McCune v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 17 June 1970
• Docket Number: No. 24,A,No. 38709,24,38709
• Citation: 237 So.2d 169
• Parties: Marion C. McCUNE, Petitioner, v. J. I. WILSON, as Chairman, and Earl Keefer, Frank J. Anderson, Gordon H Moyer, Jr., Charles W. Foglesong, William B. Smith, and Harry D. Fleming, Jr., as Members of the Professional Ethics Committee, South Florida Chaptermerican Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 169

237 So.2d 169

Marion C. McCUNE, Petitioner, v. J. I. WILSON, as Chairman, and Earl Keefer, Frank J. Anderson, Gordon H Moyer, Jr., Charles W. Foglesong, William B. Smith, and Harry D. Fleming, Jr., as Members of the Professional Ethics Committee, South Florida Chapter No. 24, American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, Respondents.

No. 38709.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 17, 1970.

Rehearing Denied July 17, 1970.

E. F. P. Brigham, of Brigham & Brigham, and Darrey A. Davis, of Scott, McCarthy, Steel, Hector & Davis, Miami, for petitioner.

G. David Parrish, Welsh & Carroll, and Horton & Schwartz, Miami, for respondents.

ADKINS, Justice.

We issued writ of certiorari under F.A.R. 2.1, subd. a(5)(b), 32 F.S.A. to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, 222 So.2d 230, which conflicts with the other appellate decisions in this State concerned with the nature of memberships and interests in nonpublic organizations which are entitled to protection by the courts. The District Court decision reversed the opinion of the Circuit Court of Dade County, and approved disciplinary proceedings undertaken against petitioner.

This case arose when respondents, members of the Professional Ethics Committee of South Florida Chapter No. 24, of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, a nonprofit foreign corporation chartered in Illinois, initiated disciplinary proceedings against petitioner McCune. Petitioner sought an injunction in the Circuit Court against continuation of the proceedings against him.

After pleadings, the Circuit Court concluded that the Chapter is a professional organization and not a purely private social club, that as a professional organization it must observe due process and fairness required by Florida law in its disciplinary proceedings, and that the Ethics Committee failed to adhere to fair standards set out in its own procedural regulations in acting against petitioner in that the Committee failed to give fair and adequate notice, failed to give notice of charges with adequate particularity, and otherwise failed to provide a fair and impartial hearing. The Circuit Court held that due to these procedural due process defects, the Ethics Committee and the Chapter lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the case against petitioner on the charges made.

The District Court of Appeal reversed, with one Judge dissenting, and held that the Chapter is not a professional organization in which due process requirements must be observed. The dissenting judge concluded that the Institute is a professional organization which must observe due process standards of fairness and that the trial court's decision should be affirmed. The majority of the District Court stated:

'(I)f the association or organization involved in the instant proceeding were one of a quasi-judicial or administrative agency of the State, we would not hesitate to affirm the action of the trial judge. Or, if the actions being taken by an association or agency should result in the disciplined member being prevented from engaging in his chosen profession or occupation in this State, we would not hesitate to affirm the action of the trial judge. However, this cause does not involve such an association or agency. The Institute involved in the instant proceeding is a mere voluntary organization, and the appellee will not be prohibited from practicing his chosen occupation or profession by virtue of any disciplinary action that might ultimately be taken by the Institute.' (page 232)

As this language makes clear, it is the view of the District Court that before judicial relief will lie, the breach of due process or the unfairness must be one involving a state agency, or if a private agency must be such as to result in prohibiting the individual from earning a living.

This standard is in conflict with rules announced in prior decisions by courts of this State.

In Grand Lodge K. of P. of Florida v. Taylor, 79 Fla. 441, 84 So. 609 (Fla.1920), this Court said that although no cause of action exists at law for expulsion from a voluntary beneficial society, the courts will offer redress if such expulsion deprives such member of a property right. Accord, Taite v. Bradley, 151 So.2d 474 (Fla.App.1st, 1963).

In Sult v. Gilbert, 3 So.2d 729 (Fla.1941), this Court recognized additional grounds. The Court held that courts would not intervene in disciplinary actions of an organization against a member 'unless some civil or contractual right is involved.' (p. 731) The Court noted that judicial review will not lie to protect 'natural' or political rights, within private organizations.

In State ex rel. Barfield v. Florida Yacht Club, 106 So.2d 207 (Fla.App.1st, 1958), the First District Court examined the nature of private organization which would or would not justify judicial intervention. Said that Court:

'There is a valid distinction between those institutions such as trade unions, professional associations or trading exchanges and like organizations, affecting a persons's right to earn a living on one hand, and private social clubs on the other. Certain conduct, which might not justify expulsion from some other type of association, Where membership is a condition to earning a livelihood, or essential to the enjoyment of a contract or property right, may justify expulsion from a private social club.' (Emphasis supplied) (p. 209)

'We agree that the courts should leave to the members of a private social club or to the proper board to which the members have lawfully delegated that power, the right to determine whether the action of a member has been such that, in the opinion of such Board, it would interfere with the pleasant, friendly and congenial social relationship between the members. In the absence of a clear allegation and convincing proof, in the case reaches that stage, Of fraud or bad faith, the action of the members or...