McCranie v. State

Decision Date26 November 1979
Docket NumberNo. 57656,57656
Citation261 S.E.2d 779,151 Ga.App. 871
PartiesMcCRANIE v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Randall P. Harrison, Macon, Randall A. Meincke, Forsyth, for appellant.

E. Byron Smith, Dist. Atty., for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Judge.

McCranie was convicted of armed robbery and on appeal enumerates six errors. The evidence presented to the jury is summarized as follows:

Shortly after 7:00 P.M. on January 19, 1977 Mr. and Mrs. John Ham were at their home, which is attached to a general merchandise store they operate in Smarr, Georgia. The doorbell rang and when Mr. Ham went to the door, a man later identified as McCranie was at the door and asked to use the telephone, indicating he wanted to call a wrecker because he was having car trouble. Mr. Ham allowed him to enter and showed him the telephone. McCranie dialed and talked briefly, but then took a handgun out of his pocket and said "(T)his is a stickup." About the same time a second man came through the door. McCranie forced Mr. Ham back to the room where his wife was watching television and told him to lie down on the floor and keep his head down. When Mr. Ham tried to look around to see the two men, McCranie threatened to shoot him if he didn't keep his head down. The second man, who also had a gun, forced Mrs. Ham to get on the floor despite the fact she was crippled.

The two men searched the house and took a bag containing one dollar bills and change, a shotgun, and Mr. Ham's wallet. The amount of money taken was estimated as $350.

Although Mr. Ham could not identify McCranie from photographs, he identified him in court as the man who first came to the door. Mrs. Ham picked McCranie from a group of photographs shown her by a deputy sheriff three or four days after the offense occurred, and also identified him positively in court as the man who first came and asked to use the telephone.

1. McCranie contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial because the evidence does not support the verdict. Code Ann. § 26-1902(a) defines armed robbery, in part, as follows: "A person commits armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon." The acts committed here clearly come within the definition of armed robbery, and the evidence amply supported the verdict of guilty. The victims of the robbery both identified the accused as the robber who ransacked their house at gunpoint and took a billfold from Mr. Ham. The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial on the general grounds. Foster v. State, 230 Ga. 186(2), 187, 188, 195 S.E.2d 902 (1973). After a review of the entire record, we find that a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced at trial proof of guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.

2. McCranie next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the identification testimony of Mrs. Ham. In her testimony she described the man who used the telephone as thirty years of age or older, and identified McCranie in court positively as the man who used the telephone. About a week after the robbery occurred, a police officer came to Mrs. Ham's house and showed her eight photographs; she picked McCranie's photograph as the man who used the telephone. After picking McCranie from the photographs, the officer nodded his head and said "that's one of them." This court has held that "(i)n a case involving photographic identification, 'each case must be considered on its own facts, and . . . convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification'. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247." Daniels v. State, 135 Ga.App. 549, 550, 218 S.E.2d 274, 275-276 (1975). There is nothing in the record to indicate that the procedure used in showing the photographs to Mrs. Ham was impermissibly suggestive. The officer merely asked Mrs. Ham to look at the photographs and see if she could identify any of the persons depicted. The case of Dodd v. State, 236 Ga. 572, 573, 224 S.E.2d 408, 410 (1976) does not hold that it is "highly irregular" for a police officer to tell a witness he has chosen the correct person, as urged in appellant's brief. Rather it held that "(I)t is not a good practice to indicate to a witness that he has chosen the 'right' person as it Could lead to an improper tainting of a subsequent in-court identification in a questionable case. However, whether a subsequent in-court identification is tainted depends on all the circumstances of each case." (Emphasis supplied.) The court went on to cite Simmons, supra, and to hold that the identification procedure did not taint the in-court identification under the circumstances of that case. Similarly, we find nothing in the present case to indicate that the photographic procedure tainted Mrs. Ham's in-court identification. Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.

3. Appellant contends it was error to admit the shotgun into evidence because of a conflict in testimony as to whether it was a .12 gauge or a .16 gauge gun and because it was not sufficiently connected to the robbery. Both Mr. Ham and his son identified the shotgun as the one stolen from the Ham residence although the stock and barrel had been sawed off. Mr. Ham said it was a Stevens double-barrel shotgun, .12 gauge, about sixty years old. He further identified the gun as being his by the fact that after it was opened "that thing over there has always been that a way. It didn't ever come back good." Two other witnesses testified that the shotgun in question, which was found in a car in Bibb County three days after the robbery, was a .16 gauge shotgun. We do not find this technical conflict to render the shotgun inadmissible in view of the total testimony concerning its identification. The fact that McCranie's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Baker v. State, 62469
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 9, 1982
    ...a robber is sufficient for its admission. See Code § 38-102; Kates v. State, 152 Ga.App. 29, 30(2), 262 S.E.2d 221; McCranie v. State, 151 Ga.App. 871, 874(3), 261 S.E.2d 779; Sell v. State, 156 Ga.App. 333, 336(6), 274 S.E.2d 723; Rutledge v. State, 152 Ga.App. 755, 759(4), 264 S.E.2d 244.......
  • Jefferson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 29, 1981
    ...the prosecuting witness could properly testify at some point in the trial other than as the state's first witness. McCranie v. State, 151 Ga.App. 871(5), 261 S.E.2d 779 (1979); Martin v. State, 151 Ga.App. 9, 11(3), 258 S.E.2d 711 (1979). "The orderly presentation of evidence being a proper......
  • Slaughter v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 15, 1982
    ...the district attorney states he needs the assistance of the investigating officer in the presentation of the case. McCranie v. State, 151 Ga.App. 871, 875(5), 261 S.E.2d 779. The assistant district attorney here stated in his place he needed the assistance of the investigating officer in th......
  • Camp v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 6, 1983
    ...at trial by defendant before or when such explanation was given. We find no merit in this complaint. See McCranie v. State, 151 Ga.App. 871, 875(5), 876, 261 S.E.2d 779; Parham v. State, 135 Ga.App. 315, 320-321(8), 217 S.E.2d 493; Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 421(6), 216 S.E.2d 4. We fin......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT