McCoy v. State
| Citation | 262 Ga. 699,425 S.E.2d 646 |
| Decision Date | 05 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. S92A1066,S92A1066 |
| Parties | McCOY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Kenneth D. Kondritzer, Clarkesville, for McCoy.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., C.A. Benjamin Woolf, Asst. Atty. Gen., Attorney General's Office, Atlanta, Michael H. Crawford, Dist. Atty., Clarkesville, for the State.
Appellant was indicted for felony murder and arson in the first degree. 1 His first trial resulted in a conviction for arson in the first degree and a mistrial on the felony murder charge due to the jury's inability to reach a verdict. A second trial on the felony murder count resulted in a verdict of guilty. The trial court merged the arson conviction into the felony murder conviction and sentenced only for the felony murder. Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to give certain requested jury instructions and that the evidence did not support the verdict.
1. The evidence at trial authorized the jury to find that appellant and his co-indictee left a party and walked to an abandoned house. After exploring the house, and having noticed the presence of a well closed by a wooden cover, appellant borrowed his companion's lighter and deliberately set the house afire. Two volunteer firemen who responded to the fire were directed to take a hose to the back of the house to prevent the fire from spreading to other property. In the darkness and the dense smoke from the fire, one of the firemen fell into the well, the cover of which had been burned in the fire. The well was filled with smoke and ashes and the fireman, unable to obtain sufficient oxygen, died of acute carbon monoxide poisoning associated with smoke inhalation and oxygen depletion.
It being clear from the evidence that appellant deliberately set the house afire, that the victim came to the scene as a direct result of appellant having set the fire, that the protective cover over the well was burned away by the fire appellant set, and that the victim died as a result of breathing the concentrated smoke from the fire which appellant set, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder with arson in the first degree as the underlying felony. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Appellant's reliance on State v. Crane, 247 Ga. 779, 279 S.E.2d 695 (1981), and Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 277(1b), 295 S.E.2d 518 (1982), is unwarranted: the felony murder statute was inapplicable in those cases because the deaths were not caused by the defendant but by the victim and a police officer, respectively, whereas the death in this case was directly attributable to appellant's felonious conduct in setting the fire.
2. In four enumerations of error, appellant complains of the trial court's refusal to give certain requested jury instructions. Appellant objected to portions of the jury charge and clearly sought to reserve other objections, but he did not specifically object to the trial court's refusal to give the charges involved in this appeal. The State argues that the objections raised on appeal were waived, citing Pruitt v. State, 258 Ga. 583(14), 373 S.E.2d 192 (1988), for the proposition that one must either state all objections at trial or reserve all objections for a motion for new trial or an appeal. The use of the word "either" in Pruitt arguably gives support to the State's position and may have been the basis for the Court of Appeals' holding in Dearmore v. State, 196 Ga.App. 865(2), 397 S.E.2d 200 (1990), that
[w]hen asked by the trial court if he had any exceptions to the charge, an appellant either must state his objections or reserve his right to object on motion for new trial or on appeal; he cannot do both. [Cit.]
However, the case cited in Pruitt as authority for the proposition did not use the word "either" in its formulation of the rule:
In order to avoid waiver, if the trial court inquires if there are objections to the charge, counsel must state his objections or follow the procedure ... of reserving the right to object on motion for new trial or on appeal. [Jackson v. State, 246 Ga. 459, 460, 271 S.E.2d 855 (1980).]
We find considerable merit in appellant's argument that an expansive interpretation of the rule stated in Pruitt, one permitting the defense to make such objections as it wishes at trial and still reserve other objections until motion for new trial or appeal, would advance one of the basic purposes of making objections to jury charges at trial, i.e.,...
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Hill v. State
...has preserved his objection to the court's omission to charge impeachment by proof of conviction of a crime, compare McCoy v. State, 262 Ga. 699, 425 S.E.2d 646 (1993), with Thomas v. State, 234 Ga. 615, 618, 216 S.E.2d 859 (1975), any error in the court's omission to charge this specific g......
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The State v. Jackson
...convictions where the death could hardly be said to have been “caused directly” by the defendant's acts. See McCoy v. State, 262 Ga. 699, 700, 425 S.E.2d 646, 647-48 (1993) (upholding felony murder conviction by finding that the death of a firefighter who fell into a well behind a burning h......
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Hyman v. State
...295 S.E.2d 518. The murder in this case was only indirectly attributable to Hyman's false statement. Compare McCoy v. State, 262 Ga. 699, 700(1), 425 S.E.2d 646 (1993). Rather, Holcomb directly caused the death of Officer Hester, and there is no evidence whatsoever that Hyman was acting in ......
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Waugh v. State
...in the first degree, rendering it unnecessary that the trial court charge on the lesser offenses. [Cit.]" McCoy v. State, 262 Ga. 699, 702(3)(b), 425 S.E.2d 646 (1993). 6. The trial court's refusal to give appellant's requested charge on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense is als......
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State v. Jackson and the Explosion of Liability for Felony Murder - Brian E. Brupbacher
...felony murder conviction, deciding that one could 80. See generally Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 372, 477 S.E.2d 827 (1996); McCoy v. State, 262 Ga. 699, 425 S.E.2d 646 (1993); Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982). 81. 250 Ga. 325, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982). 82. Id. at 325, 297 S.E.2d......