McCutcheon v. Brownfield
| Decision Date | 13 April 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 233--40902--1,233--40902--1 |
| Citation | 467 P.2d 868,2 Wn.App. 348 |
| Parties | Rita McCUTCHEON, Guardian of Grace Sandell, a widow, and Arnold Beezer, successor Guardian, Respondents, v. Rita BROWNFIELD, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Clay Nixon, Seattle, for appellant.
Frederic P. Holbrook, Eleanor Edwards, Seattle, for respondents.
Defendant, Rita Brownfield, appeals from a judgment setting aside a deed to her from the plaintiff, Grace Sandell, on the ground of undue influence. The basic question raised is whether substantial evidence supports the findings, conclusions and judgment. For convenience, we shall on occasion refer to Mrs. Sandell as the plaintiff, although a guardian and then a successor guardian were later substituted for the plaintiff.
The record shows there was substantial evidence to support the following statement of the case. Corinthian Corporation v. White & Bollard, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 50, 51, 442 P.2d 950 (1968).
Plaintiff on April 10, 1967, executed, acknowledged and delivered to the defendant a quit claim deed to virtually all of her property. The property consisted principally of a residence in which the plaintiff and defendant and the latter's four children had lived for many years. The children had been brought up principally under the care of the plaintiff. At the time of trial the children had grown and had left the home and the defendant was divorced for the second time and had returned from California to live in an apartment at the residence property. The residence property conveyed was income property and had a value of approximately $85,000. On January 12, 1968, on the petition of Rita McCutcheon, the defendant's daughter, and with plaintiff's consent, the petitioner had been appointed her guardian. The petition alleged and the court found 'that said GRACE SANDELL is not incompetent but at times is unable to handle her own affairs due to her advanced age.' At the time of trial on April 5, 1968, however, plaintiff was incompetent and unable to testify.
There had long been a close and loving relationship between the plaintiff and her daughter as well as between the plaintiff and the four grandchildren. Plaintiff was thrifty, but believed that her daughter was not. There was an incident of a $4,000 mortgage loan obtained by the defendant pursuant to a general power of attorney dated May 11, 1963, delivered by the plaintiff to her daughter for a business venture of the daughter, as a result of which plaintiff had been compelled to pay off the loan from her savings.
It had long been plaintiff's desire to provide for her daughter and her grandchildren, all five of whom plaintiff came to refer to as her children. The intention was especially evident from her prior wills and a written memorandum dated October 19, 1966, directing a change in her 1962 will. Thus, her 1956 will left her property to her daughter for life with full power of disposition except that she was prohibited from giving the property away to persons other than her children, and a remainder interest to the children. Her 1962 will set up a testamentary trust in her property with provisions for the benefit of her daughter, but with a further provision that if her daughter moved from the residence the property was to be divided one-third to her daughter and one-sixth to each of the four grandchildren. The 1966 written memorandum provided that plaintiff's estate should be left to her daughter and grandchildren in equal shares, save that the daughter's share was charged with the $4,000 previously paid by the plaintiff on her mortgage loan. The April 10, 1967, will, executed on the same date as the deed here involved, devised plaintiff's property to her daughter, if living; otherwise to plaintiff's grandchildren and their respective issue by right of representation.
There was medical evidence based on the plaintiff's doctor's observations over a period of several months ending in December, 1967, while the plaintiff was hospitalized with a broken hip, that the plaintiff was a 'typical senile cerebral arteriosclerotic,'; that her condition was a result of a progressive organic disease which had become progressly worse and that in her doctor's opinion 'this has been going on at least for six months to a year and maybe longer, * * *' The doctor testified:
There may be times they are lucid when they first start. And then there are intervals they say things out of context and they are kind of goofy. * * *
He also testified that persons with plaintiff's condition 'are just senile and old' and have Defendant testified that at the date of the deed on April 10, 1967, her mother couldn't take care of the house any more; that she was getting forgetful about paying bills and collecting rents and that at her age she was not capable of handling these matters. Defendant further testified:
Q Had you ever had any discussion prior to that time in relation to the matter of transfer of her property to you?
A Yes, we had talked about this for a number of years. She wanted me always to have the property and at my death it would go to the children, and as the years grew on we talked about it several times, and she wanted to escape probate charges, so finally we just talked about it, decided to go down. She said for me to select a lawyer and she would be glad to have the property deeded over to me with--there was to be no change, she would be there and I would be there and that it would go to the children. That was our idea.
Q This was to be an absolute deed, not a trust?
A No, it was a deed.
Q was your intention at * * * the time of the deed, April 10, * * * '67, that your mother's position in the house would still remain the same? Is that correct?
A Yes, just the same.
Q And her rights in the house would remain just the same?
A Yes, absolutely.
Q And the purpose of the deed as far as you are concerned * * * was to protect your mother's interest?
A Yes, that's true.
Q And you really didn't take the land for yourself?
A That's correct.
Defendant's attorney, selected by her to draft the instruments, testified:
She called me on the telephone and she indicated to me that she and her mother would like to come into my office and have wills drawn up and her mother deed some property to her because her mother was getting old and was unable to take care of her own affairs * * *
Q Did Mrs. Brownfield before--what reason did she give for wanting you to draw up the deed?
A She indicated that her mother was getting old, she was in her 80's or something, and that she was afraid that people would come around and cheat her mother, that her mother had forgotten to pay bills in the past and the sewer district had put a lien on the house or something for not paying the sewer will, and her mother was forgetful at times about paying bills. She put bills in the drawer and would just forget about paying them, and things of that nature.
Defendant's attorney was not originally known to the mother and he never spoke to nor conferred with the mother alone. On April 10, 1967, the daughter brought the mother into the attorney's office to execute a deed and a will for the mother and a will for the daughter already prepared. After an explanation by the attorney, the instruments were executed and the wills witnessed. The attorney testified
Well, it was my understanding that they both wanted a will, and Mrs. Sandell wanted Mrs. Brownfield to have a will leaving everything to the children to insure that the children would have everything after Mrs. Brownfield died.
The will that he prepared for the defendant provided for a life estate in the plaintiff and a remainder interest in the children. He informed the mother 'that the deed and Wills would take care of her worry of insuring that the property would go to the grandchildren.' However, the documents executed did not protect against the possibility of sale, mortgage or other disposition of the property by the defendant during her lifetime or against the possibility that she might revoke her will. The omission to provide this protection was apparently inadvertent but there is no affirmative evidence that plaintiff was informed of the inadequate protection afforded by the documents executed. The evidence is undisputed that prior to the execution of the documents involved, plaintiff did not receive independent legal or tax advice or independent business advice from anyone concerning the nature of the documents or their limitations or their provident or improvident character or as to alternate plans by which to accomplish the protection of the plaintiff during her lifetime and the interests of the defendant and her four children upon the plaintiff's death.
The deed was left in the custody of the daughter's attorney until August, 1967, when the daughter withdrew the deed and had it filed of record. She then mortgaged the property for $7,000, using part of the proceeds for paying the cost of repairs and improvements on the residence property and part of it for personal use including the payment of a personal dental bill.
Sometime later the plaintiff began to express concern to several people including her former son-in-law and her granddaughter, Rita McCutcheon, concerning whatever it was that she had signed. She stated that she wasn't sure what she had signed. In her deposition testimony read into evidence below, she testified that she did not intent to deed the property to her daughter and was not aware that she had done so. There was also evidence from the plaintiff that although she loved her daughter, she was aware of her spendthrift ways and would not wish to dispose of her property in a fashion that would imperil the ability of her grandchildren to receive the property.
Plaintiff, through her...
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