McCready v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

Decision Date31 May 1948
Docket Number16085.
PartiesMcCREADY v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Willcox, Hardee, Houck & Palmer, of Florence and V. E. Phelps, of Wilmington, N. C., for appellant.

R. E. Whitehurst, of New Bern N. C., and Royall & Wright, of Florence, for respondent.

FISHBURNE Justice.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff to recover of the defendant damages for the total loss of a certain shipment of green beans alleged to have been caused by negligent refrigeration while enroute from Lake City, South Carolina to Preston, Maryland. Upon trial the jury brought in a verdict for One Thousand Fifty-six and 00/100 ($1,056) Dollars in favor of the plaintiff, which was the alleged value of the property destroyed, and judgment was awarded for this amount with legal interest. The defendant appeals from the judgment and order of the lower Court denying its motion for a directed verdict made upon the close of all the evidence. The exceptions likewise raise issues as to the correct measure of damages, and on the admission of certain evidence.

On June 1, 1944, the respondent bought on the Lake City market 640 one-bushel hampers of green beans, which he sold to H. B Wright & Sons of Preston, Maryland, at One and 65/100 ($1.65) Dollars per bushel hamper, F.O.B. Lake City. The sale was to become effective upon delivery of the beans at Preston in good condition.

In accordance with the directions of respondent, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company placed its refrigerator car MDT 3671 at 9:00 P.M., on June 1, 1944, on the siding at Lake City and the 640 one-bushel hampers of beans were loaded therein. The car was released the following day on June 2, 1944, at 12:00 o'clock noon and the appellant issued its uniform straight bill of lading therefor, showing consignment to H. B. Wright & Sons at Preston-Maryland, with standard refrigeration requested. The refrigerator car reached Preston four days later on June 6th and was placed on the private siding of H. B. Wright & Sons on that date at 11:30 o'clock A.M. Immediately, the consignee with Mr. D. W. Cartwright, local freight agent of the Pennslyvania Railroad, which was the terminal and delivering carrier, inspected the car. They found the ice bunkers located at each end entirely empty of ice, the ventilators were closed, and when the doors were opened smoke poured out of the car as from a fire. On examination it was discovered that the beans had turned brown and limp and that the baskets in which they were packed had started to turn dark and appeared to be charred. The whole shipment was worthless and was thereafter dumped in a neighboring field.

Claim was filed with the Pennsylvania Railroad, the delivering carrier, for One Thousand Fifty-six and 00/100 ($1,056) Dollars, which claim was denied, and this suit followed against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, the initial carrier, under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11)(12).

Error is assigned because the lower court refused to direct a verdict in favor of the appellant, made on the ground that respondent produced no substantial proof that appellant failed to exercise ordinary care in the refrigeration of the beans in accordance with the shipper's directions, and also because the testimony as a whole showed that appellant had fully performed its transportation contract with respect to refrigeration and icing.

In Wentworth Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. American R. Exp. Co., 222 Mo.App. 1189, 1 S.W.2d 1028, 1029, where a shipment of berries alleged to have been good when shipped was delivered in a deteriorated state, the Court held:

'Ordinarily when such proof is made by a shipper the burden is shifted to the carrier to explain or account for the damaged condition of the shipment or respond in damages; but if the shipper pleads specific negligence he cannot invoke the presumption arising from the damaged condition. In case of a plea of specific negligence the burden is on the shipper to prove the negligence alleged, and this burden does not shift.'

We think the foregoing is a sound rule, and in view of the specific negligence alleged in this case, which was negligent refrigeration, that the burden was upon respondent to prove the negligence alleged. The same rule is declared in House v. Wheelock, 244 Ill.App. 270, and Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Georgia Packing Co., 5 Cir., 164 F.2d 1.

Service Order No. 210 of the Interstate Commerce Commission in force at the time of this shipment, prohibited common carriers by railroad from icing refrigerator cars loaded with fruits or vegetables originating in South Carolina with more ice than necessary to bring the ice in each bunker up to the 3/4's of the bunker capacity. The full icing capacity of the car furnished by the appellant was 10,800 pounds.

Evidence offered by appellant tended to show that on June 1st at about 6:00 P. M., without pre-cooling, the car was iced to a 3/4's capacity before loading, which amounted to 8,100 pounds. After loading at Lake City it was returned to Florence where it was re-iced on June 2nd at 7:55 P.M., to 3/4's capacity which required 6,300 pounds. It is undisputed that until the beans had become cool that the loss of ice would be much greater than after the beans had become thoroughly chilled.

On June 4th the car was re-iced at 9:54 P.M, at Norfolk, Virginia, which was the next regular icing station, and it then took 5,800 pounds to bring it up to 3/4's capacity, or 8,100 pounds. It was delivered, as heretofore pointed out, on the siding of the consignee at Preston, Maryland, thirty-seven hours later, on June 6th at 11:30 o'clock A.M., and the bunkers were then found devoid of ice and the shipment of beans spoiled beyond redemption.

The appellant contends that under this testimony it discharged the full measure of its legal duty in accordance with its contract for standard refrigeration, and that having proved without contradiction that it re-iced the shipment at all regular icing stations en route--at Florence, and Norfolk--affirmatively showed complete performance of its legal obligation in refrigerating the shipment.

We think the position of the appellant as stated is untenable. Assuming that appellant showed by uncontradicted evidence that this refrigerator car was re-iced to 3/4's of its capacity at Florence and Norfolk, a reasonable inference of negligence may be drawn from the evidence submitted by respondent which was sufficient to authorize the submission of the case to the jury.

The evidence offered by appellant tends to prove that when this car was iced at Florence on June 2nd at 7:55 P.M., to its 3/4's capacity, there still remained in it at the time of the re-icing at Norfolk on June 4th at 9:54 P.M., after a period of fifty hours, 2,300 pounds of ice, (which is the difference between 5,800 pounds in the car and the 8,100 pounds, its 3/4's capacity). Under these circumstances, a reasonable inference may be drawn that on June 6th at 11:00 A.M., when it was delivered and inspected at Preston, 37 hours and 36 minutes later, much more than 2,300 pounds should have been found in the bunkers. In any event, it would be reasonable to infer that if the car received 8,100 pounds, its 3/4's capacity at Norfolk, then at least 2,300 pounds would have been found therein at destination, because there is no evidence showing any marked variation in the summer time temperature during the period covered by the shipment, or any unusual circumstance affecting refrigeration. However, when opened the car was empty of ice.

Any fact in issue may be established by circumstantial evidence, if the circumstances, which must themselves be proved, lead to the conclusion with reasonable certainty. A well connected train of circumstances is as cogent of the existence of a fact as any array of direct evidence, and may outweigh opposing direct testimony. It is sufficient if there is evidence from which the fact can properly be inferred. 32 C.J.S., Evidnece, § 1039, pages 1099, 1100. Inferences drawn from physical facts, such as the empty bunkers, may be as strong as direct evidence. Such inferences amount to circumstantial evidence and circumstantial evidence, when sufficiently strong, is as competent as positive evidence to prove a fact. Powe v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 161 S.C. 122, 159 S.E. 473.

The evidence shows that the beans when shipped from Lake City were in sound marketable condition and that when the carload shipment was delivered at Preston four days later they were decayed and deteriorated to such an extent as to be worthless, and even the baskets in which they were packed appeared to be charred from heat. The ventilators of the car...

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