McComber v. Iowa Employment Sec. Com'n

• Decision Date: 12 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 50856,50856
• Citation: 119 N.W.2d 792,254 Iowa 957
• Parties: Sue A. McCOMBER, Appellee, v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and Davenshire, Inc., Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 792

119 N.W.2d 792

254 Iowa 957

Sue A. McCOMBER, Appellee, v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and Davenshire, Inc., Appellants.

No. 50856.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 12, 1963.

Don G. Allen, Des Moines, and Doerr, Dower & Rehling, Davenport, for appellants.

H. T. Lewis, Davenport, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

This appeal is unusual in that all parties rely upon and cite authorities supporting the same governing rule. It is the thoroughly established principle that the fact findings of the Employment Security Commission are binding upon the courts on appeal when supported by substantial evidence. Code of Iowa, section 96.6, subd. 10, I.C.A.; Spence v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 249 Iowa 154, 157, 158, 86 N.W.2d 154, 156; Johnson v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 239 Iowa 816, 828, 32 N.W.2d 786, 792; Wolfe v. Iowa Unemployment Compensation Commission, 232 Iowa 1254, 1257, 7 N.W.2d 799, 800, 801.

It is evident that the parties differ as to what facts were actually found. The defendants Iowa Employment Security Commission and Davenshire, Inc., make common cause in attempting to uphold the decision by the administrative body, which was adverse to the plaintiff and favorable to the employer. The Iowa Employment Security Commission will hereafter be known as the Commission, and the same term will refer to both defendants who file a joint brief and argument. The trial court held that under the record here it was not bound by the decision of the Commission, and entered its decree and judgment that plaintiff is entitled to employment security benefits under Chapter 96 of the code. From this the defendants appeal.

The controversy, as indicated above, concerns the claimed right of the plaintiff to benefits based on wages earned by her as an employee of the defendant Davenshire, Inc., from April 1, 1960 through September 5, 1961. There is no denial that she was such employee, and that she quit her employment on or about the latter date. She contends, however, that her quitting was for good cause attributable to her employer. Section 96.5, subd. 1, par. d, Code of 1962, I.C.A. It is her claim that she was required to work with woolen garments, the manufacture of which was apparently the employer's chief or perhaps only business; and that she had or developed an allergy to wool which caused her to suffer a dermatitis on her arms. She consulted with Dr. Lester Kimberly, a skin specialist, who was unable to say what caused the breaking out. She then consulted Dr. Joseph J. Kehoe, a Doctor of Chiropractic, who according to her testimony told her the condition was caused by nervousness and the contact with the wool, and 'he figured it was something in the dye of the wool that was causing it, the friction from the wool and being nervous caused it too.' She also said Dr. Kehoe told her her nervous condition should not bother her if she did not work with woolens in such manner as to cause friction on her arms. In May of 1961 she was granted a leave of absence; she returned to work on July 10 next, but her arms again suffered the dermatitis, and she was compelled to quit, and was given an indefinite leave of absence. She again returned to work on August 28, but in a few days the breaking out reappeared. She asked the supervisor if she could be transferred to the cutting room, where her arms would not come in contact with the wool; but was told they could not be transferring her all over the shop. She then left her employment.

I. It is evident the crucial point in the case is primarily whether the plaintiff quit her employment for good cause attributable to her employer. But it is also evident that if the fact findings of the Commission were adverse to her on this point, the courts are powerless to interfere. We are not concerned whether there was evidence in the hearing before the appeal tribunal which might have supported its conclusion; it is the findings and decision of that tribunal actually made with which we must deal. The Commission, on appeal to it from the appeal tribunal, merely said: 'The Commission, having reviewed the record in its entirety and being fully advised in the premises, finds and holds that the record in this case supports the findings of fact and decision of the referee, and the decision must be affirmed.' The fact findings and decision of the appeal tribunal therefore became the findings and decision of the Commission.

II. We therefore turn to the findings of fact and decision of the appeal tribunal. Here the reason all parties rely upon the rule that the fact findings of the Commission are binding upon the courts becomes evident. Section 96.6, subd. 10, supra, says: 'Any order or decision of the commission may be modified, reversed, or set aside on one or more of the following grounds and no other: * * * 3. If the facts found by the commission do not support the order or decree.'

These substantial facts were found by the appeal tribunal and adopted by the Commission: 'She suffered from extreme nervousness which apparently aggravated a sensitivity to woolen materials resulting in a skin allergy. The employer changed her work assignment in an effort to relieve the condition, and the claimant was granted a leave to absence, but the condition returned, and on the advice of her doctor, Dr. Joseph J. Kehoe, she left to seek another type of work. She testified that there was nothing inherent in the job itself that caused her nervousness, but the materials with which she worked aggravated her allergy.'

After quoting Section 96.5, subd. 1, par. d of the code, I.C.A., to which later reference will be made, the fact findings and ruling of the appeal tribunal concluded: 'This is not a case in which a substance or material used by an employer is of such a nature as to be toxic or harmful to a considerable number of its workers. It is a case of the claimant being so constituted that her allergy condition reacts unfavorably to a very common material--wool. ...