McCollum v. Snipes

• Citation: 49 S.E.2d 12,213 S.C. 254
• Decision Date: 30 July 1948
• Docket Number: 16115.
• Parties: McCOLLUM v. SNIPES et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

49 S.E.2d 12

213 S.C. 254

McCOLLUM v. SNIPES et al.

No. 16115.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 30, 1948

Charles E. Hamilton, Jr., of Gastonia, N. C., and Felix L. Finley, Jr., of Pickens, for appellant.

Julien D. Wyatt, of Pickens, for respondent P. S McCollum, administrator.

Lionel E. Wooten and Culbertson & Brown, all of Greenville, and W. E. Findley, of Pickens, for all other respondents.

BAKER, Chief Justice.

This action was instituted by the administrator of the estate of Ethel Martin, late of Clemson, Pickens County, who died on May 29, 1945, unmarried and intestate, to determine the distributees of the personal estate, and to further determine the share to which each such person is entitled, he having in hand or possession the proceeds of the sale of the personal property of the estate.

At the time of her death, Ethel Martin owned certain real property and in a separate case entitled Jay Dunn et al. versus Eula F. Hall et al., this real property was ordered by the lower Court to be sold, and the proceeds of the sale withheld pending the further direction of the Court. It is stipulated by all parties in interest that the final judgment in the case on appeal shall also constitute the judgment in the case brought by Jay Dunn and others, such that it will not be necessary to refer to the Dunn case hereafter in the composition of this opinion.

The said Ethel Martin died without leaving a father, mother brother or sister, or any lineal ancestor or descendant, but being survived by one maternal uncle of the whole blood, W P. Snipes (sole appellant), and numerous first cousins, all children of nine predeceased paternal and maternal uncles and aunts of the whole blood. There are no relatives of the half blood.

The distribution of the estate is governed by Section 8906, Volume 4, Code of Laws 1942, as amended by Act May 14, 1945, No. 194 of the Acts of the South Carolina General Assembly for the year 1945, 44 St. at Large, p. 313 effective before the date of the death of the intestate.

The title of the amendatory Act reads:

'An Act to Amend Subdivision (6) Of Section 8906, Code Of Laws Of South Carolina, 1942, Relating To The Distribution Of Intestate Estates, So As To Further Provide For The Distribution of Such Estates.'

And the said subsection as amended is as follows:

'(6) If the intestate shall leave no child or other lineal descendant, father, mother, brother or sister of the whole blood, nor child of such brother or sister of the whole blood, nor brother or sister of the half blood, or lineal ancestor, the widow shall take the entire estate. If the intestate shall leave no widow the estate shall descend in equal parts to the uncles and aunts; the children of a deceased uncle or aunt to take among them the share to which their parent would have been entitled had said parent survived the intestate. If there be no uncle, aunt or child of a deceased uncle or aunt, then the estate shall descend to the next of kin.

'In reckoning the degrees of kindred, the computation shall begin with the intestate and be continued up to the common ancestor, and then down to the person claiming kindred inclusively, each step inclusively being reckoned as a degree.'

It is the contention of the appellant that he is entitled to the estate in its entirety since prior to Act No. 194 he would have been the sole distributee, and Act. No. 194 is unconstitutional, being in violation of Section 17, Article 3, Constitution of South Carolina, 1895; that if the whole Act is not unconstitutional, then so much thereof as permits children of a deceased uncle or aunt to take among them the share which their respective parent would have taken had the parent survived the intestate, conflicts with the same Section of the Constitution. Further, the appellant argues that even if Act No. 194 is found to be constitutional, its proper construction in relation to Section 8906 would give the entire estate to him.

It is the position of the respondents, all first cousins of the deceased (the administrator excepted, he being neutral), that the estate should be distributed in equal parts to the ten uncles and aunts, the children of the nine deceased uncles and aunts to take among them the share which their respective parent would have been entitled had such parent survived the intestate. This contention is based upon the provisions of Act No. 194 of 1945, previously quoted, and hereinafter referred to as Act No. 194.

The issues of law, the factual situation being without disagreement, were submitted to Judge Grimball, who after hearing oral argument, and receiving written briefs, filed his order, dated January 24, 1948, holding the Act to be constitutional and construing its provisions so as to permit the first cousins, respondents, to share per stirpes in the estate with the appellant uncle.

We concur in so much of Judge Grimball's order as holds this amending Act to be constitutional and, following this paragraph, that portion of his order on the constitutional issue, with a few changes in punctuation, is quoted, which we adopt as part of the opinion of this Court, with one exception. We do not concur in the last paragraph of the quoted excerpt insofar as Judge Grimball concludes that Act No. 194 'amended subsection 6 and nothing more,' which point will be hereinafter discussed. The following is the portion of the order appealed from pertinent to the constitutional issue decided:

'The law is well settled that the burden is on the persons claiming the Act to be unconstitutional to prove and show that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. O'Shields et al. v. Caldwell et al., 207 S.C. 194, 35 S.E.2d 184; Connor v. Charleston High School District et al., 191 S.C. 412; 4 S.E.2d 431.

'It is therefore apparent to the Court that the attorneys for the surviving uncle, W. P. Snipes, have the burden of convincing the Court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Act in question is in violation of Section 17, Article 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina, and while their argument is persuasive, it is far short of convincing.

'The law is well established in this State that this section of the constitution which provides: 'No law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in title,' should be liberally construed, and construed so as to uphold the Act if practicable. McKiever v. City of Sumter, 137 S.C. 266, 135 S.E. 60; Freeman v. Holliday, 165 S.C. 408, 164 S.E. 20; Arthur v. Johnston, 185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151; Stewart v. Woodman of the World Life Ins. Soc., 195 S.C. 365, 11 S.E.2d 449; Crouch v. Benet, 198 S.C. 185, 17 S.E.2d 320; and numerous other decisions. Const.Art. 3, 17 is complied with if title expressed a general subject and if body of act provides means, methods or instrumentalities intended to facilitate accomplishment of the general purpose. McKiever v. City of Sumter, 137 S.C. 266, 135 S.E. 60; Title of Act need not specifically refer to previous statutes which are to be amended to satisfy constitutional requirements that subject of statute shall be expressed in the title. Evans v. Beattie, 137 S.C. 496, 135 S.E. 538; Constitutional mandate is complied with if title states general subject of legislation and body provisions are germane thereto (Const. Art. 3, Section 17). When general subject of Act is expressed in title, means to facilitate accomplishment of purpose of Act, and germane thereto may be embraced in body (Const. Art. 3, 17). State v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269; appeal dismissed and certiorari denied (1930) Johnson v. State Highway Commission of South Carolina, 281 U.S. 691, 50 S.Ct. 238, 74 L.Ed. 1120. General title of act is sufficient to embrace all incidents germane to general subject mentioned in title. Witt v. Peoples State Bank of South Carolina, 166 S.C. 1, 164 S.E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1088. Constitutional requirements that a statute relate to but one subject will not be construed so as to defeat the legislative will merely because the language of the statute might have more clearly shown the connection between its various articles and sections. Const. Art. 3, 17. Arthur v. Johnston, 185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151. The constitutional provision that each act or resolution having the force of law, shall relate to but one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title, does not preclude the legislature from dealing with several branches of one general subject in a single act. (Const. Art. 3, 17) DeLoach v. Scheper, 188 S.C. 21, 198 S.E. 409. The constitutional requirements that a statute relate to but one subject to be expressed in its title will not be construed to defeat legislative will merely because language of the statute might have more clearly shown the connection between its various articles and sections. (Const. Art. 3, 17) Crouch v. Benet, 198 S.C. 185, 17 S.E.2d 320.

'One of the principal cases relied upon by Counsel for the surviving uncle is the case of Stewart v. Woodman of the World Life Ins. Co. 195 S.C. 365, 11 S.E.2d 449. This case is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the Woodman of the World case the title of the Act was 'to amend Section 7986 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina for 1932 by extending the application of the incontestability of life insurance policies to agreements in the policies for indemnity for disability or other coverage.' The Act was unconstitutional as relating to subject not expressed in title, as respects its amendment of former provisions affecting time when waiver of misrepresentations becomes effective. This title set out to extend the application of such provisions to policies other than life insurance policies. The Act did this particular thing and also the period in which a policy would be...