McComb v. Aboelessad

Decision Date07 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 950007,950007
Citation535 N.W.2d 744
PartiesLynne McCOMB, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Hossam ABOELESSAD, a/k/a Hossam Assad, Defendant and Appellant. Civ.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Mark R. Fraase (argued), Wegner, Fraase, Nordeng, Johnson & Ramstad, Fargo, for plaintiff and appellee.

Susan Ellison (argued), Hannig Law Office, P.A., Moorhead, for defendant and appellant.

MESCHKE, Justice.

Hossam Aboelessad, also known as Hossam Assad (Assad), appeals from an order denying his NDRCivP 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment obtained by default after service by publication and mailing. The judgment annulled his marriage to Lynne McComb and granted McComb custody of their child. We affirm.

In February 1985, McComb met Assad, an Egyptian citizen who was working at the Cairo airport, while she was traveling through Egypt before beginning her residency in obstetrics and gynecology in this country. Assad corresponded with McComb, and later came to the United States on a six-month tourist visa. He visited McComb in Buffalo, New York on August 1, 1985, and "beg[ged]" her to marry him. Although McComb wanted to wait, Assad wanted to get married as soon as possible because he could not work in the United States without a "green card." McComb and Assad married on September 14, 1985, and had a daughter, Nora, on October 12, 1987.

According to McComb, in early 1990, she learned Assad had married her solely to avoid deportation. McComb left the couple's home in Maryland with Nora and moved to North Dakota to be close to her family. McComb got a job at Fargo Clinic MeritCare and bought a home in Fargo. On May 15, 1990, McComb sued Assad for divorce in North Dakota and obtained an interim order granting her temporary custody of Nora, with reasonable visitation for Assad, and prohibiting Assad from removing Nora from the United States.

On October 12, 1990, the day after Assad arrived in Fargo for visitation with Nora, Assad took Nora and fled to Egypt. Assad was charged by a criminal complaint under NDCC 14-14-22.1 with removing a child from the state in violation of a custody decree. State and federal warrants were issued for Assad's arrest.

McComb went to Egypt on October 21, 1990, to look for Nora. McComb found Nora and Assad, but Assad would not allow McComb to see Nora unless the criminal complaint and arrest warrants were withdrawn, Nora's passport mailed to him, and the pending divorce action dismissed. McComb met these conditions and dismissed the divorce action on November 5, 1990. Assad then allowed McComb to visit Nora, but he refused to let Nora return with McComb to the United States. McComb returned to work at Fargo and sought diplomatic assistance to have Nora returned to the United States.

Assad got a job as an architect in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and moved there with Nora. In September 1991, McComb took a leave of absence from her employment, went to the UAE, and lived with Assad. According to McComb, after her arrival, when Assad left their home, he would lock McComb and Nora in the apartment. McComb could not leave the UAE because Assad had her and Nora's passports. According to McComb, Assad forced her to have sexual relations with him and threatened her about attempting to interfere with his custody of Nora.

On October 30, 1991, by long distance telephone, McComb had the criminal complaint against Assad and the state and federal warrants reinstated. Also, she had a new summons and complaint for divorce filed and obtained an ex parte order for temporary custody of Nora from the North Dakota court. She did not serve these divorce papers on Assad.

During all her time in the UAE, McComb and her father sought a way to return Nora to North Dakota. In early August 1993, McComb let her father know that Assad would be taking them to Moscow, Russia. On August 12, 1993, McComb's father, with the assistance of Moscow police, got McComb and Nora separated from Assad and put them on a flight from Russia to the United States.

On August 17, 1993, McComb filed an amended complaint seeking annulment of the marriage. The next day, Assad's local attorney asked, and was granted, permission to withdraw from representing Assad. Assad's attorney served the motion for leave to withdraw on Assad's "last known address": "Al Ghurir Center, P.O. Box 6999, Dubai, United Arab Emirates."

On August 18, 1993, McComb also filed a sheriff's return certifying Assad could not be found in Cass County. On August 19, 1993, McComb's attorney filed an amended affidavit for service by publication stating "after diligent inquiry affiant does not know the whereabouts of [Assad] and to his best knowledge, information and belief, personal service cannot be made on [Assad] within ... North Dakota." On August 20, 1993, her attorney sent a copy of the amended summons and complaint by ordinary mail to Assad at the same Dubai address Assad's attorney mailed the motion to withdraw. Her attorney published for three consecutive weeks the amended summons in a Fargo daily newspaper in the county where the annulment action was pending. McComb's attorney made no attempt to personally serve Assad outside Cass County, either by mail with return receipt or under the laws of the UAE.

McComb and Nora went into hiding through a private witness protection program because of the threats Assad had made to McComb while they were living in the UAE. McComb participated telephonically in the default hearing on the annulment action in the trial court on October 26, 1993. The trial court ruled Assad had been properly served by publication at the Dubai address. The court also found McComb's consent to the marriage had been obtained by fraud, that McComb had not freely cohabitated with Assad upon learning of the fraud, and that she was entitled to annul the marriage. In the annulment, the court granted McComb custody of Nora.

Nearly a year later in October 1994, Assad appeared in court telephonically from Dubai and pled guilty to criminally violating NDCC 14-14-22.1 by removing Nora from the state. He was sentenced to one year of imprisonment, suspended for five years, and placed on supervised probation for five years.

On October 27, 1994, Assad moved under NDRCivP 60(b) to set aside the annulment. Assad asserted proper service of process had not been made and that McComb obtained the annulment by fraud. At the hearing on his motion, the trial court, adhering to a local practice rule, would not allow Assad to testify telephonically, but did accept his affidavit dated the same date as the hearing. The court ruled there was proper service by publication and McComb "had been a resident in good faith" of North Dakota for at least six months at the time of service by publication. The court denied Assad's motion for relief from the judgment and ordered Assad to pay $300 for McComb's attorney fees. Assad appealed.

Assad asserts the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because McComb failed to personally serve him with the amended summons and complaint. We disagree.

One who moves for Rule 60(b) relief has the burden of establishing sufficient grounds for disturbing the finality of the judgment. First Nat'l Bank of Crosby v. Bjorgen, 389 N.W.2d 789, 794 (N.D.1986). The trial court must exercise sound discretion in deciding whether the movant's reasons are sufficient to set aside the judgment, and we will not disturb its decision on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Bjorgen v. Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d 553, 561 (N.D.1991). Valid service of process is necessary for personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Smith v. City of Grand Forks, 478 N.W.2d 370, 371 (N.D.1991). A judgment or order entered without personal or subject matter jurisdiction is void under NDRCivP 60(b)(iv). Larson v. Dunn, 474 N.W.2d 34, 39 (N.D.1991). These principles guide our analysis here.

Assad did not seek relief under NDRCivP 4(e)(7) that allows a defendant served by publication to reopen and defend in certain circumstances:

Except in an action for divorce, the defendant upon whom service by publication is made, or the defendant's representative, upon making it appear to the satisfaction of the court by affidavit, stating the facts, that the defendant has a good and meritorious defense to the action, and that the defendant had no actual notice or knowledge of the pendency of the action so as to enable the defendant to make application to defend before the entry of judgment therein, and upon filing an affidavit of merits, may be allowed to defend at any time within three years after entry of judgment on such terms as may be just.... A defendant who receives a copy of the summons in the action mailed to the defendant as provided in paragraph (4), or upon whom the summons is personally served out of this state, as provided in paragraph (5), is deemed to have had notice of the pendency of the action and of the judgment therein entered.

(Emphasis added). Unlike Rule 4(e)(7), NDRCivP 60(b) does not exclude divorce actions from the scope of its relief. See Bentley v. Bentley, 533 N.W.2d 682 (N.D.1995). While we need not decide whether an annulment action is the same as a divorce action, Rule 60(b) expressly says it "does not limit the power of a court ... to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Rule 4(e)(7), ..." See Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833 (N.D.1994); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 410 N.W.2d 508 (N.D.1987). Under either Rule 4(e)(7) or Rule 60(b), therefore, a moving party, served by publication, can obtain relief by proving lack of actual knowledge of the pendency of the action, as well as by proving a jurisdictional defect in the service by publication.

Here, Assad does not claim that McComb failed to strictly comply with the provisions allowing for service by publication, or failed to make the NDRCivP 4(e)(4) mailing. See Bickel v. Jackson, 530 N.W.2d 318 (N.D.1995). Indeed, Assad did not deny that he received copies of the...

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