McCrea v. School District of Pine Township

• Decision Date: 09 November 1891
• Docket Number: 28
• Parties: MARY McCREA v. PINE TP. SCHOOL DIST
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

22 A. 1040

145 Pa. 550

MARY McCREA v. PINE TP. SCHOOL DIST

No. 28

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

November 9, 1891

Argued October 27, 1891

APPEAL BY DEFENDANT FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 1 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY.

No. 28 October Term 1891, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 739 December Term 1889, C.P. No. 1.

To the first Monday of December, 1889, Mary McCrea brought assumpsit against the School District of Pine township, for salary as a teacher. Issue.

At the trial, on November 12, 1890, the following facts were shown:

On September 16, 1889, the board of directors of the defendant school district, having appointed the plaintiff as teacher of Chapel Hill school No. 3, entered into a written contract with her for the teaching of that school for a term of seven months, at a salary of thirty-five dollars per month. The contract contained the following clause: "Reserving the right to the board of directors, for the time being, to dismiss the said teacher at any time whatever, for any of the causes specified in the twenty-third section of the act of May 8, 1854, entitled "An Act for the regulation and continuance of a system of education by common schools." The plaintiff, who had a proper certificate as a teacher from the county superintendent, commenced teaching under the contract on the day of its date, and continued so to do until November 6, 1889, when she was dismissed by action of the board of directors, entered on their minutes as follows:

"DUNLAP'S SCHOOL-HOUSE, November 6, 1889.

"Per adjournment, board met, Messrs. Lurting, Kelley, Umstead and Kidd present. Same day, in the afternoon at Chapel Hill, No 3; Messrs. Lurting, Kelley, Umstead, Warner, Reynolds and Kidd present.

"We found this school in a very unsatisfactory condition recitations poor, deportment bad, scholars lifeless and indifferent in studies. Teacher Miss Mary McCrea displayed inability to get up any enthusiasm in studies whatever, and it appeared that she had no discipline.

"At 3.30 P.M. Miss McCrea dismissed her school, and after the scholars were all gone Miss McCrea called on the members of the board for remarks. Lurting responded to her request, and remarked that he was not at all pleased with the condition of the school, but at present was undecided whether it would be best to continue or discontinue Miss McCrea.

"Miss McCrea then called on Kidd for remarks. He followed in the same strain, except that he was decided that it was a loss of time and money to continue. Kelley remarked the school was far from being what he desired it, and he thought not much use to continue under present management; but if the members of the board residing in the district thought it was of any use to continue and try for better, he would not object. Messrs. Reynolds' and Warner's remarks favored continuing and trying for better. Umstead remarked that the school was lifeless, no work doing at all, but was undecided what was best to do; but at present would favor the idea advanced by Kelley. Kelley said to Miss McCrea that he thought she had better resign. Miss McCrea replied that she was employed to teach, and it was the only way she had of making a living, and she intended to teach the term out.

"Kidd asked Miss McCrea to retire, but she insisted on being present. Kidd then remarked that there was no motion before the board, and as it was evident a quorum would be in favor of continuing for a time and trying for better, that we drop the matter and proceed with other business, though, in his opinion, to continue was loss in every sense of the word after which Lurting remarked that it was evident to him no good was being done, and would favor a dismissal of Miss McCrea; whereupon it was moved and seconded to dismiss Miss Mary McCrea, teacher in Chapel Hill, No. 3, for (in our opinion) incompetency to teach or govern a school under ou care. incompetency to teach or govern a school under our care.

"The vote being taken, resulted as follows: Ayes, Messrs. Lurting, Kelley, Umstead and Kidd; nay, Warner; not voting, Reynolds.

"Miss McCrea was asked if she would teach the two following days, in order to make out the present month. She replied she would.

E. W. KIDD, Sec. of Board."

Members of the school board testified to the results of their obversation of the school at the visit to it mentioned in the minutes, and on other occasions, and that the plaintiff was dismissed for the cause stated in the minutes. Their testimony, and that of other witnesses, called by the defendant, tended to show that the plaintiff exhibited incompetency as a teacher and inability to govern the school. Testimony, given by the plaintiff and other witnesses called by her, tended to rebut the statements and opinions testified to by the witnesses for the defendant.

E. W. Kidd, a member of the school board, in testifying for the defendant, stated that the president of the board, Mr. Umstead, remarked to the plaintiff, before her dismissal: "You may think, Miss McCrea, that it is on account of your religion, but we didn't take that into consideration at all. Q. Why did he make that remark? A. The impression had gone abroad that Miss McCrea was a Catholic, and that on that account we were dismissing her. Q. Miss McCrea had said nothing about it? A. Nothing."

The plaintiff testified: "Q. When you were dismissed, do you remember of the president of the board making a remark? A. Yes, sir. He said, 'Now, Miss McCrea, I want you to understand this has nothing to do with religion, your dismissal;' and I didn't say anything, and Mr. Warner says, 'Well, Mr. Umstead, I think it has,' or he said something to that effect."

The testimony being closed, the court STOWE, P.J., charged the jury in part as follows:

The plaintiff in this case says that she made a contract with the school board for a certain term of service as teacher, at thirty-five dollars a month for seven months; and all that was necessary to do on her side of the case was to show that contract, and show that the school board had refused to let her fulfil her agreement for the serving of that time; that they discharged her before the expiration of the term of service. That would give prima facie a right to her to recover compensation for the whole term. She says she could not get any other service; and consequently, if she is entitled to recover anything, it is for the five months that she did not serve when willing to serve, and when the defendant would not let her serve, at thirty-five dollars a month.

School boards have supervisory power over their teachers, and have a right to discharge for certain reasons. . . . If the school board are satisfied, by proper evidence, of incompetency, cruelty, negligence, or immorality, on the part of the teacher, they have the right at once to terminate the contract, and then the teacher cannot recover anything for the time not actually served. [In this case, they allege that they did discharge this plaintiff on account of incompetency and neglect of duty, and it is for you to determine, under all the testimony in the case, whether or not they had sufficient reason for coming to that conclusion.]

The fact that the law gives them the right to discharge for incompetency, does not give them such dictatorial power as that the members of the board may meet just at their pleasure and get rid of a teacher they do not want, for some other reason, or for any reason except that given them by the law. They cannot simply meet and resolve that the teacher is incompetent or immoral, and say that she is to be discharged, without assuming the responsibility of vindicating their action, if the occasion arises in court for giving some reason. My first impression was a little the other way; I thought that where they fell within the term at all, they had an absolutely discretionary power, but I am satisfied that is not the position that ought to be taken, nor is it the position taken by defendant's counsel in this case. He does not pretend to say, as I understand it, -- at least the point does not suggest it, -- that they are mere dictators; that they may employ a teacher, male or female, for seven months, and then meet and resolve, without some reason for coming to that conclusion, that the person is immoral, or incompetent, and discharge him without being held responsible in court for a misuse of their power. . . .

[The defendants here say they saw and learned from their own observation by going to the school, that it was improperly managed, carelessly attended to, negligently taught, and that then and there they, from knowledge thus derived, had sufficient cause to come to the conclusion that the teacher was anything but competent, was negligent in her duties so as to make her unfit to be retained in the school, and they discharged her: and they have stated their reasons as appears upon the minutes. If you believe they had reasonable cause for that, then that ends the case, so far as the plaintiff's claim is concerned, and your verdict should be for defendant. . . . This parties, however, have undertaken, upon their own assumed knowledge, to discharge her; and now it is for you to determine whether or not, under the testimony in the case, they have shown a reasonable excuse; not satisfied you, as I take it, beyond a reasonable doubt that they were right, but have they...