McCloud, In re

• Decision Date: 26 July 1972
• Docket Number: No. 1304-A,1304-A
• Citation: 110 R.I. 431,293 A.2d 512
• Parties: In re Thomas I. McCLOUD, Jr. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 512

293 A.2d 512

110 R.I. 431

In re Thomas I. McCLOUD, Jr.

No. 1304-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 26, 1972.

Richard J. Israel, Atty. Gen., Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Providence, for plaintiff

Eugene J. McCaffrey, Jr., Warwick, for defendant.

Abedon, Michaelson, Stanzler & Biener, Milton Stanzler, Providence, amicus curiae.

OPINION

POWERS, Justice.

On September 8, 1969, Thomas I. McCloud, Jr., was referred by the Warwick police department to the Family Court as being a delinquent within the meaning of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 14-1-3(F). ¹ At the time of his referral, McCloud was 17 years of age. The basis for such referral was that he was guilty of conduct which if committed by an adult would constitute the crime of rape. McCloud pleaded not guilty and moved that the charge of delinquency be tried to a jury. The Family Court justice released McCloud to his parents and took the motion under advisement.

Thereafter, on January 15, 1971, said Family Court justice granted McCloud's motion for a jury trial. At the request of the city solicitor of the city of Warwick, the Attorney General appealed from said decision, pursuant to the provisions of now § 9-24-32. ² It is clear from the decision of the Family Court justice that, in his opinion, a juvenile charged with delinquency has a constitutional right to have such accusation tried to a jury under both article XIV of amendments to the Constitution of the United States and article I, sections 10 and 15 of the constitution of this state.

However, subsequent to the filing of the Family Court justice's decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the precise question in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). There, a majority of the Court held that neither under article VI of amendments to the United States Constitution, binding on the state through article XIV of amendments to that Constitution, nor under the fundamental fairness concept of the due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment when considered apart from its relationship to the Bill of Rights, are the states required to provide jury trials at the adjudication stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings. See also In re J.T., 290 A.2d 821 (D.C.Ct.App.1972) decided May 12, 1972, after the case at bar was argued in this court.

As to the nonapplicability of the sixth amendment the Court pointed out that its guarantee of a jury trial related only to those accused of a crime. Further, pointing out that while the Court had consistently avoided the wooden approach of labelling juvenile deliquency proceedings as civil rather than criminal, it had, with equal consistency, refused to consider them as criminal, notwithstanding that some aspects thereof were of that nature.

Restating certain definitive due process protections which, consistent with the fundamental fairness concept, must be accorded to juveniles charged with delinquency, ³ the Court went on to say that the jury is not a necessary component of accurate fact-finding in our legal system. In making this point, the Court referred to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1452, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 501 (1968). The Court stated:

'We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial-or any particular trial-held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.'

It is obvious from the foregoing that the Family Court justice's conviction regarding articles VI and XIV of amendments to the United States Constitution was unfounded unless, of course, this court were persuaded to take a broader view of constitutional provisions than did the United States Supreme Court. We are not so persuaded.

Even so, McCloud contends that the decision of the Family Court justice is correct in light of the requirements of the constitution of this state. He points out, as did the Family Court justice in reaching his decision, that article I, section 10 of the constitution of this state is significantly different from the provisions of article VI of amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

The distinction to which he refers is that unlike the guarantee of said article VI of amendments to the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 10 of the constitution of this state further provides '* * * nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.'

This language, the Family Court justice pointed out, makes no reference to crime and, for that reason, must have been intended to be applicable to state action which had restraint of personal liberty as its goal. Continuing, and referring to sound decisional law, he made the point that whether a juvenile, adjudged to be a delinquent, is ordered confined to a state institution, or merely held answerable to supervision by the Family Court is immaterial. In either case, the Family Court justice reasoned that a juvenile so situated is restrained of his liberty. We have heretofore agreed with such reasoning. See State v. Turner, 107 R.I. 518, 268 A.2d 732 (1970).

However, in a substantial number of cases, this court has consistently pointed out that the prohibition against deprivation of 'life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers,' as guaranteed by article I, section 10 of the constitution of this state is applicable only to an accused in a criminal prosecution. ⁴ Indeed, more recently, in State v. Holliday, R.I., 280 A.2d 333 (1971), we held that the right to a trial by jury, even in criminal prosecutions as guaranteed by article I, section 10, does not extend to persons charged with petty misdemeanors.

All of this, however, is not to say that the organic law of this state makes no provision for the right to a trial by jury in all other instances. Of equal solemnity with article I, section 10, as noted by the Family Court justice, is section XV of said article. It provides, '(T)he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.'

But, although a right to a trial by jury thus constitutionally secured, is not limited to criminal prosecutions, it is limited to those justiciable controversies which were triable to a jury at the time the constitution was adopted in 1842. Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 628, 278 A.2d 852 (1971); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Director of Public Works, 98 R.I. 167, 200 A.2d 580 (1964); Mathewson v. Ham, 21 R.I. 311, 43 A. 848 (1899); Mathews v. Tripp, 12 R.I. 256 (1879).

It was not until some 73 years thereafter that a more definitive parens patriae concept brought about the enactment of P.L.1915, ch. 1185. Prior to the passage of that Act, juveniles who were alleged to have violated any municipal ordinance or the laws of this state would, in common with adults, be prosecuted by complaint or indictment as the offense might require. With the enactment of P.L.1915, ch. 1185, however, juveniles, defined by said Act as children under the age of 16, were, except for murder and manslaughter, exempt from such prosecutions.

Rather, juveniles charged with misconduct were to be referred to 'a juvenile court' which, the statute provided, would be presided over by the judges of the then District Courts for the several judicial districts.

Although the original Act has been several times amended both as to substance and procedure, ⁵ the adjudication of McCloud's alleged delinquency by a Family Court justice, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) ch. 1 of title 14 is representative of the same type of proceedings which first became a part of our judicial system in 1915. No more need be said to make the point that such proceedings were not of the class for which adjudication by a jury was secured by the adoption of article I, section 15 of our constitution in 1842.

Consequently, neither under the Constitution of the United States nor the constitution of this...