McCoy v. United States
| Decision Date | 04 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:09cv1960 (MRK),3:09cv1960 (MRK) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | TRANEL MCCOY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
On May 19, 2010, this Court issued a Ruling and Order denying - with one exception -the claims in Petitioner Tranel McCoy's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [doc. # 1]. See McCoy v. United States, No. 3:09cv1960 (MRK), 2010 WL 2011144 (D. Conn. May 19, 2010) ("McCoy III"). One of Mr. McCoy's claims was that his sentence was incorrect because he should not have been subject to a consecutive mandatory five-year minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In its Ruling and Order, the Court explained that because the Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari in two cases relevant to Mr. McCoy's § 924(c) sentencing argument, see United States v. Abbott, 574 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1284 (Jan. 25, 2010); United States v. Gould, 529 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1284 (Jan. 25, 2010), the Court would await a decision from the Supreme Court in those cases, after which Mr. McCoy could renew his § 2255 petition regarding his sentence.
Mr. McCoy never renewed his petition with regard to the 924(c) sentencing issue. However, on October 26, 2010 - a few weeks before the Supreme Court issued its decisions in Abbott and Gould, see Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010) - Mr. McCoy moved to filean amended § 2255 petition. On February 16, 2011, the Court issued an Order [doc. # 22] granting that motion. Mr. McCoy filed his amended § 2255 petition on March 17, 2011. See Amended Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [doc. # 23]. In his amended petition, Mr. McCoy raises two claims. First, Mr. McCoy asserts that his sentences were erroneously based upon a second offender enhancement, see 21 U.S.C. § 851, that increased his mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) from five years to ten years. Second, Mr. McCoy asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the second offender enhancement. On March 18, 2011, the Court issued an Order [doc. # 24] directing the Government to show cause why Mr. McCoy's amended petition should not be granted, and the Government filed its Response [doc. # 25] on May 17, 2011. Mr. McCoy filed a Reply [doc. # 27] to the Government's Response on June 17, 2011.
For reasons that follow, Mr. McCoy's amended petition is denied.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the factual background of this case and will limit its summary to those facts relevant to Mr. McCoy's amended petition. Additional facts will be related as needed when the Court turns to Mr. McCoy's claims. Those seeking a more detailed discussion of the case's facts and procedural history should refer to the Court's previous Ruling and Order. See McCoy III, 2010 WL 2011144, at *1-*5.
In August 2006, a jury convicted Mr. McCoy on charges contained in two separate indictments. Mr. McCoy was convicted of Count One of the Superseding Indictment in the first case, No. 3:04cr336 (MRK) (D. Conn. filed Dec. 14, 2004), which charged him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, five grams or more of cocaine base; and on Counts One through Three of a separate Indictment in the other case, No. 3:06cr100 (MRK) (D.Conn. filed Apr. 12, 2006), which charged him with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
Before trial, the Government had filed a second offender notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. In that notice, the Government indicated its intent to rely on a prior felony drug conviction that would subject Mr. McCoy to the enhanced sentencing provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). The offense noted by the Government was Mr. McCoy's 1996 conviction for sale of narcotics in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 21a-277(a) in the Connecticut Superior Court. In that 1996 case, Mr. McCoy had pled guilty under the Alford doctrine. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1), 846, and 851, the statutory minimum term of imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base after having been convicted of a prior felony drug offense, and for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute or to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base after having been convicted of a prior felony drug offense, is ten years. In the absence of a second offender enhancement, Mr. McCoy's statutory minimum sentence for the cocaine base counts was five years. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 846.
Mr. McCoy was sentenced by this Court on February 13, 2007. Mr. McCoy was in Criminal History Category II with a base offense level of 30 for Count One of the Superseding Indictment in the 3:04cr336 case, and Counts One and Two of the Indictment in the 3:06cr100 case. Under the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines ("the Guidelines") in effect on the date of sentencing, a defendant in Criminal History Category II with a total offense level of 30 faced a sentence of 108 to 135 months imprisonment, assuming no higher statutory minimum. A statutory minimum of ten years increased that Guidelines range to 120 to 135 months.However, because Mr. McCoy had committed the felony drug offenses in the 3:06cr100 case while on release following his arrest in the 3:04cr336 case, he was subject to a statutory sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147. Under § 3C1.3 of the Guidelines, "[i]f a statutory sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies," the sentencing court should "increase the [defendant's] offense level by 3 levels."1 On the date of Mr. McCoy's sentencing, the Guidelines range for an offense level of 33 in Criminal History Category II was 151 to 188 months. In addition, Mr. McCoy faced a mandatory, consecutive five-year term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(I). Therefore, Mr. McCoy's total effective Guidelines range was 211 to 248 months.
The Court ultimately imposed a non-Guidelines sentence of 181 months imprisonment and eight years supervised release. Specifically, in the 3:04cr336 case, Mr. McCoy was sentenced to a term of 120 months imprisonment, to run concurrently with his sentence on Counts One and Two in the 3:06cr100 case. In the 3:06r100 case, Mr. McCoy was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment on Counts One and Two, to run concurrently; to a term of 60 months on Count Three, to run consecutively to the sentence on Counts One and Two and the sentence imposed in case 3:04cr336; and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147, one month of imprisonment, to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Counts One, Two, and Three, and to the sentence imposed in case 3:04cr336.
The Court presumed, and the Government and defense counsel agreed, that Mr. McCoy faced a mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment on the cocaine base counts. In its Judgment, the Court explained the non-Guidelines sentence as follows:
The Court imposed a non-Guidelines' sentence insofar as the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3147 is concerned. . . . The Court concluded that a sentence of 181, or one additional month under 18 U.S.C. § 3147, was sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of a criminal sentence, taking into account all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including defendant's relatively low criminal history category and his family circumstances. The Court did so, because the Government represented to the Court that it had filed the second offender notice, which increased defendant's mandatory minimum on the drug offenses, from 5 years (60 months) to ten years (120 months) because defendant had committed his second offense while on release. According to the Government, it would not have filed the second offender notice but for that fact since defendant's first offense was committed over 10 years before and while the defendant was 19. Thus, the Government stated that defendant would receive an additional 60 months imprisonment effectively because he had committed a felony while on release and further represented that no further increase in the length of defendant's sentence was needed for deterrence or any other purpose. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3147 requires the Court to impose at least some period of imprisonment when a defendant commits a felony offense while on release, which is why the Court imposed an additional month of imprisonment to run consecutively to all other sentences. Therefore, defendant received an effective total sentence of 181 months.
Judgment, United States v. McCoy, Nos. 3:04cr336 (MRK), 3:06cr100 (MRK) (D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2007), ECF No. 428 (3:04cr336), ECF No. 72 (3:06cr100).
The Court had previously denied Mr. McCoy's motion for acquittal, see United States v. McCoy, Nos. 3:04cr336, 3:06cr100, 2006 WL 3791390 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2006) ("McCoy I"), and after judgment was entered, Mr. McCoy appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed in a summary order, see United States v. McCoy, 303 F. App'x 45 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) ("McCoy II"). In his direct appeal, Mr. McCoy did not raise either of the claims that he now asserts in his amended § 2255 petition.
To obtain collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the petitioner must show that his "sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. "As a general rule, 'relief is available under § 2255 only for a constitutional error, a lackof jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete...
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