McCue v. C-Tran
| Decision Date | 12 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 28153-8-II.,28153-8-II. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SHERRIE McCUE, RITA WOOD, CHERYL BENBOE, JEREMY SUE EASTHAM, JOHN FIELDER, and ROBERT COLLINS, Appellants and Cross Respondents, v. C-TRAN and KEITH PARKER, Respondents and Cross Appellants. |
Appeal from Superior Court of Clark County Docket No: 01-2-01688-5 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 11/28/2001.
Margaret Scully Olney, Smith Gamson Diamond & Olney, Portland, OR, Counsel for Appellant(s).
Elizabeth Rose Butle Kennar, Summit Law Group, Seattle, WA, Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
Otto G. III Klein, Summit Law Group PLLC, Seattle, WA, Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Six former paratransit workers assign error to the trial court order dismissing their claims against C-TRAN and its chief executive office (CEO), Keith Parker, arguing procedural error. C-TRAN and Parker cross-appeal on procedural and substantive grounds. We affirm.
C-TRAN, a public employer under RCW 41.56.030(1),1 provides fixed route public transportation services in Clark County. C-TRAN subcontracted with Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc., to provide paratransit services.
In spring 1999, the Amalgamated Transit Union Division 757 (ATU) bargained with C-TRAN on behalf of all C-TRAN and Laidlaw operators. As a result, C-TRAN and the ATU ratified a new collective bargaining agreement, effective July 1, 1999. C-TRAN then cancelled its contract with Laidlaw, choosing instead to bring paratransit services `in-house' as of that date. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 75.During negotiations before the contract ratification, the parties entered into an oral `transfer agreement' under which C-TRAN agreed that all former Laidlaw employees would be laterally transferred to C-TRAN according to seniority. The oral agreement also required that the employees pass a character reference, criminal background and fingerprint check, and drug screen. The oral agreement was neither reduced to writing nor incorporated into the ratified collective bargaining agreement.
After completing the screening, and in reply to an ATU request, C-TRAN's CEO Parker told the ATU that six former Laidlaw employees, Sherrie McCue, Rita Wood, Cheryl Benboe, Jeremy Sue Eastham, John Fielder, and Robert Collins (Employees) would not be transferred because they failed the criminal background check. In response, the Employees and the ATU filed an unfair labor practice claim with the Public Employee Relations Commission (PERC). PERC dismissed the claim because it was a contract grievance and not an unfair labor practice claim subject to its jurisdiction.
The Employees then sued C-TRAN and Parker (hereafter referred to collectively as C-TRAN) for breach of the oral employment contract. In their complaint, the Employees twice referred to the ATU as their exclusive bargaining representative.
C-TRAN brought a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Employees' claims under the statute of frauds, RCW 19.36.010,2 and the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, chapter 41.56 RCW. It argued that the alleged agreement was unenforceable because it was not reduced to writing and that it was barred by the collective bargaining agreement. It further argued that the Employees' claims against Parker must be dismissed because he was not a party to the alleged oral agreement.
In an April 3, 2001 written ruling, the trial court determined that the ATU was the Employees' exclusive bargaining representative as confirmed by two paragraphs in the Employees' complaint.3 It further determined that the negotiations between the ATU and the Employees were within RCW 41.56.030(4)'s definition of `collective bargaining.' CP at 182-83. Therefore, the trial court reasoned that the oral agreement was unenforceable.
On April 18, the trial court signed an order incorporating its letter ruling and dismissing the Employees' claims without prejudice. The Employees neither moved for reconsideration of nor appealed that order.
The Employees then filed a second complaint against C-TRAN, alleging common law breach of contract and also defamation by Parker. But in this complaint, the Employees deleted any reference to the ATU as their exclusive bargaining representative.
C-TRAN moved to dismiss the second complaint under CR 12(b)(6), arguing (1) that there was inadequate consideration or, in the alternative, any contract could have been only for at-will employment; (2) res judicata as to claims against Parker; and (3) lack of publication of the alleged defamatory remark.4
In ruling on the motion, the trial court noted that CP at 53. The trial court then dismissed the common law breach of contract and defamation claims as barred by res judicata. With regard to the other arguments, the trial court determined that there was sufficient consideration to support a contract and this potentially entitled the Employees to just cause protection.
The Employees appeal the trial court's dismissal of their claims. C-TRAN cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly converted its CR 12(b)(6) motion into a CR 56 motion, erred in finding that adequate consideration supports the contract, and erred in not holding that C-TRAN could revoke an alleged offer to hire for at-will employment.
C-TRAN cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in deciding that the Employees' oral contract claim was supported by consideration and in not deciding that C-TRAN could revoke its offer to hire, thus barring the breach of contract claim. Because we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Employee's claims on other grounds, we do not address C-TRAN's cross-appeal that the trial court erred in finding adequate consideration supported the oral side agreement and entitled the Employees to `just cause' protection.
We begin with the procedural issue raised on cross appeal: Did the trial court properly convert C-TRAN's CR 12(b)(6) judgment on the pleadings motion into a CR 56 summary judgment motion? C-TRAN argues that because the trial court reviewed only the letter ruling and order on the first dismissal, it was unnecessary and improper to convert the matter to CR 56 summary judgment.
CR 12(b) provides in part:
If, on a motion asserting {a CR 12(b)(6)} defense . . . to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by rule 56.
Here, there was no need to convert the motion to dismiss on the pleadings into one for summary judgment because the operative facts were undisputed, the core issue was one of law, and whatever else might have been presented would not have changed the motion's disposition. Ortblad v. State, 85 Wn.2d 109, 111, 530 P.2d 635 (1975). Thus, the trial court unnecessarily converted the motion to one for summary judgment. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to whether the Employees failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. CR 12(b)(6).
The Employees first contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims on res judicata grounds.5 They make three arguments to support their contention: (1) res judicata must be affirmatively pleaded and that the court cannot raise it sua sponte; (2) a dismissal without prejudice is not a final judgment for res judicata purposes; and (3) res judicata does not bar the defamation claim.
Even assuming, without so holding, that the trial court erred in applying res judicata,6 we may nevertheless affirm its dismissal on other grounds. Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wn.2d 726, 730, 903 P.2d 455 (1995) ().
As to the breach of contract claim, the pleadings demonstrate that there was an oral agreement not reduced to writing, violating the statute of frauds, RCW 19.36.010. Simply put, because their alleged contract violates the statute of frauds, the Employees cannot establish a cause of action for breach of the oral agreement.
As to the defamation claim, the Employees must show four essential elements: (1) falsity, (2) an unprivileged communication, (3) fault, and (4) damages and publication to one other than the alleged defamed. Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wn.2d 687-701, 24 P.3d 390 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Commodore v. Univ. Mech. Contractors, Inc., 120 Wn.2d 120, 133, 839 P.2d 314 (1992). Here, the Employees...
To continue reading
Request your trial