McCray v. Lee

• Decision Date: 18 June 2020
• Docket Number: August Term, 2019,Docket No. 18-1144
• Citation: 963 F.3d 110
• Parties: Lionel MCCRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Superintendent William LEE, Watch Commander Lt. Plimley, Sergeant Kutz, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

963 F.3d 110

Lionel MCCRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Superintendent William LEE, Watch Commander Lt. Plimley, Sergeant Kutz, Defendants-Appellees.^*

Docket No. 18-1144

August Term, 2019

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: February 19, 2020

Decided: June 18, 2020

Lionel McCray, Auburn, New York, Plaintiff-Appellant pro se.

DAVID LAWRENCE III, Assistant Solicitor General, New York, New York (Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor General, New York, New York, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

KEVIN KING, Washington, D.C. (Amy Leiser, Covington & Burling, on the brief), Court-Appointed Amicus-Curiae, in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.

Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, KEARSE and BIANCO, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff pro se Lionel McCray, a New York State prisoner, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Kenneth M. Karas, Judge , dismissing his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging that the defendant officials at the correctional facility where he was previously incarcerated failed to clear snow and ice from outdoor exercise yards for an entire winter and thereby violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by (a) denying him a meaningful opportunity for physical exercise for four months, and (b) causing him to be injured in a slip-and-fall accident. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss McCray's second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), principally ruling that McCray failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment; that if such a claim for damages were stated, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity; and that requests for injunctive relief were moot because McCray had been transferred to a different correctional facility. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McCray's state-law claims. On appeal, McCray challenges these rulings and contends that defendants' failure also violated a 1985 consent decree. We conclude that the district court erred in granting a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of McCray's Eighth Amendment claims seeking damages for the denial of physical exercise; and as those claims are to be reinstated, we also reinstate McCray's state-law claims. In all other respects, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The second amended complaint in this action (hereinafter "Complaint" or "SAC") alleged the following facts, which must be taken as true for purposes of considering a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

A. The Events

During part of 2013-2014, McCray was incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility ("Green Haven") in Stormville, New York. During that period, defendant William Lee was Green Haven's Superintendent and was responsible for operations, management, policymaking, and correctional officer supervision; defendant William Plimley, who served as Facility Watch Commander, was an agent of Lee and was responsible for implementing policies adopted by Lee. (See SAC ¶¶ 2, 4.) Defendant Sergeant Kutz was an agent of Lee; his duties included inspection of the outdoor exercise yard available to McCray, and supervision of McCray's physical activity. (See id . ¶ 12.)

1. The Denial of Physical Exercise

For part of the winter of 2013-2014 ("Winter of 2014" or "Winter"), McCray was on "keeplock" status. In that status, he was allowed out of his cell each day for one hour of exercise. Green Haven had several outdoor exercise yards and one indoor gymnasium. McCray was permitted to exercise only in an outdoor yard; access to the indoor gymnasium, which was sometimes used for special events, was restricted to inmates in other categories. (See SAC ¶¶ 8, 9.)

In the Winter of 2014, Lee's policy was not to have snow and ice removed from any outdoor exercise yard. Rather, the snow and ice were allowed to accumulate in each yard, to remain there until the arrival of sufficiently warm weather to melt the snow and ice away. During the winter months, any natural melting that occurred refroze into slippery ice overnight, and the yard remained uncleared. (See id . ¶¶ 6, 10.)

In that Winter, Lee closed one or more outdoor recreational yards. Given that Green Haven's prisoner population was at the facility's maximum capacity, the closures and the snow-and-ice accumulations created overcrowding in the open yards, blocked access to the yards' exercise equipment, and prevented McCray from moving sufficiently freely to be able to exercise. (See id . ¶¶ 6, 9.) These impediments to exercise persisted for four months. (See id . ¶ 11.)

Defendants Lee and Plimley were aware of these circumstances. The conditions (a) were "easily visible from the facility's long hallways," and (b) were the subject of inmate grievances and complaints. (SAC ¶ 7.)

2. McCray's Slip and Fall

By February 20, 2014, all of the recreational yards at Green Haven were covered with uncleared snow and ice; in more than 75 percent of the areas, accumulated snow and ice were waist-high. On that day, Sergeant Kutz inspected the G and H block yard and ordered McCray and other inmates to enter for exercise, despite those conditions. While attempting to avoid a large sheet of ice, McCray stepped into a snowbank and slipped on concealed ice, permanently injuring his ankle and shoulder. (See SAC ¶¶ 10, 12-14, 17.)

B. Dismissal of the Present Action

McCray commenced the present action in 2016, by which time he had been moved to a different correctional facility. The Complaint--filed after various proceedings addressing his original and his first amended pleadings--alleged that the refusal of defendants at Green Haven to have snow and ice removed from the only exercise areas available to McCray had deprived him, for four months, of his Eighth Amendment right to exercise, and had caused his slip-and-fall accident by denying him a "hazard free environment" as required by the Eighth Amendment and state law (SAC ¶ 18). McCray requested declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory, punitive, and future damages.

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint principally pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). They argued that the Complaint failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment; that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that no such Eighth Amendment rights had been clearly established; that McCray's requests for injunctive relief were moot because he was no longer at Green Haven; and that, absent any viable Eighth Amendment claim, the court lacked jurisdiction over McCray's state-law claims.

In an Opinion and Order reported in McCray v. Lee , No. 16-CV-1730, 2018 WL 1620976 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2018) (" McCray I "), the district court granted defendants' motions. It held, first, that the Complaint failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment with respect to McCray's slip-and-fall accident. The court noted that slip-and-fall claims are seldom viewed as having constitutional dimension, see , e.g. , id . at *7, and it rejected McCray's argument that Kutz's ordering McCray onto the slippery yard constituted an "exceptional circumstance" that rose to the level of a constitutional violation, reasoning (1) that "conditions such as winter snow and ice ‘constitute a daily risk faced by members of the public at large,’ " id . at *8 (quoting Reynolds v. Powell , 370 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004) ); (2) that McCray was not ordered to walk on ice but was ordered simply to proceed into the yard, see McCray I , 2018 WL 1620976, at *8 ; and (3) that

[t]he allegations in the SAC are insufficient to allege plausibly that any Defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind because Plaintiff has, at most, alleged that Defendants were negligent, not that any [D]efendant obdurately and wantonly refused to remedy a specific risk to [P]laintiff,

id . at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Turning to McCray's Eighth Amendment denial-of-exercise claims, the court viewed McCray as requesting only injunctive relief, see McCray I , 2018 WL 1620976, at *10 n.11, and it held that his claims were moot because he was no longer housed at Green Haven, see id . at *10. The court held that to the extent that McCray requested damages for denial of exercise, he failed to allege a viable Eighth Amendment claim, stating as follows:

If Plaintiff in fact seeks damages for an Eighth Amendment claim for restricted access to exercise separate from his slip and fall injuries, ... his allegations are insufficient to state a claim. "[T]emporary limitations on access to exercise, without full denial of opportunities, do[ ] not violate the Eighth Amendment." Burns v. Martuscello , No. 13-CV-486, 2015 WL 541293, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015). Defendants' choice to temporarily restrict access to some of the recreation yards due to the presence of ice , is not "based on a culpable state of mind or deliberate indifference to [Plaintiff's] health or safety, but the legitimate penological interest of waiting until the yard was cleared of ice and snow so that it would be safe for inmates to use ." Id .

McCray I , 2018 WL 1620976, at *10 n.11 (emphases ours). The court continued:

"[A]n occasional day without exercise when weather conditions preclude outdoor activity [is not] cruel and unusual punishment. With outdoor recreation space provided and opportunity for its daily use assured , the absence of additional exercise space indoors and of recreational equipment for use in the outdoor space is not a denial of constitutional rights." .... And, ... Plaintiff made use of outdoor recreation options ....

Id . (quoting Anderson v. Coughlin , 757 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphases ours)).

The court also concluded that if McCray had sufficiently pleaded a claim under the Eighth Amendment, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. It stated that "a prisoner[']s constitutional right against...