McChesney v. Moore
| Decision Date | 25 January 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 1007.,1007. |
| Citation | 78 A.2d 389 |
| Parties | McCHESNEY v. MOORE. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Louis P. Haffer, Washington, D. C., James G. Boss, Washington, D. C., on the brief, for appellant.
Josiah Lyman, Washington, D. C., Kathryn M. Schwarz, Washington, D. C., on the brief, for appellee.
Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.
The Municipal Court dismissed three separately stated counterclaims of defendant interposed in an action brought by plaintiff-landlord for rent and water charges. Apparently (although the record is indefinite on the subject) the first counterclaim over which the Municipal Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction was dismissed as being too indefinite and the other two counterclaims, each of which was within the $3,000 jurisdictional limit of the trial court but which in the aggregate exceeded such limit, apparently were dismissed as being beyond the jurisdiction of the court.1 In dismissing the counterclaims, however, the trial court gave leave to amend each of them. Instead of amending or refusing to amend, defendant appealed from the order of dismissal and also filed with the trial court a stipulation, signed by counsel for both plaintiff and defendant, extending the time within which the counterclaims might be amended "to and including five days after disposition and termination of her appeal."
Although the trial court was not a party to this stipulation, it seems to us that there is such a lack of finality in the entire proceedings below as to prevent this from being an appealable order within the meaning of the statute regarding appeals to this court.2 It has often been stated that it is not within the province of appellate courts to decide abstract, hypothetical or moot questions, disconnected with the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. It has also been properly said that an appellate court will not consider a fictitious case submitted merely for testing the right to do a particular thing and on the same principle the general rule is well settled that if, pending an appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant any relief, or renders a decision unnecessary, the question becomes moot and the appeal will be dismissed. A question may be rendered moot by the action of the parties themselves.3
We have concluded that the order appealed from is not a final order and therefore that the appeal must be dismissed. We nevertheless think it appropriate in the interest of the speedy administration of justice to mention certain considerations which occur to us, not as expressive of a final opinion but merely as suggestive of the field of investigation. We do so because we can not determine now what amendments may be offered by defendant, because at least some of the considerations mentioned below may not arise, because the parties have not argued the case on the basis of most of the cases from other jurisdictions mentioned below, and because the parties may unknowingly prejudice their rights.
To the complaint claiming $1,400 unpaid rent and $300 water charges, defendant filed a paper divided into five parts. The first part consisted of a general denial of the allegations of the complaint. In the second part, denominated affirmative defense, the defendant claimed that the premises in question had been rented to defendant by plaintiff in 1947 to be used for living, office and club activities, that the premises had been rented on January 1, 1941, or within one year ending on that date, and that the rent charged defendant exceeded the applicable rent ceiling, and furthermore that the minimum services furnished were less than the minimum service standards for the premises. The next three parts were denominated defendant's first, second and third counterclaims. The first did not state the amount claimed but in general terms demanded judgment in an amount representing double the alleged rent overcharge and double the value of the services of which defendant claimed she had been deprived. The next claimed judgment for $2,500 based upon an allegation that plaintiff had agreed to make the premises conform to the fire regulations of the District of Columbia and that upon the plaintiff's failure to fulfill his contract defendant had been compelled to make the installation. The final counterclaim pleaded an agreement separate in time and content from the previous one which plaintiff had made to repair the premises. Defendant alleged this agreement had been breached by plaintiff and claimed $2,000 on account thereof.
Under the Rent Act, Code 1940, Supp. VII, 45-1610(a), the Municipal Court is given jurisdiction of claims for rent overcharges and violations of minimum service requirements irrespective of the amounts involved. The first counterclaim, therefore, was clearly within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. Considered as a matter of pleading, it has been held under other statutes permitting the recovery of multiple damages for overcharges or underpayments that the amount of such charges or payments need not be stated in the claim.4 If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party can not reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, a motion to make more certain is more appropriate than a motion to dismiss where it seems clear that regardless of vagueness the party filing a pleading has a claim upon which an action may be based.
As to the second and third counterclaims, each of them is within the $3,000 jurisdiction of the Municipal Court if considered separately but if aggregated they exceed such jurisdiction. Admittedly, a party can not split up an entire cause of action and maintain several actions, each for part of his demand, and the same rule applies to a counterclaim.5
Rule 13(a) of the Municipal Court, based upon rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., requires a defendant to state as a counterclaim any claim over which the court has jurisdiction which at the time of filing the pleader has against any...
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VAUGHN v. U.S.
...Barber v. D.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 361 A.2d 194, 196-97 (D.C. 1976); Smith v. Worksman, 99 A.2d 712 (D.C. 1953); McChesney v. Moore, 78 A.2d 389, 390 (D.C. 1951). 8. See Super.Ct.Civ.R. 19(a) (1989), Joinder of persons needed for a just adjudication. See also Flack v. Laster, 417 A.2d......
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Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb
...section we have held that if in fact plaintiff has but one cause of action he has but one claim which cannot be split. McChesney v. Moore, D.C. Mun.App., 78 A.2d 389; Astor Pictures Corporation v. Shull, D.C.Mun.App., 64 A.2d Appellant contends that even if there were two breaches of the co......
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Barber v. District of Columbia Dept. of Human R., 9180.
...the question becomes moot and the appeal will be dismissed." Smith v. Worksman, D.C.Mun.App., 99 A.2d 712 (1953); McChesney v. Moore, D.C.Mun.App., 78 A.2d 389, 390 (1951). Such, under the facts, is the case presented here. Although petitioner filed application for emergency assistance to c......
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Smith v. Worksman
...court to grant any relief, or makes a decision unnecessary, the question becomes moot and the appeal will be dismissed. McChesney v. Moore, D.C.Mun.App., 78 A.2d 389. This rule has been applied in numerous cases where the statute which was the subject of the appeal had been repealed by the ......