McCloskey v. Salveter & Stewart Investment Co.
Citation | 298 S.W. 226,317 Mo. 1156 |
Decision Date | 16 September 1927 |
Docket Number | 25862 |
Parties | Gaston S. McCloskey, Appellant, v. Salveter & Stewart Investment Company |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. John W Calhoun, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Abbott Fauntleroy, Cullen & Edwards and Rice & Straub for appellant.
(1) If the owner elects to keep the shaft opening unguarded he must keep the surroundings well lighted, so that a person exercising due care for his safety will not step into it, and if he fails to do so he is liable for the ensuing negligence. 9 R. C. L. 1241. (2) It was the duty of defendant, in operating the elevator, to exercise the utmost care and diligence, and to provide and maintain proper and secure fastenings to the doors opening into the elevatorway that could not be opened or controlled from the outside. Colorado Inv. Co. v. Rees, 42 P. 42; Burner v Higman & Skinner Co., 103 N.W. 803. (3) The locks on the elevator door in question were so defective that if the door did not rebound anyone wanting to use the elevator "would just walk in and open the door and use it." Therefore, it was "wholly immaterial whether such door was opened by some third person," provided that such accident could not have happened but for the negligence of the defendant in keeping and maintaining the fastenings to its elevator door; for, had it performed its duty in the premises, such interference by a third party would have been impossible. Hence its negligence necessarily concurred in, and constituted an essential factor in, causing the injury. Colorado Inv. Co. v. Rees, 42 P. 45. (4) "It is well settled by the adjudged cases that where an injury is the result of the combined negligence of the defendant and the negligent or wrongful act of a third person, for whose act neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is responsible, the defendant is liable, when the injury would not have happened, except for his negligence." Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, sec. 10. (5) "A person has the right to assume that the owner and operator of an elevator will exercise that high degree of care that the nature of the business demands, and will see to it that the approaches thereto are reasonably safe, and that the doors to the shaft can be safely and securely locked, and are not negligently left open; and that he may safely enter when he finds the door open, without stopping to make a special examination. Tousey v. Roberts, 114 N.Y. 312. When the motion was interposed, the evidence before the jury tended to show that, because of the broken lock on the elevator door, the door was standing open; and that, owing to the inadequate light in the hallway, plaintiff failed to discover the absence of the elevator. Whether, under the circumstances thus shown, he exercised that degree of care which persons of ordinary prudence would exercise on approaching and entering the elevator, was at least a question of fact for the jury. Colorado Inv. Co. v. Rees, 42 P. 43. (6) The owner of an elevator must use the highest degree of care, vigilance and precaution, both in providing and managing it. 9 R. C. L. 1249; Lander v. Hornbeck, 179 P. 21; Luckel v. Building Co., 177 Mo. 628. (7) The permissive use of the elevator to any who desired was negligence. Lander v. Hornbeck, 179 P. 21. (8) It is not contributory negligence not to look for danger when there is no reason to apprehend any. People's Bank v. Morgolofski, 32 Am. St. 411.
Foristel, Mudd, Hezel & Habenicht for respondent.
(1) The record fails to show any negligence on the part of the defendant proximately causing injury to the plaintiff. Katz v. Development Co., 215 Mo.App. 662; Hake v. Stove & Range Co., 234 S.W. 1061. (2) It is not shown that defendant owed plaintiff any duty to keep the hallway lighted after 6:30 o'clock in the evening when the plaintiff entered into it to go up the stairway. Morse v. Maddox, 17 Mo. 569; New Era Mfg. Co. v. O'Reilly, 197 Mo. 466; Dean v. Murphy, 169 Mass. 413; Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N. J. L. 475; Jucht v. Behrens, 7 N.Y.S. 185; 36 C. J. 36, sec. 636; 16 R. C. L. 1041, sec. 560; 14 Ann. Cas. 764, note; 19 Ann. Cas. 667, col. 1, note. (3) Plaintiff directly contributed to his injuries by negligence on his own part. Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N. J. L. 475; Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 131 N.Y. 674; Miller v. Mencken, 26 N.Y.S. 801; Jucht v. Behrens, 7 N.Y.S. 185; State ex rel. v. Trimble, 279 S.W. 60.
Seddon, C. Lindsay and Ellison, CC., concur.
Action by plaintiff (appellant) to recover damages in the sum of $ 25,000 for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant (respondent) while plaintiff was rightfully and lawfully within the first or ground floor hallway of defendant's business building at 507 North Broadway, in the city of St. Louis, known as the Stewart Building. Plaintiff fell into an open elevator shaft or well in the building, which was owned and operated by defendant corporation. The negligence charged against defendant in the petition is as follows:
The answer of defendant is a general denial and, by way of further defense, "defendant states that whatever injury, if any, plaintiff sustained on the occasion mentioned in his said amended petition was due to and caused by his own negligence and carelessness, directly contributing thereto in this, that plaintiff, without using and exercising ordinary care for his own safety, entered said building in the nighttime, and when it was dark therein, and walked about in said building then and there in the nighttime and when no light, or lights, were burning in said building and when it was dark in said building, and in the nighttime; that plaintiff, upon coming to and against the door of the elevator shaft in said building, and while it was dark and in the nighttime, as aforesaid, and when he could not see where or into what place said door permitted entrance, opened the said door and entered into and through the same and thereby was caused to fall into and down said elevator shaft."
The reply is a general denial.
At the beginning of the trial, defendant, through its counsel, made the following admission, which is incorporated in the record:
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