McCord v. State

• Docket Number: 85271
• Decision Date: 28 December 2023
• Parties: DAVID WILLIAM MCCORD, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

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139 Nev.Adv.Op. 59

DAVID WILLIAM MCCORD, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 85271

Supreme Court of Nevada

December 28, 2023

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a bench trial, of trafficking in a controlled substance, 100 grams or more but less than 400 grams. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Scott N. Freeman, Judge.

Evelyn Grosenick, Public Defender, and Kathryn E. Reynolds, Chief Deputy Public Defender. Washoe County, for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General. Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks, District Attorney, and Jennifer P. Noble, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLTCH, C.J., and LEE and BELL, JJ.

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OPINION

STIGLICH, C.J.

Law enforcement pulled over appellant David McCord because McCord's Nevada license plate had a dealership frame around it that partially covered the word "NEVADA." According to the deputy who conducted the stop, although he was able to immediately identify the license plate and perform a license plate check, McCord's license plate was not legible as required by NRS 482.275(4). McCord was later charged with trafficking in a controlled substance after contraband was found in his car during the traffic stop. He sought to suppress the evidence on the basis that the traffic stop was unlawful. The State argued that the frame on McCord's license plate was foreign material and obscured the lettering imprinted on the plate, in violation of NRS 482.275(4), and served as probable cause for the traffic stop. The district court agreed and denied the motion to suppress.

In this opinion, we hold that a license plate frame does not constitute "foreign materials" within the meaning of NRS 482.275(4) and a license plate is "clearly legible" if the required registration information is readily identifiable. To hold otherwise would effectively ban license plate frames. Such an outcome would promote discretionary law enforcement and potentially subject otherwise law-abiding motorists to arbitrary or, as here, pretextual traffic stops. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying McCord's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop because there was no probable cause to support the stop based on a

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violation of NRS 482.275(4). We therefore reverse McCord's judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings.^[1]

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Detective Apryl McElroy of the Regional Narcotics Unit (RNU) developed a confidential informant whom she instructed to contact McCord and arrange a purchase of methamphetamine. The RNU informed Deputy Ned Nemeth, a member of a canine unit, that McCord would be traveling to Reno and might be in possession of a large amount of methamphetamine. In an effort to protect the informant's identity, the RNU asked Deputy Nemeth to conduct a "wall stop."^[2] To facilitate this plan, the RNU provided the deputy with McCord's name and a description of the vehicle he would be driving. According to Deputy Nemeth, the RNU often gave him minimal information about criminal suspects so that he could perform pretextual traffic stops to build cases against those suspects.

Using the information provided by the RNU, Deputy Nemeth located McCord's vehicle and watched for any traffic violations to justify a vehicle stop. Because Deputy Nemeth observed no moving violations, he focused on the vehicle's license plate and the license plate frame. Although Deputy Nemeth immediately identified the license plate as a standard issue Nevada plate and was able to perform a license plate check, he concluded that the license plate nonetheless violated NRS 482.275(4) because the

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dealership frame partially covered the name of the state. Based on that perceived violation, Deputy Nemeth initiated a traffic stop.

After pulling over McCord, Deputy Nemeth approached the vehicle and spoke with him. Deputy Nemeth told McCord that he would issue a warning for the license plate violation and directed McCord to exit the vehicle to observe the violation. With McCord out of the vehicle. Deputy Nemeth performed a pat down search, discovered a scale with a white crystalline substance on it in McCord's pocket, and asked McCord for permission to search the vehicle. McCord refused to consent to the search. Another deputy arrived on the scene shortly after Deputy Nemeth pulled over McCord. While that deputy worked on the warning citation for the obstructed license plate, Deputy Nemeth deployed his drug detection canine, and the canine alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. A search revealed approximately 187 grams of methamphetamine. As a result, McCord was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance.

Before trial, McCord moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that Deputy Nemeth lacked probable cause to make the stop. The district court disagreed, finding that McCord's license plate violated the plain language of NRS 482.275(4) because the plate holder was "in itself a foreign material" and the words "NEVADA" and "Home Means Nevada" were obscured by the holder and thus provided probable cause for the stop. Accordingly, the district court denied the motion to suppress.

After a bench trial, McCord was found guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, 100 grams or more but less than 400 grams, and was sentenced to serve a minimum of 60 months and a maximum of 150 months in prison. This appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION

McCord argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and finding that the traffic stop was reasonable. A motion to suppress evidence presents mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Beckmaru 129 Nev. 481, 485, 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013). We "review[] findings of fact for clear error, but the legal consequences of those facts involve questions of law that we review de novo." Id. at 486, 305 P.3d at 916.

The Fourth Amendment safeguards individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Nev. Const. art. 1. § 18. A traffic stop is a seizure and therefore is subject to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806. 809-10 (1996). Such stops are "reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. at 810. ""The reasonableness requirement strikes a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." State v. Rincon, 122 Nev. 1170, 1175, 147 P.3d 233, 236 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is undisputed that Deputy Nemeth stopped McCord's vehicle under the pretext that the license plate frame obscuring the name of the issuing state violated NRS 482.275(4).^[3] The district court found that there

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was probable cause for the stop because the license plate frame on McCord's vehicle covered parts of the lettering imprinted on the plate such that it was not "clearly legible" and because the license plate frame was "foreign material." McCord contends that the district court's interpretation of the statute was erroneous.

Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). When interpreting a statute, the objective "is to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Id. To determine legislative intent, we first look to the statute's plain language. Id. "[W]e interpret clear and unambiguous statutory language by its plain meaning unless doing so would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result." Moore v. State, 136 Nev. 620, 622-23, 475 P.3d 33, 36 (2020).

Proper display of license plates

In relevant part, NRS 482.275(4) provides that "[e]very license plate . . . must be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible." The statute thus requires that all license plates meet two requirements: (1) "be maintained free from foreign materials" and (2) "be clearly legible." The use of the conjunctive "and" means that if either condition is not satisfied, a license plate is not properly displayed. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 117 (2012) (explaining that "the conjunction and" when used between two elements, "entails an express or implied both before the first element"). Therefore, we address each requirement in turn.

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Whether the license plate was free from foreign materials

McCord argues that the district court erred in concluding that the license plate frame constituted a "foreign material" for purposes of NRS 482.275(4). License plate frames "generally surround the periphery of the plate, leaving the numbers and place of origin readable." United States v. Mores, 798 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2015). The district court acknowledged McCord's argument that license plate frames are widely used. Indeed, as evidenced by the frame at issue here, automotive dealerships regularly supply frames after a vehicle purchase. And many people attach frames to show allegiance to a social group, alma mater, or sports team as a means of self-expression. Although the Legislature did not define "foreign materials," we are not convinced that the Legislature intended the term to include all license plate frames.

We have already determined that maintaining a license plate "free from foreign materials" is its own requirement under NRS 482.275(4). But in determining the meaning of that requirement, we cannot read it in isolation but must construe the statutory provision as a whole. See...