McCubbins v. United Airlines, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:16–cv–116 HTW

Decision Date21 March 2017
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:16–cv–116 HTW
Citation244 F.Supp.3d 557
Parties Martin H. MCCUBBINS, Plaintiff v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.; United Continental Holdings, Inc. ; fictitious defendant, William Black; fictitious defendant, Charles White; and fictitious Defendants A–M, Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

Wayne E. Ferrell, Jr., Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff

John T. Rouse, McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, Jackson, MS, for Defendant

ORDER

HENRY T. WINGATE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Before this court are the following motions: 1) Plaintiff's "Motion to Remand" [docket no. 7]; 2) Plaintiff's "Supplement to Motion to Remand" [docket no.27]; and 3) Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss or Alternative Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings," [docket no. 5].

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff, Martin H. McCubbins (hereafter McCubbins), planned a trip to Panama with a friend. He purchased his ticket from United Airlines, Inc. One day prior to his flight, McCubbins attempted to check in and obtain his boarding pass through the United Airlines, Inc. website. He was informed that because his was an international flight, he would have to come to the ticket counter in person in order for his passport to be inspected and verified. On February 13, 2013, the morning of his flight, McCubbins went to the check-in counter of the Jackson–Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport, located near Jackson, Mississippi, as instructed.

McCubbins had a valid passport, but it was due to expire within six months. At the ticket counter a United Airlines, Inc. agent reviewed and verified his ticket and passport and issued him a boarding pass. McCubbins had to present his passport to United Airlines, Inc. agents several additional times over the course of the trip. None of these agents informed McCubbins of any problem with his passport.

When McCubbins arrived at the airport in Panama he proceeded to customs, where he was informed that he would not be allowed to enter the country. His passport was the problem he was told: it was going to expire in six months or less, a fatal circumstance for international travel. Consequently, he was detained in the airport overnight in an isolated room with armed guards outside, no provisions for food and no accommodations for sleeping. The next morning, the Panamanian authorities placed him on a flight back to Jackson, Mississippi.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. McCubbins I

Prior to initiating the instant lawsuit, McCubbins filed a different suit against United Airlines Corporation (the incorrect corporate name for United Airlines, Inc.) in the First Judicial District of Hinds County Circuit Court, cause no. 25CI1:15–cv–025–WLK (hereafter "McCubbins I "). In that lawsuit, McCubbins sued United Airlines Corporation, alleging that the airline had failed to warn him that he would not be allowed into the country of Panama if his passport was due to expire within six months from the date of his flight. He accused the airline and certain of its employees, whose names were unknown at the time, of negligence, gross negligence and breach of contract under state law for failing to inform him of that fact. He did not plead any federal claims.

In that state court case, McCubbins obtained a default judgment against United Airlines Corporation. On February 2, 2016, United Airlines, Inc., (improperly named as United Airlines Corporation) removed that suit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Civil Action No. 3:16–cv–072 DPJ–FKB. On that same date, United Airlines, Inc., filed a motion in the federal court case to have the default judgment set aside, on the basis that Plaintiff had incorrectly designated the airline's corporate name in the complaint and summons.

The basis for removal, according to United Airlines, Inc., was federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1 None of the parties claimed that federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, because the amount in controversy was less than $75,000.2 United Airlines, Inc., contended that a federal question was created because the Montreal Convention3 and the Airline Deregulation Act4 (hereafter "ADA") preempted Plaintiff's state law claims.

McCubbins filed a motion to remand the case to state court, alleging that no federal question was presented. Generally, under the "well-pleaded complaint rule," a federal court does not have jurisdiction unless a federal question appears on the face of the Plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. Elam v. Kansas City Southern Ry. , 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011) ; Caterpillar, Inc. v Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Ordinarily, state law claims of negligence, gross negligence and breach of contract, such as Plaintiff asserted in McCubbins I , would not support original federal question jurisdiction; and as McCubbins pointed out, the complaint he filed made no reference to the Montreal Convention, the ADA, nor to any other federal or international laws or treaties on its face. [doc. no. 1–A].

An exception occurs, however, when a federal statute completely preempts a particular area such that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character. Id. at 803. West v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co. , 128 F.Supp.2d 396 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (a case is removable if the area of law has been completely preempted by federal law). Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. , 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994) (complete-preemption doctrine allows defendant to remove case to federal court), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 808, 115 S.Ct. 55, 130 L.Ed.2d 14 (1994). If complete preemption exists, as United Airlines, Inc. claims, it authorizes removal to federal court even in circumstances where the complaint has been pleaded in a way that artfully avoids mention of any federal law claims. McKnight v. Dresser, Inc. , 676 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. Baylor Univ. , 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 2000) ).

In McCubbins I , Federal District Court Judge Daniel P. Jordan, III stated that the Fifth Circuit has held that the ADA does not provide complete preemption, citing Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc. , 117 F.3d 922, 925–26 (5th Cir. 1997). There, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "[t]his [the ADA's] preemption clause, standing alone, does not give rise to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 925. That Court went on to say, complete preemption occurs "only when Congress intends not merely to preempt a certain amount of state law, but also intends to transfer jurisdiction of the subject matter from state to federal courts." Id. at 925. See Metropolitan Life , 481 U.S. at 65–66, 107 S.Ct. at 1547–48. Judge E. Grady Jolly, writing for the panel, concluded that Congress did not intend to completely preempt state law. Judge Jordan, writing for the federal district court, likewise concluded that McCubbins' state law claims were not completely preempted by federal law.

Whether the Montreal Convention was preemptive of McCubbins' state law claims, according to Judge Jordan, presented a more difficult question. The Montreal Convention succeeded the Warsaw Convention, as the treaty governing the rights and liabilities of passengers and carriers in international air transportation. Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc. , 360 F.3d 366, 371 n.4. (2nd Cir. 2004). Judge Jordan did not find it necessary to decide the issue of whether the Montreal Convention provides complete preemption, since he determined that McCubbins' claims did not come within the purview of Article 19 of the treaty which is the section that United Airlines, Inc. cited as governing Plaintiff's claims.

McCubbins asserted that Article 19 deals only with passenger 'delay' and his complaint was not about 'delay'. Benjamin v. American Airlines, Inc. , 32 F.Supp.3d 1309, 1317 (S.D. Ga. 2014). Judge Jordan did not find the cases cited by the Defendant to be persuasive of Article 19's applicability to McCubbins' complaints of what the airline did wrong. In fact, they seemed to reinforce Plaintiff's position that Article 19 only applied to passenger 'delay', and that was not the issue before the court. The judge stated: "Because the Montreal Convention does not preempt McCubbins' state-law claims, no federal question exists, and this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction." [3:16–cv–072 docket no. 43 at p. 7]. The case was remanded to state court, where United Airlines, Inc. filed a motion to have the default judgment set aside. The Circuit Court of Hinds County denied the "motion to set aside the default judgment, quash process, and dismiss".5 United Airlines, Inc. appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, where McCubbins I remains pending as United Airlines, Inc. v. McCubbins , 2017–TS–00154.

2. McCubbins II

The instant case, (McCubbins II ), was filed by McCubbins in an effort to ensure that the correct entity was being sued and to toll the statute of limitations. This case was originally filed in the First Judicial District of Hinds County Circuit Court, cause no. 25CI1:16–cv–0098–JAW. The principal parties are the same in McCubbins I and McCubbins II , but the new Complaint identifies United Airlines, Inc., by its correct corporate name and adds United Continental Holdings, Inc., as a defendant. Some additional fictitious defendants are named in both cases who have not yet been served, and in some instances have not been identified. The Complaint contains essentially the same claims as were made in McCubbins I , with the one notable exception which will be discussed below. On February 16, 2016, United Airlines, Inc., and United Continental Holdings, Inc., (together, the "Defendants") removed this case to this federal district court.

This Court conducted a hearing on November 9, 2016, whereat the parties appeared, and this Court heard oral arguments. At the time of the hearing, McCubbins I had a motion pending before the Circuit Court of Hinds...

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