McCraney v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co.
| Decision Date | 20 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-1402-L |
| Parties | DELORES MCCRANEY, Plaintiff, v. ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY COMPANY LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court are Defendant Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC's ("Defendant" or "Oncor") Amended Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 9), filed August 10, 2018; Plaintiff Delores McCraney's ("Plaintiff" or "McCraney") Response to Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 10), filed August 30, 2018; and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 11), filed September 12, 2018. After careful consideration of the motion, briefs, pleadings, and applicable law, the court denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 9).
On May 31, 2018, McCraney filed this action against her former employer, Oncor, for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). After Oncor filed its first motion to dismiss, McCraney filed an amended complaint ("Amended Complaint") (Doc. 8) on July 27, 2018.
According to the Amended Complaint, McCraney's claims arise from allegedly unpaid "salary continuation benefits" that she contends she was entitled to under an Oncor policy that provided paid leave of up to 100% of regular base pay for an employee who is on restricted duty because of an injury or illness. On or about November 12, 2014, McCraney informed Oncor that she suffered from carpal tunnel in her right hand as a result of an on-the-job injury. Doc. 8, ¶ 8. After she submitted proper medical certification to Oncor indicating that she was unable to perform her essential job duties, she was approved for unpaid FMLA leave. Doc. 8, ¶ 8. McCraney also corresponded with Oncor's disability carrier about her benefits under its Salary Continuation policy. Doc. 8, ¶ 11. McCraney contends that the parties agreed that her "salary continuation period" would be in effect between November 12, 2014, and May 31, 2015. On November 21, 2014, McCraney was approved for and agreed to a modified transitional duty role. Doc. 8, ¶ 11. She contends that she did not receive any salary continuation benefits from November 12, 2014, through November 21, 2014, and did not receive her benefits once she began working under her modified duty schedule. Doc. 8, ¶ 12. She contends that Oncor told her she was placed on a "no pay status" because of "excessive absences" between 2003 to 2008. Doc. 8, ¶ 13. McCraney contends that these absences occurred "while on FMLA and/or on-the-job injury time off." Doc. 8, ¶ 13. She contends that "no other employee of [Oncor] was placed on a 'no pay status' under the Salary Continuation policy due to 'excessive absences.'" Doc. 8, ¶ 13.
On January 23, 2015, McCraney submitted medical certification that she suffered a second injury to her left hand and consequently had bilateral carpal tunnel in both hands. Doc 8, ¶ 16. Oncor determined she was unable to perform her essential job duties with either hand and sent her home on February 12, 2015. Doc. 8, ¶ 16. McCraney maintains that, as a result of the diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel, she is entitled to salary continuation benefits for the period between February 12, 2015, and August 12, 2015, which Defendant has not paid. Doc. 8, ¶ 16.
McCraney contends that, by January 2015, she and Oncor had not come to an agreement about her entitlement to the benefits for the period beginning on November 12, 2014, which prompted her to file a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"). On October 26, 2015, Oncor informed the DOL that it would pay McCraney $9,000 in salary continuation benefits but conditioned the payment on her signing a release stating that she would not sue Oncor for any and all claims, whether or not related to her salary continuation benefits. Doc. 8, ¶ 15. McCraney refused the conditional offer on November 4, 2015. Doc. 8, ¶ 15.
McCraney states that Oncor "intentionally and willingly interfered with and discriminated and retaliated against [her] legal rights under the FMLA" based on (1) Oncor's decision to place her on a "no pay status" during the period she was entitled to salary continuation benefits; (2) Oncor conditioning its offer to pay her benefits for the period between November 12, 2014, to May 31, 2015, on her agreeing to forego her right to sue Oncor for any reason; and (3) Oncor's refusal to remedy its failure to pay her salary continuation benefits. Doc. 8, ¶ 17.
On August 10, 2018, Oncor moved to dismiss McCraney's Amended Complaint. First, Oncor maintains that its conditional offer did not constitute an FMLA violation because, under the FMLA, employers are permitted to make a post-dispute settlement offer that includes a waiver of a cause of action under the FMLA. Doc. 9, ¶ 12. Second, Oncor contends that the only remaining viable FMLA violations alleged in McCraney's Complaint are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c). Oncor maintains that the statute of limitations accrued, at the latest, on February 12, 2015, the date that she was sent home due to her bilateral carpal tunnel diagnosis and, therefore, the statute of limitations expired on February 12, 2018, prior to McCraney's filing of this action on May 31, 2018. Doc. 9, ¶¶ 10, 14.
In her Response, McCraney only addresses the statute of limitations issue, and not Oncor's argument that its conditional offer is not a proper basis for an FMLA claim. Doc. 10, ¶ 8 (). McCraney states that February 12, 2015, is not the correct date for the last alleged violation because she was not, at that time, informed of Oncor's decision not to pay salary continuation benefits for the time she would be placed on leave, between February 12, 2015, through August 12, 2015. Doc. 10, ¶ 11. She contends that she was only later made aware of Oncor's refusal to pay benefits on October 26, 2015, when it made the conditional $9,000 offer, or alternatively on November 4, 2015, when she refused it. Doc. 10, ¶ 11. She contends that Oncor "strung [her] along every step of the way" with "false hopes of payment of her Salary Continuation benefits," and it was not until October 26, 2015, the date of Oncor's conditional offer, when she "was put on notice that her FMLA rights were violated." Doc. 10, ¶ 15. "[McCraney] had no reason to expect she would not be paid by Defendant when for the past 12 years, she had been paid for every leave of absence despite being on 'no pay status.'" Doc. 10, ¶ 15.
Oncor replies that McCraney was "clearly on notice of her claim at the time she filed her complaint with the DOL" in January 2015, and she provides no case law in support of her contention that the statute of limitations for a violation under the FMLA can accrue when a settlement offer on the disputed denial of benefits is made and rejected. Doc. 11, ¶ 2.
To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008); Guidry v. American Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177,180 (5th Cir. 2007). A claim meets the plausibility test Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must set forth "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). The "[f]actual allegations of [a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). When the allegations of the pleading do not allow the court to infer more than the mere possibility of wrongdoing, they fall short of showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007); Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Id.; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000). Likewise, "'[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [the plaintiff's] claims.'" Id. (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)). In this regard, a document that is part of the record but not referred to in aplaintiff's complaint and not attached to a motion to dismiss may not be considered by the court in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 820 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Further, it is well-established and '"clearly...
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