McCloud v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 07 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 18270,18270
• Citation: 507 S.W.2d 644
• Parties: Lorayne McCLOUD, Appellant, v. Joseph L. KNAPP, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 644

507 S.W.2d 644

Lorayne McCLOUD, Appellant, v. Joseph L. KNAPP, Appellee.

No. 18270.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Dallas.

March 7, 1974.

Rehearing Denied April 4, 1974.

Richard L. Griffith, Cantey, Hanger, Gooch, Cravens & Munn, Fort Worth, for appellant.

G. Ward Beaudry, Lane, Savage, Counts & Winn, Dallas, for appellee .

CLAUDE WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

Lorayne McCloud brought this action against Joseph L. Knapp for a declaratory judgment under Article 2524--1 (1965) Vernon's Ann.Civ.St ., ¹ to determine her rights to enforce an oral contract for a lifetime tenancy of certain realty owned by Knapp; and in the alternative, for damages in lieu of possession of said premises, having been evicted therefrom by proceedings in the justice court. From a summary judgment denying her any relief she brings this appeal.

ATTACK ON SUFFICIENCY OF MOTION

In her first point of error appellant attacks the motion for summary judgment on the procedural ground that such motion fails to allege any specific grounds therefor as specifically required by Rule 166--A(c), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion for summary judgment does not contain any specific grounds, but merely alleges

. . . that the pleadings and attached affidavit of Defendant show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

However, appellee points to his brief filed in the trial court herein te grounds of his motion and specifically sets forth in detail, being: (1) that the judgment in the justice court is res judicata of all issues in this suit, and (2) the alleged oral lease is unenforceable by reason of Article 1288. These are the only two points designated, presented and argued by appellee. Appellant cannot say that she was misled or misinformed concerning appellee's position; her only complaint is that there was technical noncompliance with the Rule.

We do not wish to be understood as holding that strict compliance with Rule 166--A is unnecessary, but it is our holding that in this particular factual situation it appears that no harm or prejudice was suffered by appellant and that she presents no proper ground for reversal. Rule 434. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.

Appellant's second point of error is that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Under this general point of error appellant presents sub-points which we will consider separately.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

Resolution of the questions here presented requires a statement of the material summary judgment evidence considered most favorably to appellant's contentions. Great American Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41--47 (Tex., 1965).

In November 1969 appellee Knapp purchased the premises and improvements located at 3317 Amherst Street, Dallas, Texas. About this time Knapp told Mrs. McCloud that he was purchasing the house and lot for her use and benefit and that it was his intention to devise it to her at his death. Subsequently, by codicil to his will dated September 18, 1970, Knapp did devise this property to Mrs. McCloud. At the time Mrs. McCloud and her husband moved into the house in question Knapp told Mrs. McCloud that he would charge her a rental of only $200 per month inclusive of utilities, during her lifetime. After moving into the property, Mrs. McCloud and her husband began paying the agreed rental of $200 per month, inclusive of utilities, which arrangement continued until May 24, 1971, at which time a meeting was held between Mrs. McCloud, Knapp and Knapp's attorney. At this meeting Mrs. McCloud was informed by Knapp that he had changed his mind in regard to leaving her the property under his will and that in lieu thereof he offered her a tenancy of the premises in question for her lifetime at a set rental of $200 per month, inclusive of utilities. Mrs. McCloud accepted this offer and in reliance upon the oral agreement she made her June rental payment of $200 which was accepted by Knapp . Thereafter, on June 3, 1971, Mrs. McCloud was informed that Knapp had apparently changed his mind again and wanted to attempt a modification of the oral contract previously entered into on or about May 24, 1971. Mrs. McCloud refused to accept the attempted modification but rather continued to pay her monthly rental at $200 per month which said rental was received and accepted by Knapp until July 1972. Mrs. McCloud and her husband remained in possession of the premises, making the payments when due, until they were forced out of possession by judgment rendered by the Justice of the Peace on the 10th day of August 1972.

On June 16, 1972, Mrs. McCloud filed her original petition in this cause in the district court of Dallas County in which she sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to Article 2524--1, adjudicating her rights under the oral agreement made between her and Knapp on May 24, 1971, and, in the alternative, for damages in the event she and her husband were forced out of possession of the property. Thereafter on July 20, 1972, Knapp filed a suit for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court in which he sought immediate possession of the premises. The judgment of the justice court provides that Knapp should have possession of the premises. Mrs. McCloud and her husband removed themselves from the premises because of this judgment. At that time the motion for summary judgment had not been heard in the district court.

The evidence reveals that Mrs. McCloud and Knapp maintained both a social and a medical relationship prior to the purchase of the property in question. In addition there was a business relationship involved in which Mrs. McCloud had been the interior decorator for the hospital and clinic of which Knapp was medical director. Also, after Knapp purchased the property in 1969, he utilized the services of Mrs. McCloud to remodel and redecorate the same.

RES JUDICATA

In the light of the record thus made we first consider the contention first advanced by appellee Knapp that the trial court's action in sustaining the motion for summary judgment was proper because the judgment of the justice of the peace in the forcible entry detainer action effectively barred Mrs. McCloud's cause of action. In support of his contention of res judicata, appellee relies upon Rankin v. Hooks, 81 S.W. 1005 (Tex.Civ.App.--1904, no writ); YWCA v. Hair, 165 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.); and Slay v. Fugitt, 302 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). These cases hold that a material issue in a forcible detainer suit in the justice court is whether the person holding the property is entitled to the possession thereof and this involves the question whether he was holding possession thereof under a valid lease, entitling him to retain possession. Therefore, the determination of the issue by the justice of the peace court would be res judicata of the question of validity of the lease. However, these cases were all decided prior to the passage of Article 2226a. Section 1 of that article provides that:

'A determination of fact or law or a judgment in any proceeding in the Small Claims Court, Justice of the Peace Court, County Court, County Civil Court at Law, County Criminal Court at Law, or County Court at Law shall not be res judicata and shall not constitute a basis for estoppel by judgment in any proceeding in a District Court, except that any such judgment shall be binding on the parties thereto as to the recovery or denial thereof rendered in that particular case, and further except that all judgments in probate, guardianship, lunacy and other matters over which said inferior courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter, on a basis other than the amount in controversy, shall not be affected thereby.

This statute became effective in 1965 and the obvious purpose of the legislature in enacting the same was to preclude a judgment for less than $20 in the justice court from controlling the results in a suit in the district court. As said by Lochridge, Res Judicata, 27 Tex.B.J. 959, 1000 (1964):

It is designed to confine the effective jurisdiction of such courts to their constitutional limits and to eliminate the trap for the unwary and the present device by which a justice court or other inferior court indirectly can extend its jurisdiction over matters in dispute involving thousands of dollars. ²

Appellee argues that this case comes within the exceptions contained in Article 2226a. He contends that the language 'except that any such judgment shall be binding on the parties thereto as to the recovery or denial thereof rendered in that particular case' is applicable here. He contends that there can be no claim for these damages sought by appellant if there is no right to possession of the premises, and that this question has been determined adversely to appellant by the justice of the peace court. We cannot agree with this argument. The exception in the statute refers to 'the recovery or denial thereof rendered in that particular case.' The only issue in the justice of the peace court in the forcible detainer case was the right to immediate possession of the premises. Garcia v. Munoz, 309 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1958, writ ref'd), and Haginas v. Malbis Memorial Foundation, 163 Tex. 274, 354 S.W.2d 368 (1962). The record is silent as to what was shown in the justice of the peace court entitling Knapp to judgment. We cannot assume or speculate as to the record made in the justice of the peace court which led to the judgment giving immediate possession to Knapp. Certainly it is not demonstrated that the issues urged the presented by Mrs. McCloud in her suit in the district court were the same as those presented in the justice of the peace court. The claim for damages asserted by Mrs. McCloud has not been disposed of in the...