McCravy v. McCravy, 35112
| Decision Date | 26 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 35112,35112 |
| Citation | 244 Ga. 336,260 S.E.2d 52 |
| Parties | McCRAVY et al. v. McCRAVY. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Lawrence J. McEvoy, Jr., Atlanta, for appellants.
Frank Gore, Austell, for appellee.
This appeal is from an order of Douglas Superior Court cancelling, setting aside and declaring invalid a certain deed from appellee Charles Alton McCravy to Otis J. McCravy, filed on February 15, 1968, and adjudging that appellee Charles Alton McCravy is the owner of a one-third undivided interest in certain property commonly referred to as Lakeside Mobile Home Park in Douglas County, Georgia.
Appellants and appellee are brothers, the sons of Otis J. McCravy, deceased. In deeds dated May 5, 1966, and August 1, 1966, Otis J. McCravy deeded forty-two acres of real estate in Douglas County, Georgia, in equal shares to his three sons. On February 15, 1968, appellee reconveyed his one-third interest in the property back to his father. On February 21, 1968, Otis J. McCravy deeded the one-third interest returned to him by appellee to appellants.
On May 26, 1976, appellee filed a petition in equity alleging fraud, seeking to set aside the February 15, 1968 deed and asking restoration to appellee of a one-third interest in the mobile home park property. Appellee alleged that he had been fraudulently induced to reconvey his one-third interest in the property to Otis J. McCravy after being falsely informed that appellants were also deeding back their fractional shares, vesting sole title in the land in Otis J. McCravy so to enable him to borrow money against the land. Appellee understood that the land was to pass back to the three sons at the death of Otis J. McCravy, through his will.
The case was heard by a jury who returned a verdict in favor of appellee. Pursuant to that verdict the trial court entered its order, setting aside the deed and declaring appellee to be the owner of a one-third undivided interest in the property. We affirm.
1. Appellants complain that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the personal relationship between appellee and his mother. At trial appellee took the position that because of the relationship of trust and confidence he had with his father and brothers, he did not learn of the alleged fraud perpetrated upon him until his father's death, at which time he learned that the one-third interest he had conveyed to his father in February, 1968 was not a part of the father's estate, but had been deeded to appellants.
Appellants sought to show that no confidential relationship existed between appellee and his father in 1968, by offering evidence that appellee had a poor relationship with his mother at that time. The trial court refused to allow the evidence unless some relevancy was shown. We find no error.
Testimony as to appellee's relationship with his father and his brothers was allowed. Appellee's mother and father were divorced at the time in question. Appellants' counsel failed to illustrate how appellee's relationship with his mother had any bearing on appellee's relationship with his father and brothers. The excluded evidence was not relevant to the issue and was properly excluded.
2. Appellants complain that the trial court erred in denying their motion for directed verdict on the ground that any promises allegedly made to appellee by Otis J. McCravy were unenforceable promises to perform an act in the future and could not form the basis of an action for fraud.
The alleged fraud existed in misrepresentations made by Otis J. McCravy to appellee that appellants were also transferring their interest in the property to their father for the sole purpose of allowing Otis J. McCravy to obtain a loan, with the understanding that the interest in the land would be willed to appellee at the father's death. Appellee contended that the misrepresentation was made with the present knowledge that this was false. "While fraud cannot generally be based on instances of misrepresentations as to future events, it may consist of such instances if, when the misrepresentation is made, the defendant knows that the future event will not take place." Hayes v. Hallmark Apts., 232 Ga. 307 (1), 207 S.E.2d 197 (1974). Sutton v. McMillan, 213 Ga. 90 (4), 97 S.E.2d 139 (1957). Additionally, the misrepresentation that the appellants were at the same time deeding their interest to the father was a present event, which did not occur. The jury was authorized to find these misrepresentations to be a part of a fraudulent scheme.
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Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., Inc., STUART-JAMES
...future event would not take place. Hines v. Good Housekeeping Shop, 161 Ga.App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 238 (1982) (citing McCravy v. McCravy, 244 Ga. 336, 337, 260 S.E.2d 52 (1979)). Moreover, appellant contends that appellees' fraud would have justified punitive damages pursuant to appellant's cl......
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N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Grant
...This could be a fraud claim if New York Life had no intention to fulfill its promises at the time it made them. McCravy v. McCravy, 244 Ga. 336, 338, 260 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1979). But as pled, Grant has failed to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation.d. Count IV–Breach of Implied Contra......
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Hines v. Good Housekeeping Shop, 62523
...if, when the misrepresentation is made, the defendant knows that the future event will not take place.' [Cits.]" McCravy v. McCravy, 244 Ga. 336, 337, 260 S.E.2d 52 (1979). With regard to a party's "guilty knowledge," "[t]he circumstances, the time, the secrecy, all the transactions before,......
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Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., L.P.
...law failure to fulfill a promise to undertake some future event ordinarily will not give rise to an action for fraud. McCravy v. McCravy, 244 Ga. 336, 260 S.E.2d 52 (1979). However, under an exception to this general rule a promise may be considered fraudulent if, at the time it was made, t......