McClain v. State

• Decision Date: 29 December 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-0718
• Parties: McClain, Appellant, v. The State of Ohio, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

2022-Ohio-4722

McClain, Appellant, v. The State of Ohio, Appellee.

No. 2021-0718

Supreme Court of Ohio

December 29, 2022

Submitted May 24, 2022

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-200195 2021-Ohio-1423.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, for appellee.

Koenig & Owen, L.L.C., Charles A. Koenig, and James D. Owen, for appellant.

STEWART, J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we are asked to decide whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution in a claim for wrongful imprisonment. We hold that appellant, Anthony McClain, has no constitutional right to a jury trial in his action to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned person under R.C. 2743.48, because this type of action did not exist at common law. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 1995, McClain was indicted for murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), with an accompanying firearm specification. He was tried by a jury, convicted of murder and sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life, to be served consecutively to a 3-year prison term for the firearm specification. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed McClain's conviction on appeal. State v. McClain, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-950859, 1996 WL 487931 (Aug. 28, 1996).

{¶ 3} In 2002, McClain filed in the trial court a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. After converting the motion for leave into a motion for a new trial, the trial court denied the motion. The First District reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a new trial. State v. McClain, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040647 (Aug. 17, 2005). In 2006, McClain was retried by a jury and acquitted of all offenses.

{¶ 4} McClain filed an action against appellee, the state of Ohio, to be declared a "wrongly imprisoned individual" under R.C. 2743.48(A). He included a jury demand with his complaint.^[1] McClain's demand was overruled. The question raised under R.C. 2743.48(A)(5)-whether McClain proved either that he did not commit murder or that no offense was committed by any person-was then tried to the bench.

{¶ 5} The trial court held that McClain failed to prove that he was actually innocent of the murder offense or that no offense was committed by any person; it therefore declined to declare McClain a wrongfully imprisoned person. McClain appealed to the First District, raising a single assignment of error: the trial court erred by refusing to grant McClain's right to a jury trial. The court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, overruled McClain's assignment of error, holding that McClain did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in the wrongful-imprisonment action. 2021-Ohio-1423, 171 N.E.3d 1228, ¶ 30.

{¶ 6} McClain filed a discretionary appeal in this court, raising a single proposition of law:

The divided court in the First District erred when it held, in direct contravention of Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution, that Appellant was not entitled to a jury trial for his wrongful imprisonment claim.

See 164 Ohio St.3d 1460, 2021-Ohio-3594, 174 N.E.3d 810.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 7} Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution protects the right to a jury trial: "The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in civil cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less than three-fourths of the jury." In 1929, this court clarified that a right to a jury trial in civil cases is available only when, under the principles of the common law, the type of claim existed prior to the adoption of the Ohio Constitution. Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner, 121 Ohio St. 393, 396, 169 N.E. 301 (1929). Accordingly, the "assertion of a constitutional right to a jury necessarily entails inquiry into whether the common law recognized the type of claim [the plaintiff] presents." Arrington v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, ¶ 22.

{¶ 8} The wrongful-imprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48 was enacted in 1986 to authorize wrongfully imprisoned persons to bring civil actions against the state for money damages. Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678, 985 N.E.2d 1229, ¶ 10. The statute establishes a two-step process: it first directs a plaintiff to obtain a determination whether he was wrongfully imprisoned by filing a civil action in the court of common pleas in the county in which the underlying criminal action was initiated, R.C. 2743.48(B)(1). That court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and determine that action. R.C. 2305.02. Second, if the common pleas court determines that a person was wrongfully imprisoned, then the person may file a civil action against the state in the court of claims to recover a sum of money because of the wrongful imprisonment, R.C. 2743.48(B)(2). The court of claims has exclusive, original jurisdiction over the action to determine damages. R.C. 2743.48(D).

{¶ 9} To be declared a "wrongfully imprisoned individual" by the court of common pleas under the first step of the statute, an individual needs to satisfy the five elements of R.C. 2743.48(A):

(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony, felony, or misdemeanor.

(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser-included offense by the court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was found guilty was an aggravated felony, felony, or misdemeanor.

(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the individual was found guilty.

(4) The individual's conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal and all of the following apply:

(a) No criminal proceeding is pending against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.

(b) The prosecuting attorney in the case, within one year after the date of the vacating, dismissal, or reversal, has not sought any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, provided that this division does not limit or affect the seeking of any such appeal after the expiration of that one-year period as described in division (C)(3) of this section.

(c) The prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation, within one year after the date of the vacating, dismissal, or reversal, has not brought a criminal proceeding against the individual for any act associated with that conviction, provided that this division does not limit or affect the bringing of any such proceeding after the expiration of that one-year period as described in division (C)(3) of this section.

(5) Subsequent to sentencing or during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure was discovered that occurred prior to, during, or after sentencing, that involved a violation of the Brady Rule which violated the individual's rights to a fair trial under the Ohio Constitution or the United States Constitution, and that resulted in the individual's release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated either that the offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, was not committed by the individual or that no offense was committed by any person.

{¶ 10} McClain argues that a wrongful-imprisonment claim has roots in the common law in the intentional tort of false imprisonment, which carried with it a right to a jury trial. McClain further asserts that this court recognized a common-law claim of false imprisonment against state officials long before R.C. 2743.48 was enacted, so he is therefore entitled to a jury trial.

{¶ 11} The state first responds that McClain's claim is statutory and has no common-law analogue. Second, the state argues that because McClain essentially seeks a declaratory judgment that he qualifies as a wrongfully imprisoned person under R.C. 2743.48(A), he seeks relief that was unavailable at common law. Finally, the state reasons that because McClain seeks to sue the state, an entity that could not be sued at common law without its express consent, the enactment of the wrongful-imprisonment statute created a new cause of action against the state without displacing former remedies. We agree with the state.

{¶ 12} Contrary to McClain's assertion, a wrongful-imprisonment claim is different than a claim at common law for the intentional tort of false imprisonment. The latter exists when "a person confines another intentionally 'without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time however short.'" Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 573 N.E.2 633 (1991), quoting Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Section 3.7, at 226 (1956). While the common law sometimes allowed plaintiffs to bring false-imprisonment claims against state officials, see, e.g., Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 119 N.E. 451 (1918), it did not permit suits against the state itself, Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 518, 118 N.E. 102 (1917). However, R.C. 2743.02-the general waiver of immunity that was enacted in 1975 as part of the Court of Claims Act, see Reynolds v. State, Div. of Parole & Community Servs., 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 471 N.E.2d 776 (1984)-now allows persons who were imprisoned to bring false-imprisonment actions against the state. Bennett at 110. But...