Reynolds v. Powell
Decision Date | 03 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-4156.,03-4156. |
Citation | 370 F.3d 1028 |
Parties | Toya Jeffon REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert POWELL, Captain; David Morrey, Officer; Ken Knobel, Officer, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Submitted on the briefs: Toya Jeffon Reynolds, Pro Se.
Nancy L. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiff-appellant Toya Jeffon Reynolds, a state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the summary judgment entered by the district court in favor of defendants-appellees Robert Powell, David Morrey, and Ken Knobel. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.1
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Uinta IV maximum security facility in Draper, Utah. Defendants are correctional officers at the Uinta IV facility, and plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by subjecting him to a hazardous condition in the prison shower area. Although the district court found that plaintiff had put forth sufficient evidence to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the court also determined that plaintiff had failed to establish that the law governing defendants' conduct was clearly established at the time of the violation. See R., Vol. II, Doc. 35 at 5-8. As a result, the district court concluded that defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on their affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 8.
As set forth below, unlike the district court, we conclude that plaintiff put forth insufficient evidence to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, we affirm the entry of summary judgment on that basis, and we do not reach the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment right allegedly violated by defendants was clearly established at the time of plaintiff's incident. See Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 528 (10th Cir.1994) ( ).
The district court accurately summarized plaintiff's allegations as follows:
[Plaintiff alleges] that about 6:00 p.m. on February 18, 1999, [he] suffered significant injury to his head, neck, and back when he fell in the shower at the Uinta IV prison facility. Plaintiff attributes his fall to the fact that the shower area in the prison failed to drain properly and water accumulated in a depression outside the shower area. Plaintiff asserts that he warned Defendants of the problem several times before he was injured. Plaintiff specifically warned Defendants that he was at a heightened risk of falling because a previous injury required Plaintiff to use crutches. Further, Plaintiff alleges that before he fell he asked for extra towels to clean up the water, but Defendant Morrey denied this request; merely telling Plaintiff to be careful.
R., Vol. II, Doc. 35 at 4. We also note that it is undisputed that plaintiff first noticed the standing-water problem on or about December 27, 1998. Id., Vol. I, Doc. 3, attached Memorandum in Support of § 1983 Civil Rights Action at 5. In addition, we note that plaintiff alleges that another inmate slipped and fell in the shower area on February 5, 1999. Id. at 6.
"In an action under section 1983, individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is demonstrated that their alleged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their positions would have known." Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir.1999). As a result, "qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a section 1983 action, providing immunity from suit from the outset." Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir.1995).
"When the defense of qualified immunity is raised in a summary judgment motion, we apply special rules to determine whether the motion was properly granted or denied." Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir.1996). Specifically, Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir.1996) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, our Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); see also Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir.2003) ().
As a threshold matter, plaintiff must therefore demonstrate that he has presented sufficient facts to show that defendants' conduct violated his Eighth Amendment rights. See DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir.2001). Plaintiff does not have to rebut defendants' factual allegations, however, because we view all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Id. We also review the legal issues surrounding the grant of qualified immunity de novo. Id. Having conducted the required reviews of the evidence and the legal issues in this case, we conclude that plaintiff has put forth insufficient evidence to support his Eighth Amendment claim.
"To prevail on a `conditions of confinement' claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish that (1) the condition complained of is `sufficiently serious' to implicate constitutional protection, and (2) prison officials acted with `deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.'" Id. ( ). We hold that plaintiff has failed to establish that the standing-water problem was a sufficiently serious condition to warrant constitutional protection under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, we do not need to address the deliberate indifference requirement.
In order to satisfy the first prong of the Farmer test, plaintiff must show that the standing-water problem "rose to the level of [a] `condition [] posing a substantial risk of serious harm' to inmate health or safety." Id. at 973, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970). We conclude that plaintiff has put forth insufficient evidence to make this showing. To begin with, while the standing-water problem was a potentially hazardous condition, slippery floors constitute a daily risk faced by members of the public at large. Federal courts from other circuits have therefore consistently held that slippery prison floors do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.1993) ( )(quotation omitted); Denz v. Clearfield County, 712 F.Supp. 65, 66 (W.D.Pa.1989) ( ); Mitchell v. West Virginia, 554 F.Supp. 1215, 1216-17 (N.D.W.Va.1983) ( ); Robinson v. Cuyler, 511 F.Supp. 161, 162, 163 (E.D.Pa.1981) ( ); Tunstall v. Rowe, 478 F.Supp. 87, 88, 89 (N.D.Ill.1979) ( ); Snyder v. Blankenship, 473 F.Supp. 1208, 1209, 1212-13 (W.D.Va.1979) (, )aff'd, 618 F.2d 104 (4th Cir.1980).
Simply put, Mitchell, 554 F.Supp. at 1217; see also Snyder, 473 F.Supp. at 1212-13 ( ).2 But see Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir.1998) ( ). Thus, the question is whether this case presents sufficiently special or unique circumstances that require us to depart from the general rule barring Eighth Amendment liability in prison slip and...
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