McCurdy v. Gage

Decision Date14 March 1934
Docket NumberNo. 1749-6586.,1749-6586.
Citation69 S.W.2d 56
PartiesMcCURDY et al. v. GAGE et al.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Suit by T. L. Bray and wife against W. L. McCurdy and others, in which defendants filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs and J. H. Gage and others. An order overruling a motion to vacate orders appointing a receiver and granting an injunction was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals , and the orders appointing receiver and granting injunction were dissolved, and defendant McCurdy and others bring error.

Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.

H. G. Corbin, of Gladewater, and W. Edward Lee, of Longview, for plaintiffs in error.

Graves & Long, of Dallas, and Black & Graves, of Austin, for defendants in error.

SHARP, Judge.

This case presents a controversy between two district courts of this state. A suit was filed in the district court of Gregg county by certain parties to cancel a certain mineral lease and instruments executed thereunder. Later, a suit was also filed in the district court of Dallas county by other parties to adjudicate certain mineral interests, and a receiver was appointed, who, acting under the authority of the court, drilled and operated on oil well. Subsequent to the appointment of the receiver by the district court of Dallas county, the pleadings in the district court of Gregg county were amended and new parties brought in, and that court also appointed a receiver to take over the property in possession and under the control and management of the receiver first appointed by the district court of Dallas county, and, in addition thereto, issued a writ of injunction forbidding any interference with the receiver appointed by the district court of Gregg county.

In due time, J. H. Gage and a number of the defendants in the cross-action and the receiver appointed by the district court of Dallas county filed their motion to vacate the orders appointing the receiver and granting the injunction, which was heard by the district court of Gregg county and overruled. From this ruling, Gage and others prosecuted their appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals at Texarkana, and the Court of Civil Appeals held that the motion made to vacate the orders appointing the receiver and granting the injunction should have been granted and such orders dissolved. 60 S.W.(2d) 468.

A writ of error was granted in this case upon the proposition that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the district court of Gregg county was without jurisdiction to issue the writs of injunction complained of, since the district court of Dallas county had appointed a receiver in a proceeding filed therein subsequent to the filing of a suit including the same subject-matter in the district court of Gregg county.

The following controlling facts appear: On November 24, 1931, T. L. Bray and wife filed suit in the district court of Gregg county against W. L. McCurdy and others to cancel a certain mineral lease which had been executed by Bray and wife to certain of the defendants. The plaintiffs in that case alleged that the lease was placed in escrow and was never delivered, and possession of the lease was obtained through fraudulent means. The lease covered about four acres of land in the town of Gladewater, in Gregg county. They also alleged that their property was being drained by drilling operations on adjacent premises, and that, because of the recording of the lease, they were unable to enter into a contract with any one else for the protection of their property, and for that reason they were damaged in the sum of $10,000. It was also alleged that certain assignments of interests under said lease had been made to other persons who were joined as defendants. The prayer was to have the lease and all subsequent executed instruments growing out of the original lease canceled because of the fraud committed on the plaintiffs and for recovery of the $10,000 in damages.

On April 1, 1932, Bray and wife filed their amended petition. It is practically the same as the original petition, except that new defendants were joined and the instruments under which the new defendants claimed were described. This all grew out of the original lease sought to be canceled. The prayer of the amended petition was substantially the same as that contained in the original petition.

On April 8, 1932, T. J. Holcombe, who was not a party to the suit pending in the district court of Gregg county, filed a suit in the district court of Dallas county against J. H. Gage and many others who were not parties in the Gregg county suit, and also against many plaintiffs and defendants in the case pending in Gregg county. It was alleged that plaintiff and defendants in that cause were the owners of all the minerals, royalties, etc., under a certain 3.7-acre tract of land conveyed by T. L. Bray and wife by warranty deed to J. H. Gage. The interests of all the parties interested in the mineral rights were specifically alleged, and it was sought to have an adjudication of such interests in the land and a distribution of the proceeds derived from the sale of the minerals produced from the premises. It was also alleged, because of conflicting claims to the mineral lease on the land, the plaintiff and the other owners of an interest in the minerals were unable to secure development of the property, and that the minerals were being drained by wells on adjacent tracts to the damage of those rightfully entitled thereto, and would continue to be drained unless a receiver should be appointed to take charge and develop the land. The court appointed a receiver who was duly qualified and took possession of the property and, with authority of the court, caused a well to be drilled on the land and was running the oil therefrom until stopped by an order issued by the district court of Gregg county. This record does not show that a plea in abatement setting up the pendency of the suit in Gregg county has been filed therein or that any steps have been taken by any of the parties in the district court of Dallas county to have the order appointing the receiver vacated.

On April 15, 1932, the Independent Supply Company filed an answer in the cause pending in Gregg county, and, in addition to a general demurrer and general denial, filed a cross-action therein for a foreclosure of a materialman's lien alleging that, under a contract with George E. Bobb, he was in possession of the leasehold estate of the 4 acres of land, and was entitled to a lien thereon by reason of having furnished certain material.

On December 17, 1932, W. L. McCurdy and several other defendants in the case pending in the district court of Gregg county filed their amended answer and cross-action making the plaintiffs in the Gregg county suit and all of the parties to the suit in the Dallas county case, as well as the attorneys and the receiver appointed by the district court of Dallas county, defendants in the cross-action filed in Gregg county. McCurdy and others alleged that on November 24, 1931 they were the owners of an oil and gas lease on the land involved and were in possession of the property, but on that date the defendants in the cross-action unlawfully entered upon and dispossessed them of such premises and the leasehold estate and withheld from them the possession thereof, to their damage in the sum of $5,000. They prayed for a judgment for title and possession and for a writ of restitution of the premises. It was further alleged in the cross-action that the district court in Dallas county unlawfully appointed a receiver for the property, and that such receiver is running the oil from the well on the land and appropriating the proceeds from the sale to his own use, etc. They prayed for the appointment of a receiver by the district court of Gregg county to take charge of all property and for the issuance of an injunction against all parties involved in the suit pending in the district court of Dallas county and the attorneys therein from prosecuting that suit, until the further orders of the district court of Gregg county, and also prayed that the receiver appointed by the district court of Dallas county be enjoined from exercising any control whatever over the property and compelling him to turn over the property, books, receipts, etc., to the receiver to be appointed by the district court in Gregg county. On this application the district court of Gregg county, without notice to defendants in the cross-action, appointed the receiver and authorized him to take immediate possession of all the property, assets, books, contracts, and documents of the receiver, relating to said property, and that he was authorized to operate said well, make contracts with reference thereto, and collect the revenue derived therefrom, and, in addition, granted the injunction prohibiting any one from interfering with the receiver.

Plaintiffs in error contend that the suit filed in the district court of Gregg county involved the same subject-matter embraced in the suit filed in the district court of Dallas county, and, since both courts were of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the dominant jurisdiction of the subject-matter was acquired by the district court of Gregg county, to the exclusion of all other courts.

On the other hand, defendants in error...

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