Mccoy v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety.

• Decision Date: 05 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 18545.,18545.
• Citation: 12 A.3d 948,300 Conn. 144
• Parties: Ricky A. McCOYv.COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

300 Conn. 144

12 A.3d 948

Ricky A. McCOY

v.COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

No. 18545.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 8, 2010.Decided Jan. 5, 2011.*

Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).Ralph D. Sherman, West Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.EVELEIGH, J.

The defendant, the commissioner of public safety,¹ appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court partially in favor of the plaintiff, Ricky A. McCoy, declaring illegal the defendant's designation of the plaintiff as a “convicted felon” and permanently enjoining the defendant from designating any person a convicted felon because of a second conviction within ten years under General Statutes § 14–227a,² operating a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol (driving while intoxicated). The sole issue in this appeal is whether a second conviction for a breach ³ of § 14–227a within a ten year period is classified under the Penal Code as a crime, specifically, a felony, or whether, as the trial court concluded, it is classified as a “ ‘motor vehicle violation.’ ” We conclude that a breach of § 14–227a does not fall within the motor vehicle violation exception to the definition of a criminal “offense” pursuant to General Statutes § 53a–24 (a) and, therefore, a second conviction under § 14–227a within a ten year period is a felony because it carries with it a term of imprisonment of up to two years. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On May 7, 2004, the plaintiff was convicted of driving while intoxicated for the second time in a ten year period. Subsequently, at the plaintiff's request, the defendant provided him with a copy of his criminal history record, which included the designation “CONVICTED FELON.” Following the receipt of that record, the plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes § 4–174,⁴ petitioned the defendant to repeal the regulations under which the plaintiff had been designated a convicted felon, and requested a new criminal history record without that designation. After the defendant denied this request, the plaintiff commenced the present action, seeking, inter alia: (1) a declaration that the defendant had enacted an unlawful regulation permitting it to classify the plaintiff as a convicted felon because he had failed to follow the rule-making procedures required under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4–166 et seq.; and (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from classifying any individual as a convicted felon on the basis of a qualifying second conviction under § 14–227a.⁵ Thereafter, the parties agreed that summary judgment was an appropriate manner by which to resolve the case, and filed cross motions for summary judgment.

The trial court granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions. Specifically, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's claim for a declaratory judgment, concluding that the defendant's designation of the plaintiff as a convicted felon did not constitute rulemaking. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the second issue. It concluded that, although a second conviction under § 14–227a carries a term of incarceration consistent with the definition of a felony, a second conviction could not be classified as a felony because it falls under the motor vehicle violation exception to the definition of a criminal offense set forth in § 53a–24 (a). Accordingly, the trial court issued a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff's designation as a convicted felon was illegal and permanently enjoined the defendant from labeling any person as a convicted felon on the basis of a second conviction under § 14–227a within a ten year period. The defendant's appeal from the partial judgment in favor of the plaintiff followed.⁶

The defendant contends that the text and history of § 14–227a evidence a clear legislative intent that driving while intoxicated constitutes a criminal offense, which in turn is subject to classification as a felony upon a second conviction within a ten year period by virtue of the punishment prescribed. The defendant claims that, in concluding that a breach of § 14–227a falls within the motor vehicle violation exception to the definition of offense under § 53a–24 (a) of the Penal Code, the trial court improperly declined to apply the definition of violation to the phrase motor vehicle violation, which would have limited that exception to breaches punishable by fine only. Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court relied on mere dicta to support its construction. In response, the plaintiff claims that the trial court properly determined that a second conviction under § 14–227a falls within the motor vehicle violation exception to the definition of offense and therefore cannot be a felony. The plaintiff contends that this construction is supported by other statutes and case law evidencing that the definition of violation under the Penal Code does not apply to the motor vehicle violation exception to the definition of offense. We agree with the defendant.

At the outset, we set forth the standard of review. The resolution of this appeal requires us to interpret § 14–227a. “Well settled principles of statutory interpretation govern our review.... Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Woodrow Wilson of Middletown, LLC v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, 294 Conn. 639, 644–45, 986 A.2d 271 (2010).

We begin with the relevant statutory text. Section 14–227a provides in relevant part: “(a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content. For the purposes of this section, ‘elevated blood alcohol content’ means a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is eight-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight ... and ‘motor vehicle’ includes a snowmobile and all-terrain vehicle, as those terms are defined in section 14–379.

* * *

“(g) Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall ... (2) for conviction of a second violation within ten years after a prior conviction for the same offense, (A) be fined not less than one thousand dollars or more than four thousand dollars, (B) be imprisoned not more than two years, one hundred twenty consecutive days of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner, and sentenced to a period of probation requiring as a condition of such probation that such person perform one hundred hours of community service, as defined in section 14–227e, and (C)(i) if such person is under twenty-one years of age at the time of the offense, have such person's motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for three years or until the date of such person's twenty-first birthday, whichever is longer, and be prohibited for the two-year period following completion of such period of suspension from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved interlock device, as defined in section 14–227j; or (ii) if such person is twenty-one years of age or older at the time of the offense, have such person's motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for one year and be prohibited for the two-year period following completion of such period of suspension from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14–227j....” (Emphasis added.)

The plain language of § 14–227a clearly indicates that the legislature intended a violation of that provision to be a criminal offense. First, the statute clearly defines operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug as an offense. Section 14–227a (a) provides in relevant part: “A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug....” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, the statute repeatedly uses the term offense to...