Hereford v. Gingo-Morgan Park
Decision Date | 02 June 1989 |
Docket Number | GINGO-MORGAN |
Parties | William Lee HEREFORD v.PARK, an Alabama General Partnership. 88-604. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
William R. Justice of Conwill & Justice, Columbiana, for appellant.
Douglas Corretti and Jesse P. Evans III of Corretti & Newsom, Birmingham, for appellee.
William Lee Hereford appeals from an adverse judgment holding that he had no protectable rights in a strip of land known as Parkview Road. The trial court found that there had been no common law dedication of this land, and that Hereford had no rights by way of an easement, whether implied, prescriptive, or by necessity. Because we hold that an easement by necessity does exist in favor of Hereford, we modify the judgment and affirm it as modified.
The property involved in this appeal had, at one time, all been owned by Earle Morgan. Morgan conveyed part of this land to Herman Pauly and his wife. The deed given to the Paulys excepted from the conveyance "a dedicated roadway 50 feet in width." Subsequently, the land was further divided and conveyed to several other parties, and currently Hereford owns part of this land. Throughout this time, the only means of access to these lots has been by way of Parkview Road. 1 Several of the deeds that transferred title to the land involved mention the road or driveway, in one manner or another.
In 1982, the appellee Gingo-Morgan acquired title to the land that contains the eastern portion of Parkview Road. This land lies between Hereford's lot and the nearest public road. Gingo-Morgan plans to develop this land, and, in doing so, will destroy Parkview Road. Gingo-Morgan has orally assured Hereford that an alternative road, superior in quality to Parkview Road, will be built to allow access to his land.
Upon learning of the plans to close Parkview Road, Hereford, along with two other plaintiffs, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine what rights they had in Parkview Road, whether by common law dedication, easement by implication, or easement by necessity. They also sought a permanent injunction to prevent Gingo-Morgan from damaging Parkview Road. The plaintiffs thereafter amended their The case was tried ore tenus and, after personally inspecting the property involved, the trial judge entered a judgment holding that Parkview Road was not a public road and that plaintiffs had no easement over Parkview Road by implication, prescription, or necessity. The trial court also ordered Gingo-Morgan, at its expense, to build a connector road providing the plaintiffs access to their property, and the order further stated that once this road was approved and accepted as a public road, Gingo-Morgan would be allowed to close Parkview Road. Only Hereford appeals from this judgment.
complaint to add theories of easement by prescription or public road by prescription.
Hereford raises four issues: 1) whether an easement by implication exists; 2) whether an easement by necessity exists; 3) whether Parkview Road is a public road through common law dedication; and 4) whether a servient landowner can be enjoined from "relocating" a road that already is in existence. We agree with the trial court that no easement by implication exists, and that there has been no common law dedication of Parkview Road. We hold, however, that an easement by necessity does exist in favor of Hereford and, therefore, we modify the trial court's judgment on this issue, and affirm the judgment as modified.
The standard of review of a case tried ore tenus has been clearly established by this Court:
Pinkston v. Hartley, 511 So.2d 168, 169 (Ala.1987).
In addition, the ore tenus presumption is further strengthened in a case involving a dispute over real property, where the trial judge views the land in question. McCollum v. Reaves, 547 So.2d 433 (Ala.1989). On the other hand, the trial court's application of the law, or its conclusions of law, based on its findings, reach this appellate court with no presumption of correctness.
As Hereford also correctly points out, where the evidence before the trial court is undisputed, the appellate court will consider the evidence de novo, with no presumptions in favor of the trial court's determinations. Sasser v. Spartan Foods Systems, Inc., 452 So.2d 475, 477 (Ala.1984). In the present case, however, we find that the objective and historical facts are not disputed, and the trial court's findings of fact are consistent with the undisputed evidence. Therefore, we will examine the trial court's application of the law to those findings.
The trial court first concluded that Parkview Road was not a public road. We agree with that conclusion.
CRW, Inc. v. Twin Lakes Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 521 So.2d 939, 941 (Ala.1988).
The only argument made by Hereford to support his assertion that Parkview Road is a public road is that there has been a common law dedication. The record shows, and the trial court found, that there had not been an express dedication of the road. Therefore, the requirements for common law dedication have not been met, and the trial court correctly ruled that Parkview Road was not a public road. See Thomas v. Bullock County Com'n, 474 So.2d 1094 (Ala.1985).
Next, the trial court dealt with the question whether any easements existed in favor The elements necessary to establish each of these easements have been clearly stated by this Court.
of the plaintiffs. The three theories that Hereford advanced were prescription, implication, and necessity. The trial court found that no easement had been established under any of these methods. While we agree with the trial court that no easement by prescription or implication exists, we disagree with the trial court's application of the law with respect to its holding that there was not an easement by necessity.
Bull v. Salsman, 435 So.2d 27, 29 (Ala.1983). (Citations omitted).
Underwood v. Shepard, 521 So.2d 1314, 1316 (Ala.1988).
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