McCutchen v. City of Montclair
| Decision Date | 29 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. E022025,E022025 |
| Citation | 73 Cal.App.4th 1138,87 Cal.Rptr.2d 95 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6116, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7799 Thomas McCUTCHEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF MONTCLAIR et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
O P I N I O N
While on Christmas leave from the U.S. Army, plaintiff Thomas McCutchen was arrested and spent nearly four months in jail on the charge of rape with a foreign object. However, the prosecution on its own motion dismissed charges against him before the case went to trial. Upon his release from confinement, plaintiff filed a complaint against, inter alia, the complaining witness Tracy G. (hereafter, "the complaining witness"), arresting police officer Ron Pipersky, the City of Montclair (hereafter "City"), and the County of San Bernardino (hereafter, "County"). His complaint included claims for (1) violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, (2) false arrest, (3) negligence, (4) negligent employment, training, and supervision, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (6) defamation. The trial court denied defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings but later granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all causes of action, and plaintiff appealed. Defendants then cross-appealed.
As we explain below, we conclude that the trial court was correct in denying defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, we also conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on all causes of action.
On December 23, 1993, the complaining witness reported to the Montclair Police Department that at approximately 9:37 in the evening, she was sexually assaulted by an unknown man, as she was going through the automatic double doors at the upper level of a shopping mall located in the City of Montclair. Officer Pipersky was dispatched to the complaining witness's residence in Upland to take her statement. Although the complaining witness was visibly distressed, she managed to give Officer Pipersky a description of her attacker that included his age, weight, build, eye color, skin complexion, hair length, and facial hair. She also described the assailant's clothing.
On December 24, 1993, while Officer Pipersky was on patrol in the City of Montclair, he observed plaintiff and plaintiff's sister walking down the street. Apparently, plaintiff attracted his attention because he was wearing a shirt that generally matched the description given by the complaining witness. Upon striking up a casual conversation with plaintiff, Officer Pipersky noticed that plaintiff's eye color and build also matched the description given by the complaining witness. Officer Pipersky told plaintiff that he matched the description of a suspect in a rape case and asked plaintiff to come to the police station to take a picture. Plaintiff agreed and, upon arriving at the station, Officer Pipersky took his photograph. When Officer Pipersky asked plaintiff about his whereabouts on the night of December 23, plaintiff told Officer Pipersky that he was at the house of a friend, Mark Gryder, until about 9:30 p.m., at which point Gryder gave him a ride home. Officer Pipersky immediately contacted Gryder, who stated that plaintiff left his house at 8:30 p.m. and walked home. Officer Pipersky once again asked plaintiff his whereabouts on the night in question, and plaintiff repeated that Gryder drove him home at approximately 9:30 p.m. Two days later, plaintiff's photo appeared in a photo lineup shown to the complaining witness. The complaining witness identified plaintiff as the person who sexually assaulted her. At that point, Officer Pipersky arrested plaintiff. After the arrest, Officer Pipersky interviewed plaintiff, who stated that he did in fact leave Gryder's house at 8:30 p.m., walked home, and listened to CD's with his sister until 11 p.m. Subsequently, his mother; sister; and another friend, Ted Darland, confirmed his alibi.
Plaintiff was charged with a violation of Penal Code section 289. After his arrest, the complaining witness identified him as the perpetrator in two live lineups conducted at the jail. On February 14, 1994, the municipal court conducted a preliminary hearing and ruled that there was probable cause to try plaintiff on the rape charge. Subsequently, plaintiff moved to suppress the photo lineup identification. On April 20, 1994, the trial court conducted a hearing on plaintiff's motion and decided to suppress the photo lineup identification, although the court ruled that the subsequent in-court identifications were admissible. On April 21, 1994, before jury selection started, the prosecution made a motion to dismiss the charges against plaintiff, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff was immediately released from confinement.
On November 21, 1994, plaintiff filed the instant complaint against Officer Pipersky the complaining witness, City, and County. It included the following causes of action: (1) a false arrest claim against all defendants; (2) a negligence claim against City and County; (3) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against all defendants; (4) a negligent employment, training, supervision, and retention claim against City and County; (5) a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (hereafter, "section 1983") claim against all defendants; and (6) a defamation claim against the complaining witness.
On January 3, 1997, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that a finding of probable cause to try plaintiff on the rape charge collaterally estopped plaintiff's civil suit. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment on all causes of action, which the trial court granted on November 26, 1997. Plaintiff timely appealed. Defendants timely cross-appealed from the denial of the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the false arrest claim; the section 1983 claim; the negligence claim; and the negligent employment, supervision, and retention claim. 1 On cross-appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings because plaintiff was collaterally estopped from bringing this civil action.
In part I of the opinion, we address the collateral estoppel issue raised by defendants on cross-appeal. In part II of the opinion, we address the grant of summary judgment on various causes of actions presented by plaintiff's complaint.
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings. They point out that the trial court in plaintiff's criminal prosecution ruled there was probable cause to hold him over for trial. Based upon that ruling, defendants argue that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes plaintiff from challenging the validity of his arrest for lack of evidence to support it. Plaintiff responds that the ruling at the preliminary hearing does not have preclusive effect on this civil suit because the issue of probable cause to arrest was not actually litigated or necessarily decided at the preliminary hearing. Plaintiff also contends that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case because of the long-standing rule that an order dismissing criminal charges after a preliminary hearing does not have res judicata effect on future criminal prosecution on the same charges. (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 668, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657, 511 P.2d 609.) He argues that this rule should be extended in this case because a magistrate conducting a preliminary hearing is not a bona fide judge and does not have the power to decide any issue pertaining to the merits of the case, such as the issue of probable cause to arrest.
After plaintiff was arrested and charged with rape, the municipal court conducted a preliminary hearing. The only witness called by the prosecution was the complaining witness, and the only witness called by the defense was Officer Pipersky. During cross-examination, the complaining witness admitted that after the photo lineup she also identified plaintiff as her assailant at two subsequent live lineups conducted at the jail. After receiving testimony from both witnesses, the trial court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to hold plaintiff over for trial. Plaintiff never appealed the decision to hold him over for trial. Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to dismiss all charges against plaintiff.
On appeal, we review the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard of review as the decision to sustain or overrule a demurrer. (Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1803-1804, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 282.) Our standard of review is de novo, i.e., we exercise our independent judgment about whether, assuming the truth of the pleadings, the complaint states a cause of action. (Ibid.; Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125, 271 Cal.Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479.)
The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is a secondary form of res judicata. (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 477, fn. 6, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.) It prevents a party who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a particular issue in a prior proceeding from relitigating it in a subsequent proceeding. (7 Witkin, Cal....
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