McCutchen v. Windsor

• Decision Date: 31 January 1874
• Citation: 55 Mo. 149
• Parties: J. D. MCCUTCHEN, Respondent, v. T. A. WINDSOR, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

55 Mo. 149

J. D. MCCUTCHEN, Respondent,

v.T. A. WINDSOR, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

January Term, 1874.

Appeal from Cooper Circuit Court.

Hayden & Thompkins, for Appellant.

“If the defendants as directors of the sub-district employed plaintiff as teacher, they had the right in their official capacity in behalf of the sub-district to discharge him, and are not personally liable for such act.” The power to manage and control the local interests and affairs of the sub-district is vested in the directors by statute. (Wagn. Stat., 1243, § 7.) It is a broad and general power without qualification, embracing in its range the employment of teachers, and the necessary incident or implied power of removing them whenever the directors may deem it wise or prudent to do so. Being thus in vested with such power, the exercise of it is a duty enjoined by law, and the extent of its exercise is measured by the judgment or discretion of the directors on the emergency in any particular case calling for its exercise. The power of dismissal or removal of teachers in the school law, under which the appellants acted in removing the respondent, is general, and without any of the limitations or conditions prescribed by the law of 1865. (Gen. Stat., 258, § 6.) The law under which they acted also constitutes, and is a part of, the contract made between the appellants as directors, and the respondent as teacher, and his removal worked no wrong which is actionable. (See Gildersleeve vs. Board of Education, 17 Ab. Pr., 201; Rumford vs. Wood, 13 Mass., 199.)

If the directors exceeded their power (which is by no means admitted), and such excess resulted from error of judgment, or mistake, or misapprehension, and not from fraud or malice (of which there is no evidence), then they certainly are not individually liable. (See 2 Hilliard Torts, [3 Ed.] 415, § 2, notes 4, 5; Smith vs. Poor, 40 Me., 415; Mayor &c., vs. Eschbach, 18 Md., 276; Livermore vs. Freeholders, &c., 5 Dutch., 245; 2 Hilliard Torts, 419, § 4; 3 La., 568; 11 La., 41; Godbold vs. Bank, &c., 11 Ala., 191; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505; 2 Hilliard Torts, 119; Dil. Mun. Corp., 711, § 755, note 1 and authorities cited.)

If they were charged with fraud or malice, it would devolve on the respondent by evidence to prove it. (Reed vs. Conway, 20 Mo., 33; 26 Mo., 16, et seq.,Boisliniere vs. St. Louis County, 32 Mo., 375; Also Dill. Mun. Corp., 214; Wilkes vs. Dinsman, 7 How., 131.)

Draffin & Muir, for Respondent.

I. The local directors of a school sub-district have no power to discharge, at pleasure, a teacher before the expiration of his contract. (Sess. Acts, 1870, p. 141, § 7; Finch vs. Cleveland, 10 Barb., 297.)

II. The directors are liable in damages in their individual capacity for their wrongful conduct in dismissing the plaintiff. (Robinson vs. Dodge, 18 John., 357; 17 Wend., 437; 1 Chitty Pl., 77; Pike vs. Megoun, 44 Mo., 494.)

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action against the defendants, two local directors of a school sub-district in Cooper county. The plaintiff alleged in his petition, that on the 30th day of October, 1871, he, having the proper certificate of qualifications, entered into a contract in writing with the defendants as directors of the sub-district to teach a school for the term of five months, for the sum of fifty dollars per month; that he entered upon the discharge of his duties under the contract, and taught the school for one month; that afterwards, about the 27th of November, 1871, and before the expiration of his contract, the defendants wrongfully, illegally and oppressively, and in the abuse of their official authority, took forcible possession of the school house, and dismissed the plaintiff as teacher, all against the plaintiff's consent, and to his damage, &c.

The main points relied on in the answer were, that the plaintiff was dismissed on account of incompetency, and that the defendant's were acting in an official capacity and were therefore, not individually liable. To this answer a replication was filed. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

In reference to the ground of incompetency, it is only necessary to say, that that question was directly and fairly submitted to the court under proper instructions and found for the plaintiff, and is not reviewable in this court. The only question then is, whether the defendants, in dismissing the plaintiff and forcibly keeping him out of the school house, and thus preventing him from complying with his contract, were in the legal exercise of their official functions, and in consequence thereof are shielded from individual liability.

Whether the directors possess the authority to dismiss a teacher holding a proper certificate of qualifications, or if they have the authority, when they may exercise it, are questions of some difficulty and involved in great doubt. Under the law of 1865 (Gen. Stat., p. 258, § 6,) it is declared, that “it shall be the duty of the school directors in each sub-district to manage and control its local interests and affairs; to employ teachers, to certify the amount due them for services to the township clerk, who shall draw an order on the county treasurer, as hereinafter provided, for the amount; and to dismiss any teacher at any time for such reason as they may deem sufficient; provided, such dismissal shall receive the sanction of the township board.”

In this law the power to dismiss for any reason the directors might deem sufficient is given in express terms. But to provide against its capricious or arbitrary exercise, a revisory or appellate jurisdiction is vested in the township board. It shows unmistakably that the Legislature did not intend that the directors should have the full power to pass sentence of degradation upon a teacher by dismissing him, unless another body should sanction the proceeding, and where a hearing of the case could be had if desired. But under the law of...