McCune v. F. Alioto Fish Co.
| Decision Date | 30 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 77-2111,77-2061 and 77-1939,s. 77-2111 |
| Citation | 597 F.2d 1244 |
| Parties | 26 UCC Rep.Serv. 912 Glen A. McCUNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. F. ALIOTO FISH COMPANY, a corporation, Rowe Machine Works, Inc., a corporation, Defendants-Appellees. Glen A. McCUNE, Plaintiff, v. F. ALIOTO FISH COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff/Appellant, v. ROWE MACHINE WORKS, INC., a corporation, Third Party Defendant/Appellee. Glen A McCUNE, Plaintiff, v. F. ALIOTO FISH COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff/Appellee, v. ROWE MACHINE WORKS, INC., a corporation, Third Party Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Eric L. Henrikson, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
John F. Meadows, Frederick W. Wentker, Thomas J. Boyle, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
Before CHOY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and WYATT, * District Judge.
I. Statement of the Case
On March 29, 1973, McCune filed a complaint in district court alleging that he was injured while working aboard the Mineo Brothers, a fishing vessel owned by F. Alioto Fish Co. (Alioto) and operated out of San Francisco Bay and Eureka, California. McCune's complaint alleged that he was injured due to Alioto's failure to keep the Mineo Brothers in seaworthy condition and because of Alioto's negligence.
Only three persons were on board the Mineo Brothers at the time of McCune's injury: Wilson, master of the vessel; Farnham, a deck hand; and McCune, also a deck hand. The injury occurred when McCune's foot was caught by an unshielded moving part of a winch used during fishing operations. McCune was attempting to dislodge a "dog" or pawl which had become wedged tightly in the teeth of a sprocket on the drum of the winch, jamming the winch, when he was injured. As a result of the accident, McCune lost two toes.
On May 12, 1973, Farnham died. McCune did not have Alioto served with his complaint until February 1974. About three months later, Alioto sent a letter to Rowe Machine Works, Inc. (Rowe), the manufacturer of the winch, tendering defense of the case to Rowe. In November 1974, Alioto filed a third party indemnity claim against Rowe under Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a). The indemnity claim set forth three theories of recovery: negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability. The indemnity cause was severed in February 1975.
In April and May of 1975, Alioto concluded the following agreement (the Hartford Agreement, after the name of Alioto's insurance carrier) with McCune:
(1) Defendant will pay $50,000 to Davis (McCune's attorney) as trustee in return for McCune's and Davis's covenant not to execute against F. Alioto Fish Company . . . in any amount should judgment be rendered against F. Alioto Fish Company in the pending suit . . . . The sum of $50,000 shall not be repaid to defendant, however, if plaintiff fails to obtain judgment against defendant or recovers a judgment against defendant in an amount less than $50,000.
(2) As part of the consideration for plaintiff's covenant not to execute, defendant agreed to remain in the lawsuit through judgment and any appeal, with the undersigned as counsel, ostensibly to defend F. Alioto Fish Company, and to pursue its indemnity action against Rowe Machine Works, Inc. Defendant is also to attempt to bring Rowe into the action under Rule 14(c), FRCP.
Pursuant to the Hartford Agreement, Alioto sought to amend its third party complaint to state a 14(c) claim against Rowe. 1 McCune also amended his complaint to state a cause of action directly against Rowe on theories of breach of warranty and strict products liability.
Rowe moved to dismiss McCune's complaint against it on the ground of laches on January, 19, 1976, about six months after the amended complaints against it were filed. Although the district court found McCune's delay in naming and serving Rowe to be unreasonable and inexcusable, it concluded that Rowe had not demonstrated that it had suffered prejudice from the delay. The motion was denied without prejudice.
Subsequently, on May 11, 1976, the district court entered an order dismissing McCune's complaint against Rowe, reversing its position on the question of prejudice to Rowe due to McCune's delay. At the same time, the court also ordered the following claims dismissed: Alioto's 14(c) claim against Rowe, Rowe's cross claim for indemnity and contribution against Alioto, and McCune's claim against Alioto. The court stated that its May 11 order was not a final judgment and refused Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification on June 10, 1976.
Alioto's previously severed Rule 14(a) claim for indemnity came on for trial on June 21, 1976. After trial, the district court ultimately concluded that Alioto's indemnity claim was barred by laches and that, in any event, Alioto was not entitled to indemnity or contribution on the facts of this case.
II. McCune's Appeal
McCune appeals from the district court's dismissal of his claims against Alioto and Rowe. He also urges that the Hartford Agreement be set aside.
While the district court provided no rationale for its dismissal of McCune's complaint against Alioto, it is well-established that if any ground exists which would support a judgment, we must affirm. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 1001 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1978). We conclude, as a matter of law, that the Hartford Agreement renders McCune's complaint against Alioto moot, and that the district court therefore properly dismissed the claim.
McCune sought only money damages from Alioto in redress of his injuries. The Hartford Agreement provided that McCune, in exchange for $50,000 and Alioto's promise to attempt to bring Rowe into the suit by way of a Rule 14(c) claim, would not seek any money from Alioto in redress of his injuries. The Agreement also provided that the money was McCune's to keep even if the court decided that he was entitled to less than $50,000 after trial of his "claim." The concrete controversy between McCune and Alioto whether Alioto owed McCune any money and, if so, how much was thus eliminated by the Hartford Agreement. 2 McCune does not stand either to gain or to lose from pursuing his "claim" against Alioto. Under these circumstances, the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain the claim, for there was no concrete case or controversy between McCune and Alioto. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 39, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (); Construction Industry Association v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1975) (), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1148, 47 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); 13 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3530 at 168, § 3533 (1975). Hence, we affirm the dismissal of McCune's complaint against Alioto. 3
The district court found that McCune's claim against Rowe was barred by laches. McCune attacks the order of dismissal on three grounds, asserting that the district court erred in (1) failing to meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and 52(a) as to findings of fact, (2) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the laches defense, and (3) finding that laches barred his claim. We reject these assignments of error.
Rule 41(b) requires that the district court make findings of fact in accordance with Rule 52(a) when it enters a judgment on the merits of a case. See note 3 Supra. Dismissal of a claim on the ground that it is barred by laches is an adjudication on the merits. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Therefore, McCune is correct in asserting that the district court's dismissal of his claim against Rowe must have been supported by findings of fact sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 52(a). However, we cannot agree with McCune that the district court failed to meet the Rule 52(a) requirements when it dismissed his claim against Rowe.
In order to prevail upon a laches defense, a party must establish that there has been inexcusable delay and prejudice to it as a result of that delay. See Espino v. Ocean Cargo Line, Ltd., 382 F.2d 67, 69 (9th Cir. 1967). In its order dismissing McCune's claim against Rowe, the district court expressly found that McCune had unreasonably and inexcusably delayed and that McCune's delay prejudiced Rowe. The court also referred to its earlier findings of fact in Rowe's initial motion for dismissal which discussed McCune's delay and the effects of that delay in great detail. Finally, the district court explicitly stated that its order of dismissal was not a final judgment; and prior to entering final judgment as to all claims in this case, it made further detailed findings on delay and the prejudice to Rowe resulting from that delay.
Not all of the findings of fact necessary to support a judgment or order need appear in a single document. Rayonier, Inc. v. Polson, 400 F.2d 909, 922-23 (9th Cir. 1968). Here, looking to the whole record, and specifically to the three sets of findings made by the district court, we find findings of fact sufficiently explicit to give us a clear understanding of the basis of the court's decision. See Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1975); Handeland v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1975); Henry C. Beck Co. v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 456 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1972); Rayonier, Inc. v. Polson, 400 F.2d at 923; Dale Benz, Inc. v. American Casualty...
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