McCracken v. City of Chinook, Mont.
| Decision Date | 30 January 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-85-189-GF.,CV-85-189-GF. |
| Citation | 652 F. Supp. 1300 |
| Parties | John W. McCRACKEN and James Waggoner, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHINOOK, MONTANA; Blaine County, Montana; Donald Ranstrom; Scott McKenzie; George Van Deven; Charlie Hay; Chance Houle; Jack Harrington; and Glen Huestis, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
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Patrick F. Flaherty, Great Falls, Mont., for plaintiffs.
Robert F. James, James, Gray & McCafferty, Great Falls, Mont., for City of Chinook, Ranstrom & McKenzie & Van Deven.
Dennis P. Clarke, Smith, Baillie & Walsh, Great Falls, Mont., for remaining defendants.
The plaintiffs, former police officers employed by the City of Chinook, Montana, bring the present action to recover monetary compensation for the named defendants' alleged violations of the plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights, as well as the defendants' violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. In addition, the plaintiffs ask the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over numerous claims for relief founded upon the constitution, statutory law and common law of the State of Montana. The plaintiffs' claims have their genesis in the termination of their employment with the City of Chinook. Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1988, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
The action is presently before the court on motion of the defendants requesting the court to dismiss the action upon the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' complaint, as amended, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1
The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint on July 9, 1985. Pursuant to Rule 12, Fed.R.Civ.P., the defendants timely sought dismissal of the complaint upon a myriad of grounds. After the merits of the defendants' motions were addressed by the parties, the court, characterizing the complaint as incomprehensible, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for want of jurisdiction. The court, however, afforded the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to adequately invoke the jurisdiction of this court.
The plaintiffs have timely filed an amended complaint, which the defendants again attack, upon numerous grounds, the foremost being that the complaint fails to state a claim against the respective defendants upon which relief can be granted. The court now addresses the merits of the defendants' motions to dismiss.
Repeated and thorough evaluations of the plaintiffs' amended complaint leaves the court with the distinct impression that the plaintiffs have chosen not to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the court to state, in cogent and concise terms, the basis of their federal claims against the named defendants. The claim of the plaintiffs which are purportedly founded upon federal law are set forth in what plaintiffs' amended complaint denominates as their first four causes of action. Review of the allegations advanced with respect to each of these claims compels the court to conclude that the plaintiffs have not stated a claim for relief cognizable under federal law. Consequently, the court is compelled to DISMISS the plaintiffs' complaint for relief under federal law without affording them an additional opportunity to amend.
Invoking the remedy, provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, both McCracken and Waggoner seek remuneration from the defendants for their alleged violation, both individually and in conspiracy, of the rights secured the plaintiffs by the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. As best as can be ascertained from an obfuscated and verbose pleading, the gravamen of both individual's section 1983 claim lies in the assertion that they were deprived of both a "property" interest in continued public employment, and a "liberty" interest in their reputation, without due process of law. While both now allude to numerous other isolated occurrences of conduct on the part of various defendants, which purportedly constituted a violation of the rights secured by one or more of the other amendments listed, neither McCracken nor Waggoner sufficiently pleads the factual predicate upon which these alleged violations are based. Rather, the plaintiffs merely state, in conclusory fashion, that the defendants violated the constitutional proscriptions against double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment and infringement of free speech. The court finds the vague allusions offered by the plaintiffs insufficient to state a claim for relief under section 1983. Albeit, the analysis must focus on the plaintiffs' claims that their discharge as police officers served to deny them liberty and property in violation of their substantive and procedural rights to due process of law.
A public employee who has a constitutionally protected "property" or "liberty" interest in his employment is entitled to both substantive and procedural due process of law. Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952). Whenever an individual who has a "property" or "liberty" interest in public employment is discharged without being afforded the requisite due process, he may vindicate his rights to due process in a section 1983 action. Where the sufficiency of a due process claim in such an action is challenged, the initial inquiry necessarily centers on whether the discharged employee had a "property" or "liberty" interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. A discharged employee who fails to establish any "property" or "liberty" interest requiring the protections of due process is simply not entitled to relief under section 1983, since no federal right is implicated. See, Guy v. Mohave County, 688 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir.1982), rereported, 701 F.2d 73 (1983); White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1981). Accordingly, resolution of the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1983 claims in the case at bar entails a determination of whether McCracken and/or Waggoner have adequately alleged a deprivation of a "property" interest in continued employment, or a "liberty" interest in reputation.
"Property" interests do not have their genesis in the Constitution, but are created and defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567, 92 S.Ct., 2701, 2704, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see also, Perry v. Snidermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Once a property interest is created, however, federal law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement, subject to the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause. See, Loehr v. Ventura County Community College District, 743 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1984). Property rights subject to the proscription of the Due Process Clause include the legitimate entitlement to continued public employment. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974).
The legitimate entitlement to continued government employment may stem, inter alia, from statutes, or regulations, see e.g., Wilson v. Robinson, 668 F.2d 380 (8th Cir.1981); as well as contract or promise, see, e.g., Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372 (9th Cir.1983); Conley v. Bd. of Trustees of Granada College, 707 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.1983). At the same time, more than the simple fact of employment is necessary to create a property interest, since it has been held that "at will" employees have no property interest requiring the protection of due process. See, Ogilbee v. Western Dist. Guidance Center, Inc., 658 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.1981); Perkins v. Board of Directors of School Admin. Dist. No. 13, 686 F.2d 49 (1st Cir.1982). In that regard, this court has recently held that no property interest in continued employment is created under Montana law on behalf of "at-will" employees. Clemans v. Beaverhead County, ___ F.Supp. ___ CV-85-180-BU (D.Mont. decided May 30, 1986).
Review of the amended complaint in the present case reveals that McCracken and Waggoner have failed to plead the basis upon which they claim a property interest in their continued employment with the defendant City of Chinook. Consequently, the court must conclude that they were "at-will" employees. As such they were subject to termination at the will of their employer. Section 39-2-503, Montana Code Annotated (1983); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital, ___ Mont. ___, 693 P.2d 487 (1984). Having failed to plead the existence of a property interest in continued employment with the defendant City of Chinook, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for deprivation of a property interest in continued public employment without dueprocess of law, cognizable under section 1983.
"Liberty" includes rights to reputation when a public employee is discharged with stigmatizing charges made public about him. See, Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. at 2707. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized that an individual's interest in liberty is affected, for purposes of requiring procedural due process, only when dismissal imposes "a stigma that seriously damages an individual's ability to take advantage of other employment opportunities." Gray v. Union County Intermediate Education Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.1975). Consequently, to state a claim for deprivation of liberty under section 1983, an aggrieved employee...
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...See Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-407 (1985); Cassidy v. Finley, 173 Mont. 475, 568 P.2d 142, 144 (1977). See also McCracken v. City of Chinook, et al., 652 F.Supp. 1300 (D.Mont. 1987). Thus, plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by dismissal of the state ORDER Based upon the foregoing opinion, IT IS ......
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McIntyre v. Seminole County School Bd., 5D00-516.
...in his job. See Sublett v. District Sch. Bd. of Sumter County, 617 So.2d 374, 377 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (citing McCracken v. City of Chinook, 652 F.Supp. 1300 (D.Mont. 1987)). Moreover, under Florida law, a school board's decision to terminate an employee is one affecting the employee's subst......
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...Sublett had a contractual property interest in his job because he could only be terminated for just cause. E.g., McCracken v. City of Chinook, 652 F.Supp. 1300 (D. Montana 1987). Under Florida law, a school board's decision to terminate an employee is one affecting the employee's substantia......