McCorker v. Lashbrook
| Decision Date | 26 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17 C 5613 |
| Parties | LEE McCORKER, (#N73107), Petitioner, v. JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Lee McCorker's petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Petitioner's habeas petition and declines to certify any issues for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).1 [R. 1.]
When considering § 2254 habeas petitions, federal courts must presume as correct the factual findings made by the last state court to decide the case on the merits unless the habeas petitioner rebuts those findings by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 525 (7th Cir. 2017). Where Petitioner has not provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, the following factual background is based on the Illinois Appellate Court's findings in People v. McCorker, No. 1-11-1155, 2013 WL 3148996(1st Dist. June 18, 2013) (unpublished); People v. McCorker, No. 1-14-3624, 2016 IL App (1st) 1423624-U (1st Dist. July 11, 2016) (unpublished).
Evidence at Petitioner's jury trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County revealed that at about 10:30 p.m. on May 11, 2008, Petitioner and his girlfriend Beth Pickett were arguing in an alley when Petitioner punched Pickett in the stomach and face. Pickett then fell to the ground and appeared unconscious. Thereafter, Petitioner braced himself against a fence with both hands and forcibly kicked Pickett in the face eight or more times with the heel of his shoe. Petitioner walked away, but when Pickett made a gurgling noise, he returned to her and repeatedly stomped on her head and face with his foot. Again, Petitioner walked away leaving Pickett lying on the ground in the alley. Shortly before midnight, Petitioner went to his father and told him "I think I killed Beth." The following morning, Petitioner went to the police station with his father and turned himself in for Pickett's murder.
After his jury trial and conviction, the Circuit Court of Cook County Judge held a sentencing hearing. In aggravation, the State submitted three victim impact statements from Pickett's family and certified copies of Petitioner's prior convictions for armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The State argued that Petitioner's actions were mean, vicious, and violent and that he should be sentenced to life in prison. In mitigation, defense counsel presented a portion of the video from Petitioner's police interrogation showing him crying and argued that Petitioner was truly remorseful. Defense counsel further highlighted several notations in Petitioner's presentence investigation report, including that he grew up with "an abusive mother and a drug-dealing father," and that he was removed from his mother's care and raised by his father due to her abuse. In addition, defense counsel stated that Petitioner wasreceiving psychiatric treatment and taking two antidepressant medications. Defense counsel also argued that Petitioner started using drugs when he was 17-years-old and tried to stop, but began using crack cocaine again when he met Pickett. After the sentencing hearing, the Circuit Court concluded that Petitioner had led a criminal life involving considerable violence and sentenced him to a term of 50 years in prison.
On direct appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, Petitioner, by counsel, argued that his sentence was excessive based on the sentencing court's improper weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors in violation of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois case law. Petitioner moved for leave to file a pro se supplemental brief arguing that: (1) he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial court refused to give jury instructions on self-defense; (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to preserve the issue of the self-defense jury instructions in his post-trial motions; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the affirmative defense of self-defense; and (4) he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial due to the prosecution's inflammatory and erroneous statements made in opening and closing arguments.
The Illinois Appellate Court denied Petitioner leave to file his pro se supplemental brief because he was represented by counsel on appeal. Further, the Illinois Appellate Court held that Petitioner had forfeited review of his claim that his sentence was excessive because he did not file a motion to reconsider his sentence and did not establish plain error. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for rehearing that the Illinois Appellate Court denied on August 15, 2013. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for leave to appeal ("PLA") to the Supreme Court of Illinois bringing the claims he asserted in his motion for leave to supplement his counseledappellate brief. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Petitioner's direct appeal PLA on January 29, 2014.
On August 22, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq. In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner argued that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not: (1) preserve the claim that the trial court erred in denying his request for self-defense jury instructions; (2) object to the prosecution's use of inflammatory and egregious statements made during opening and closing arguments; and (3) fully develop a self-defense affirmative defense.
The Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed the pro se post-conviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(2). After Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, on February 23, 2016, his appointed appellate counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). Petitioner filed a pro se response to counsel's Finley motion in which he included a new claim, namely, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for not pursuing an insanity defense. The Illinois Appellate Court permitted counsel to withdraw and affirmed the denial of Petitioner's post-conviction petition. Petitioner then filed a post-conviction PLA with the Supreme Court of Illinois arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to assert an insanity defense. On November 23, 2016, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied Petitioner's post-conviction PLA.
On July 31, 2017, Petitioner filed the present pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Construing Petitioner's pro se allegations liberally, see Echols v. Craig, 855 F.3d 807, 812 (7thCir. 2017), he asserts that: (1) his sentence is excessive based on the sentencing court's improper weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors; and (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise an insanity defense. In his supplemental motion, Petitioner asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial court refused to give jury instructions on self-defense.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), the Court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Pinno v. Wachtendorf, 845 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court has explained that a state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law" or "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. Under the "unreasonable application" prong, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that although the state court identified the correct legal rule, it unreasonably applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. Id. at 407. "Needless to say, the AEDPA standard of review is a difficult standard, and it was meant to be." Baer v. Neal, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 358029, at *4 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2018).
"A federal habeas corpus petitioner is required to exhaust his available state remedies before seeking federal relief." Lisle v. Pierce, 832 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 28U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). "Inherent in the habeas petitioner's obligation to exhaust his state court remedies before seeking relief in habeas corpus, is the duty to fairly present his federal claims to the state courts." King v. Pfister, 834 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). More specifically, a habeas petitioner must fully and fairly present his federal claims through one full round of state court review before he files his federal habeas petition. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 848, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). If a habeas petitioner fails to fully and fairly present his federal claims through one full round of state court review, he has procedurally defaulted his claims. Tabb v. Christianson, 855 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2017). Also, "a federal court may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court - that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural rule." Davila v. Davis, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial