McDaniel v. Colvin, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13-CV-989-O
| Decision Date | 26 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13-CV-989-O |
| Parties | CHRISTI MCDANIEL, PLAINTIFF, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
This case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b). The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Christi McDaniel ("McDaniel") filed this action pursuant to Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of Title 42 of the United States Code for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II, and supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). In April 2011, McDaniel applied for social security benefits, alleging that her disability began on March 1, 2011. (Transcript ("Tr.") 15, 123-32.) Her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, and McDaniel requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 15, 70-84.) An ALJ held a hearing on May 8, 2012 and issued a decision on August 2, 2012 that McDaniel was not disabled. (Tr. 12-25, 32-63.) On October 10, 2013, the Appeals Council denied McDaniel's request for review, leaving the ALJ's decision to stand as the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-3.)
Disability insurance is governed by Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 404 et seq., and SSI benefits are governed by Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., of the SSA. In addition, numerous regulatory provisions govern disability insurance and SSI benefits. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 (disability insurance); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 416 (SSI). Although technically governed by different statutes and regulations, "[t]he law and regulations governing the determination of disability are the same for both disability insurance benefits and SSI." Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994).
The SSA defines a disability as a medically determinable physical or mental impairment lasting at least twelve months that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382(a)(3)(A); McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152,. 154 (5th Cir. 1999). To determine whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to disability benefits, a five-step analysis is employed. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the claimant must not be presently working at any substantial gainful activity. Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity involving the use of significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.972. Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). Third, disability will be found if the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Fourth, if disability cannot be found on the basis of the claimant's medical status alone, the impairment orimpairments must prevent the claimant from returning to her past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any work, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 197, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1999). At steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant to show she is disabled. Crowley, 197 F.3d at 198. If the claimant satisfies this responsibility, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other gainful employment the claimant is capable of performing in spite of her existing impairment. Id.
A denial of disability benefits is reviewed only to determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a responsible mind might accept to support a conclusion. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001). It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id. A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision. Id. This Court may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's but will carefully scrutinize the record to determine if evidence is present. Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000); Hollis, 837 F.2dat 1383.
In her brief, McDaniel presents the following issues:
In his August 2, 2012 decision, the ALJ found that McDaniel met the insured status requirements of the SSA through September 30, 2014 and had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since March 1, 2011, the alleged date of McDaniel's onset of her disability. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ further found that McDaniel suffered from the severe impairments of major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 17.)
Next, the ALJ held that none of McDaniel's impairments, or combination of impairments, met or equaled the severity of any impairments in the Listing. (Tr. 18-20.) As to McDaniel's RFC, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but is limited to simple job tasks involving simple decision making, occasional public contact, and occasional co-worker interaction.
(Tr. 20 (emphasis omitted).) Next, the ALJ found that McDaniel was not able to perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr. 23.) However, because the ALJ found that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that McDaniel could perform, the ALJ concluded that McDaniel was not disabled. (Tr. 24.)
As to Step Two, McDaniel first complains that the ALJ applied the incorrect legal standard in evaluating her impairments of hearing loss and/or obesity. (Pl.'s Br. at 9-11.) Specifically, McDaniel argues that the ALJ erred in failing to apply or cite to the severity standard set forth in Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). (Id.) To evaluate whether a claimant's medical condition qualifies as a "severe impairment" at Step Two of the analysis, the Commissioner has issued regulations that define a "severe impairment" as one that "significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); cf. id. § 404. 1521(a), 416.921(a) (). The Fifth Circuit, however, has held that a literal application of that definition is inconsistent with the statutory language and legislative history of the SSA. See Stone, 752 F.2d at 1104-05. Instead, the Fifth Circuit has established the following standard for determining whether a claimant's impairment is severe: An impairment is not severe only when it is a "slight abnormality" having "such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." Id. at 1101 (emphasis added).
In this case, in setting forth the law regarding the sequential disability evaluation, the ALJ stated the following:
At step two, the undersigned must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that is "severe" or a combination of impairments that is "severe" (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). An impairment or combination of impairments is "severe" within the meaning of the regulations if it significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. An impairment or combination of impairments is "not severe" whenmedical and other evidence establish only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work (20 CFR 404.1521 and 416.921; Social Security Rulings (SSRs) 85-28, 96-3p, and 96-4p). If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, she is not disabled. If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis proceeds to the third step.
(Tr. 16.) In addition, the ALJ stated:
The second step of the sequential evaluation involves determining whether the claimant has a severe impairment, which is defined as an impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits (has more than a minimal effect on) an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. The claimant's conditions produce limitations that meet this definition of "severe," as will be clear from the discussion of the...
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