, $140 being allowed to the owner of the life estate and $700 to the plaintiffs as owners of the remainder. It is conceded that the right of way (50 feet in width) amounts in area to about 3 1/2 acres for each farm. These plaintiffs as owners in common of the remainder in each farm appealed separately from the assessments to the district court, where the appeals were consolidated, and on trial to a jury there was a verdict for plaintiffs for $1,949.16. On defendant's motion for a new trial, the verdict was set aside as excessive, and it was ordered that, unless plaintiffs elected to accept the sum of $1,400 for their damages, a new trial would be granted. On failure of the plaintiffs to accept the reduced amount, there was another trial to a jury in which a verdict for plaintiffs in the sum of $1,185.79 was returned, which verdict was confirmed by the court as a proper finding of the amount of damages, and the plaintiffs appeal. Modified and remanded.Ganoe & Ganoe and Whitaker & Snell, for appellants.
Dyer & Dyer, for appellee.
The two applications made by the defendant to the sheriff for condemnation of right of way through the two separate farms, in each of which farms Elsie D. McCaskey held a life estate and these plaintiffs held the remainder as tenants in common, resulted in one finding by the commissioners fixing separately the damage to the life estate and the damage to plaintiffs' remainder in both farms. On the appeal from these findings, there has been no contention that there was error in not treating the two tracts as constituting one farm, or, on the other hand, in assessing a lump sum by way of damages to the widow's life estate, or the plaintiffs' remainder in the two farms. The sole question as to the sufficiency of the verdict on the last trial is as to the rulings in the admission of evidence and the instructions to the jury relating to the method of ascertaining the damages sustained by plaintiffs as owners in common of the remainder in each tract.
1. Although the rules of law relating to the measure of damages for the taking of a right of way through a tract of land used as one farm are elaborated by counsel for appellants, with the citation of many authorities, it is conceded for appellee that it was proper for the jury to consider each tract as an entire farm without regard to the separate uses that may have been made of different portions of each farm, and the only questions which we find it necessary to discuss are those involving certain rulings and instructions which, as counsel for appellants contend, authorized the jury to estimate the damages on the basis of evidence relating to the separate use and value of the different parcels. We are unable to discover from the record whether the right of way crosses only one 80-acre tract in each farm; but, as the evidence and the instructions relate in each instance to damages to the entire farm, the fact seems to be immaterial, provided the rulings and instructions as to the method of ascertaining the damage to each farm shall be found to be correct.
It is contended, however, that evidence was improperly admitted relating to the value of distinct parcels and improperly excluded in relation to the use of different parcels as one farm. The testimony objected to with reference to the different value of distinct parcels consisted of the testimony of a witness who, over objection for the plaintiffs, gave the value of the parcel west of the right of way per acre, and also the value of the entire farm per acre in each case. This testimony was given on cross-examination, and no doubt the witness might properly be asked as to the value placed by him on different parcels to determine his credibility.
[1] But, however this may be, as the case was submitted to the jury only with reference to the value per acre of each farm as an entirety, no possible prejudice could have resulted to the appellants from the question asked the witness and the answer thereto relating to the separate value per acre of the parcel west of the right of way. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury could have found to the plaintiffs' prejudice a value for each parcel in the aggregate differing from the value found for the farm as a whole. The statement as to the value per acre of the parcel west of the right of way fixed it as of the same value per acre as that fixed by the witness for the entire farm, and it is not possible in our judgment that appellants could have been prejudiced by the question and answer.
[2] This question and answer on cross-examination related to the value per acre of the land when the case was tried; but the witness had already testified on direct examination as to the value per acre of each farm at the date of the condemnation, and he explained the discrepancy by saying that in the meantime land had advanced in value. With this explanation, there could have been...
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