McDaniel v. Dominium Mgmt. Servs.
| Decision Date | 03 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-cv-01997-RMR-NYW |
| Parties | TONYA MCDANIEL and ASHLEY MCDANIEL, Plaintiffs, v. DOMINIUM MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC and MEL TERRAZAS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (the “Motion” or “Motion to Dismiss”). [Doc. 30, filed February 4, 2022]. This court considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order Referring Case dated February 3, 2022, [Doc. 29], and the Memorandum dated February 7, 2022. [Doc. 32]. The court concludes that oral argument will not materially assist in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, upon review of the Motion, the related briefing, and the applicable case law, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.
The court takes the following facts from the Amended Complaint [Doc. 10] and presumes they are true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs Tonya McDaniel and Ashley McDaniel are Black Hebrew single mothers who practice Judaism and who are eligible for Section 8 housing. [Doc. 10 at 9-11 ¶¶ 4 10].[1] On August 31, 2018, Plaintiffs began the application process to live in an apartment at North Range Crossings, which is a federally funded property operated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). [Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 1 3]. Plaintiffs identified as Black Hebrew Jews on all rental applications submitted to North Range Crossings. [Id. at 4, ¶ 1].
At Plaintiffs' lease signing, staff informed Plaintiffs that North Range Crossings is a smoke-free property. [Id.]. Plaintiffs then told property management that due to their race and religious practices, they burn “various items for ritualistic reasons that would result in smoke, such as candles, sage, smudging, burning incense, spices, herbs, and oils as a form of offering and sacrifice.” [Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 1, 3]. Plaintiffs further explained that denying them the ability to engage in these practices would be a violation of Plaintiffs' religious freedom and housing discrimination laws. [Id. at 5, ¶ 4]. Although property management initially told the Plaintiffs that they would not be able to burn their religious sacrifices on the property management later conceded and permitted Plaintiffs to engage in their rituals. [Id. at 5, ¶ 5].
Plaintiffs allege that for the past two years, they have been the target of retaliation, discrimination, harassment, false allegations, and multiple threats of eviction from North Range Crossings management and staff, which began immediately after Plaintiffs began living at North Range Crossings [Id. at 5, ¶¶ 2, 5-6]. For example, Plaintiffs state that they “have been bombarded with false noise allegation emails repeatedly” and have been threatened with eviction due to those false noise complaints. [Id. at 7, ¶ 13]. However, such noise complaints arose out of “simple noises” such as a dish inadvertently falling, the television, walking on the floor, the washer or dryer running, or Tonya McDaniel's therapeutic art activities. [Id. at 14, ¶ 6]. Plaintiffs state that they have kept a “detailed log of all inciden[ts] in which [they] have been the target” of such harassing conduct. [Id. at 6, ¶ 7]. Plaintiffs assert that they have been targeted on the basis of their race, and further allege that “North Range Crossings” refused to re-sign Plaintiffs' lease due only to their race. [Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 5, 7].
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that they have been treated less favorably than their white neighbors. For instance, Plaintiffs allege that their white first-floor neighbor repeatedly raised noise complaints about Plaintiffs' white second-floor neighbor, but the first-floor neighbor was never prompted by “the office” to file a formal written complaint and the second-floor neighbor was never formally emailed a noise violation complaint. [Id. at 6, ¶ 8]. Instead, the second-floor neighbor was informed of the noise complaints through a mass email “sent to everyone residing in the units.” [Id.]. The second-floor neighbor was further offered “warnings and corrections, ” but was never threatened with eviction, despite the fact that the second-floor neighbor continued to make noise and continued to prompt noise complaints. [Id. at 6, ¶ 9; id. at 7, ¶ 11]. Moreover, Defendant Mel Terrazas (“Ms. Terrazas”)[2] mediated the conflict between the first- and second-floor neighbors and offered each tenant the opportunity to move into a new unit at North Range Crossings. [Id. at 6-7, ¶ 10]. The first-floor neighbor eventually moved into a third-floor unit. [Id. at 7, ¶ 12]. Plaintiffs were not offered mediation or the opportunity to move units and were instead served with a “notice to quit the lease.” [Id. at 7, ¶¶ 11, 13].
Plaintiffs initiated this action pro se on July 22, 2021, naming Ms. Terrazas and Dominium Management Services, LLC (“Dominium”)[3] as Defendants in this matter. [Doc. 1]. After the Honorable Gordon P. Gallagher granted Plaintiffs leave to proceed in forma pauperis, [Doc. 6], and ordered Plaintiffs to file an amended pleading, see [Doc. 9], Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint on November 12, 2021, raising the following claims: (1) a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Claim One”); (2) a claim under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) (“Claim Two”); (3) a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) (“Claim Three”), and (4) a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (“Claim Four”). [Doc. 10 at 3].
On December 2, 2021, Judge Gallagher conducted a preliminary review of the Amended Complaint. See [Doc. 13]. First, Judge Gallagher determined that Claims Three and Four were subject to dismissal and recommended that they be dismissed without prejudice. [Id. at 3-4]. Then, upon finding that Claims One and Two are not appropriate for summary dismissal, Judge Gallagher recommended that those claims be drawn to a presiding judge. [Id.]. The Honorable Lewis T. Babcock accepted the Recommendation on December 23, 2021 and dismissed Claims Three and Four. [Doc. 14 at 1]. The case was then directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. [Id.]. Upon the Parties' decision to decline consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge, see [Doc. 26], the case was re-assigned to the presiding judge, the Honorable Regina M. Rodriguez, and referred to the undersigned. [Doc. 28; Doc. 29].
Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on February 4, 2022, arguing that Claims One and Two should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 30 at 6]. Plaintiffs responded in opposition on March 9, 2022, see [Doc. 52], and Defendants have since replied. [Doc. 57]. The Motion to Dismiss is thus ripe for recommendation, and I consider the Parties' arguments below.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)). Nevertheless, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (). Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) ( that plausibility refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint, ” and that the allegations must be sufficient to nudge a plaintiff's claim(s) “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”).
At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case to survive dismissal. Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff must nevertheless establish a plausible cause of action, and “the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether [the plaintiff] has set forth a plausible claim.” Id. The court must ultimately “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
In applying the above principles, this court is mindful that Plaintiffs proceed pro se and the court thus affords their papers and filings a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). But the court cannot and does not act as their advocate, Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to Plaintiffs as to represented parties. See Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008); Dodson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 878 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012).
Defendants assert numerous arguments in their Motion to Dismiss. First they argue that Plaintiffs' Title VI claim against Ms Terrazas should be dismissed because Title VI does not provide a cause of action against individuals. [Doc. 30 at 7]. Defendants also maintain that Pla...
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