McCoy v. Queens Hydraulic Co.

• Decision Date: 20 August 2001
• Citation: 729 N.Y.S.2d 733,286 A.D.2d 425
• Parties: (A.D. 2 Dept. 2001) Michelle McCoy, plaintiff-respondent, v Queens Hydraulic Co., Inc., defendant third-party plaintiff-respondent; Feldware, Inc., third-party defendant-appellant. 2000-10706 : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 733

729 N.Y.S.2d 733 (A.D. 2 Dept. 2001)

Michelle McCoy, plaintiff-respondent, v Queens Hydraulic Co., Inc., defendant third-party plaintiff-respondent;

Feldware, Inc., third-party defendant-appellant.

2000-10706

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE DIVISION: SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Argued May 4, 2001

August 20, 2001

Garcia & Stallone, Melville, N.Y. (Stephen V. Morello and Karl Zamurs of counsel), for third-party defendant-appellant.

Fink & Moskowitz, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Brian M. Moskowitz of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.

GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, LEO F. McGINITY, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the third-party defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated September 25, 2000, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motion is granted, and the third-party complaint is dismissed.

In May 1997 the plaintiff severed a portion of her right index finger while operating a hydraulic press in the course of her employment. Following the accident, the plaintiff commenced this action against Queens Hydraulic Co., Inc. (hereinafter Queens Hydraulic), alleging that it negligently designed and manufactured the press she was operating at the time of her accident. Queens Hydraulic in turn commenced a third-party action against the plaintiff's employer, Feldware, Inc. (hereinafter Feldware). After some discovery had been conducted, Feldware moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not sustained a "grave injury" as defined by Workers' Compensation Law 11. In support of the motion, Feldware relied upon hospital records and medical reports which revealed that the plaintiff suffered the amputation of the distal phalanx, or upper third of her index finger. The Supreme Court denied Feldware's motion for summary judgment, and we reverse.

Workers' Compensation Law 11 was amended in 1996 to permit an employer to be held liable for contribution or indemnity only where the third-party plaintiff proves through competent medical evidence that the employee sustained a "grave injury" (see, Curran v Auto Lab Serv. Ctr., 280 A.D.2d 636, 721 N.Y.S.2d 662). "The term 'grave injury' has been defined as a 'statutorily...