McCollum v. Reaves

• Decision Date: 28 April 1989
• Citation: 547 So.2d 433
• Parties: Ralph L. McCOLLUM and Pauline McCollum v. Adrian L. REAVES, et al. 87-1498.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 433

547 So.2d 433

Ralph L. McCOLLUM and Pauline McCollum v. Adrian L. REAVES, et al.

87-1498.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 28, 1989.

Rehearing Denied June 16, 1989.

John R. Benn, Florence, for appellants.

James Dardess, Sheffield, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, who initiated this lawsuit to ascertain the proper boundary lines between their land and that of the adjoining landowners, challenge the trial court's decision to override the legal description of their property as given in their deed. After taking ore tenus evidence and making an inspection of the premises, the trial court entered judgment for the defendants consistent with their claim of adverse possession, and appointed a surveyor, as agreed upon by the parties, to fix the boundary line accordingly. The court-appointed surveyor's report was subsequently approved by the court. Thereafter, following a hearing on the plaintiff's post-judgment motion for a new trial, the trial court entered an amended judgment, which reads in part:

"1. The Court finds that an Order was entered on June 7, 1988, and with this Order the Court does hereby amend that Order as follows:

" '(a) Testimony was offered by the Plaintiff and Defendant and exhibits were presented to the Court for consideration in said cause. Also, cases were submitted to the Court which are contained in the file concerning coterminous landowners. In addition to this, the Court and the attorneys made a visit to the site of the disputed strip of property, and the Court noted an old fence extending from the Southwest corner of the disputed property beginning on Kentucky Avenue and extending eastwardly to a point being the Southeast corner of the disputed property.'

"2. The Court finds that the defendants, Adrian L. Reaves, Agnes Reaves, Emmie Simms, Meredith Willingham, Lee Willingham, and Mrs. Phillip K. Burton and their predecessors in interest had the open, notorious, adverse, hostile, continuous, and peaceful possession of the property to the old fence in question for more than twenty (20) years preceding the filing of this action. The disputed property was used as a truck farm, potatoes were grown on it, watermelons were grown on it, it was farmed, horses were kept on said property, it was used for pasture land, cattle were placed on the property, and, in general, the disputed property was used right up to the old fence."

Because the evidence of record supports a finding of each of the elements of the defendants' claim of adverse possession for the requisite prescription period, and because such evidence is legally sufficient to overcome the presumption of legal title, we affirm the judgment on the authority of Nelson v. Styron, 524 So.2d 353 (Ala.1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record in light of appellants' earnest insistence that the evidence is insufficient to dispute their testimony to the effect that the appellees have not manifested acts of continuous possession of the disputed strip of land during the past 20 years (the period during which the appellants have owned and possessed their property). We agree that the record supports the appellants' contention in this respect and, accordingly, we understand their frustration and disappointment with the trial court's rejection of their claim of legal title to the property.

Yet, we can not overlook the abundance of substantial evidence from which the trial court could have been clearly convinced that the appellees' predecessors in title had openly, notoriously, adversely, and continuously possessed the disputed property for more than 20 years before the appellants acquired title to the adjoining property. Moreover, the presumption in favor of the trial judge's findings, where, as here, those findings are supported by the evidence, is strengthened by his personal inspection of the premises. See Barnett v. Millis, 286 Ala. 681, 246 So.2d 78 (1971).

AFFIRMED.

HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, ADAMS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.

JONES, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur specially.

JONES, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur in the opinion to affirm the trial court's judgment based upon the appellees' claim of adverse possession. I write separately to clarify what I perceive to be a troublesome area of property law in this State. The problem is brought into focus, though not raised as a specific issue in this case, by the trial court's reference in its final judgment to the 20-year prescription period, as opposed to the 10-year statutory period. I believe that much of the needless confusion relating to the two distinct periods of limitations applicable to adverse possession claims can be eliminated by an analysis of Code 1975, § 6-5-200; § 35-3-1 et seq.; and § 6-2-33(2).

Initially, it is clear that § 6-5-200 proceeds on the premise that, according to common law, the prescription period of 20 years applies generally to claims of adverse possession. Proceeding on this premise, the statute effects a modification of the common law rule in several particulars: A party can claim adverse possession to confer or defeat title if the party shows that 1) a deed or other color of title has been recorded for 10 years; 2) he or she has listed the property for taxation for 10 years; or 3) he or she claims title by descent cast or by devise from a predecessor in title who was in possession of the land. Thus, § 6-5-200(a)(1), (2), and (3) prescribe three separate sets of circumstances (deed or color of title, payment of taxes, and descent cast or devise from one in possession) that permit adverse possession to confer or defeat title to...